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This dissertation is a study of the literature of Aldous Huxley, especially his 
fiction, with a particular focus on the issue of identity. By observing his representations 
of the self and Others, and by elucidating his attitude towards political and cultural 
problems pertaining to identity, I aim to reveal significant aspects of this topic, which 
have not been fully recognized in recent research on his work. Each chapter offers close 
readings of his texts biographically, historically and theoretically. 
Chapter I, “Self,” sheds light on Huxley’s early writing on the Great War, 
particularly the “Farcical History of Richard Greenow,” disclosing his insights into the 
mind, which are then compared with psychoanalytic discourses on human aggression. 
Chapter II, “Woman,” focuses on Point Counter Point and analyses female characters 
while considering the actual women around the author as well as gender criticism of the 
maternal and the feminine. Chapter III, “Savage,” examines Brave New World by 
contextualizing the Savage Reservation and the hero Savage with their possible sources 
in anthropology in order to align the text with postcolonial concerns. Chapter IV, 
“Mass,” delves into how Huxley deepened his Utopian ideas in his later career, and 
investigates specifically Eyeless in Gaza and Island in relation to Marxist discussions of 
Utopia and totality. 
With his sensitivity and imagination, the novelist Aldous Huxley consistently 
questioned the concept of identity in ways that might now seem postmodernist. 
However, his fear that loss of identity would lead to loss of meaning in life, history and 
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the world prompted him to seek a paradoxical form of identity that was not fixed or 
exclusive, and that was based on his scientific and religious belief in the changing and 




Table of Contents 
 
Abstract-------------------------------------------------------------------------------2 
Table of Contents--------------------------------------------------------------------4 
List of Illustrations------------------------------------------------------------------5 
Acknowledgements-----------------------------------------------------------------6 
Introduction--------------------------------------------------------------------------8 
Chapter I: Self----------------------------------------------------------------------21 
Chapter II: Woman-----------------------------------------------------------------80 
Chapter III: Savage---------------------------------------------------------------124 





List of Illustrations 
 
Fig. 1. Battle of Ginchy-----------------------------------------------------------76 
Fig. 2. Illustration of the Recapitulation---------------------------------------114 
Table 1. Timeline of the World State in Brave New World------------------149 
Fig. 3. San Francisco Call, Vol. 110, No. 130 (8 Oct. 1911), P. 4---------162 
Fig. 4. San Francisco Call, Vol. 110, No. 130 (8 Oct. 1911), P. 5---------163 






Although it was several years ago in Japan that I chose Aldous Huxley as the 
subject of my doctoral research, I mostly put this idea into practice during my thirty-
four months in London. Now in submitting my dissertation to King’s College London, I 
would like to express my appreciation for the following people and organizations. 
First, I offer my heartiest thanks to my supervisor, Professor Max Saunders, 
whose gentleness, gravity and Huxleyan encyclopaedic knowledge assisted me in 
studying and living in an unfamiliar place—unlike the World Controller in Brave New 
World, who brings misfortune upon a visitor to twenty-sixth-century London. I must 
also tender my gratitude to the International Aldous Huxley Society, particularly its 
president, Emeritus Professor Bernfried Nugel (University of Münster). It was indeed 
“an expected pleasure” (BNW, Chapter 3) in my sometimes-dystopian life that my 
original article for the latter part of Chapter III was awarded the Peter Edgerly Firchow 
Memorial Essay Prize. Moreover, I am deeply grateful to my former supervisors—
Emeritus Professor Ai Tanji (University of Tokyo), Professor Yoshiki Tajiri (University 
of Tokyo) and Emeritus Professor Yoshio Inoue (Hitotsubashi University). They have 
effectively educated me by showing their own sincere attitudes towards literature rather 
than by instructing what/how I should do in/with literary studies. My research was 
financially supported by the Japan Student Services Organization (JASSO), without 
whose funding I would not have been able to study in the UK and my dissertation 
would appear in a totally different form, or perhaps even not at all. 
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Last but not least, from the bottom of my heart, I thank my parents for all of their 
emotional support and would like to dedicate this dissertation to them, namely my 
father, the first person who taught me the charm of literature, and my mother, the first 
person who taught me English—even though they know nothing about Huxley and will 





And now at last it was clear, now by some kind of immediate experience he knew that the point 
was in the paradox, in the fact that unity was the beginning and unity the end, and that in the 
meantime the condition of life and all existences was separation, which was equivalent to evil. 
—Aldous Huxley, Eyeless in Gaza 
 
Before his successful career as a novelist, Gabriel García Márquez was engaged 
in journalism, writing many articles for newspapers, some of which are interesting 
albeit in a different sense from his original intention. A column titled “Nobel Prize 
Again” (8 April 1950, El Herald) is one such example. It is ironic that Márquez, who 
himself would win the prize thirty-two years later, made fun of the Swedish Academy, 
questioning very much their insight into the worth of literature. Márquez also made a 
mistake when he declared that William Faulkner was unlikely to be awarded the prize 
precisely because he was too a good writer—in fact, Faulkner did receive the 1949 prize 
retrospectively in 1950. A more unexpected remark is that Márquez counted Aldous 
Huxley as one of the great European writers, along with Virginia Woolf, James Joyce, 
André Gide and Marcel Proust: “Herman Hesse did not deserve the Nobel Prize for 
Literature. [. . .] And I am sure that the venerable members of the Swedish Academy 
would have a much more enjoyable time reading Point Counter Point and Eyeless in 
Gaza, the most interesting works by Huxley, than any by Hesse.”1 Although Huxley was 
indeed nominated for this prestigious prize in seven different years,2 it probably looks 
9 
 
natural, to most of us, that the academy awarded the prize to another candidate each 
time, ignoring a writer who is now remembered nearly only as the author of the 
controversial Brave New World (1932). 
On the whole, we may, however, not have to deplore the demise of Huxley’s 
reputation. In 1999, when the Modern Library announced the “100 Best English 
Language Novels of the 20th Century,” the editorial board ranked Brave New World 
fifth, only after Ulysses, The Great Gatsby, A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man and 
Lolita; incidentally Point Counter Point (1928) was ranked forty-fourth.3 The board 
consisted of authors and scholars from the humanities,4 but if the list had been drawn up 
entirely by literary scholars, it would likely have been impossible for Huxley to have 
gained a higher ranking than Woolf, E. M. Forster and D. H. Lawrence. 
Why, then, has Huxley recently been less popular in the academic community? In 
“Aldous Huxley and the Modernist Canon” (1995), Peter Edgerly Firchow, a leading 
expert on the author, gives two distinct answers. Firstly, Huxley’s literature, which 
sacrifices “complexity of expression” for his aim of “clarity,” is not suitable for “the 
kind of close reading which [. . .] still remains the staple of literary instruction, 
especially of modernist writers, in the universities.” The second reason appears to me 
more relevant, essential and therefore persuasive: 
Huxley lacks—in today’s English-speaking academic world anyway—a 
clearly definable constituency. In this respect he differs from just about all 
the other major modernist writers. He is not specifically supported by the 
gay community, as are Forster and Auden; nor by the feminists, as are 
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Virginia Woolf and H.D.; nor by Irish-Americans and post-colonialists, as 
are Joyce and, to a lesser and more ambiguous extent, Yeats [. . .]. (RM, 
173) 
Firchow’s argument contains the suggestion that Huxley’s text is not closely related to 
the topics addressed by critical theories that have been ‘fashionable’ in the academic 
community since the late 1970s. Indeed, this point seems true not only of 
postcolonialism and gender, which Firchow clearly bears in mind, but also of other 
theories such as Marxism and psychoanalysis. 
My Ph.D. dissertation ultimately aims to overturn these two images of Huxley, 
which have probably contributed to the unpopularity of this author and which have been 
widely shared and reproduced by many literary scholars, including some Huxley 
researchers. Throughout this dissertation, I aim to demonstrate that Huxley’s literature is 
indeed worth studying by close reading with a particular emphasis on the critical topics 
noted above. In a less abstract way, the subject of my dissertation is interpreting 
Huxley’s literature, particularly his fiction, with regard to the issue of identity, to reveal 
hidden significances of Huxley and his work to his time and ours. In my discussion, due 
attention will be given to his representations of the self and Others, as well as to his 
attitude towards contemporary political and cultural problems related to identity. Here, 
“Others” refers to women, non-Western people and the masses—i.e., those who are 
others in a political sense for Huxley, a British white male intellectual from the upper-
middle class. It is probably because scholars have assumed Huxley had 
conventional/unquestioning relations to these Others that he has not received searching 
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theoretical explorations. The image of his life, far removed from the vulgarity of the 
world, has been stressed too often by many critics and biographers, although it could 
also be traced back to his avowed philosophy of “non-attachment” (see e.g., The 
Perennial Philosophy [1945], Chapter 6). 
In terms of methodology, I observe how Huxley came to grip with the issue of 
identity by closely investigating his texts biographically, historically and theoretically. I 
am particularly interested in comparing his work with his contemporary and the present-
day materials that have been slighted or are unknown in Huxley studies. My research 
will also be characterized by a stress on his fiction rather than his non-fiction. This is 
because I would like to highlight not so much an aspect of Huxley as an essayist or a 
thinker with intelligence and reasons—which has already been recognized in previous 
debates5—but an aspect as a novelist with imagination and sensitivity—which has been 
unfairly underestimated. It can also be expected that Huxley’s fiction reflects more 
honestly and daringly his conscious or unconscious mind in response to problems 
pertaining to identity. 
Before focussing on his fiction, I will summarize what Huxley in his non-fiction 
wrote about identity, especially about the concept of the self. In his early work, Huxley 
repeatedly emphasized the fluid and diverse nature of the self. According to “Spinoza” 
and “Pascal” in Do What You Will (1929), everyone tries to be “one person all the time” 
“of stiff consistency” (AHCEII, 371), encouraged or forced by Christianity and some 
aspects of modern civilization, but the fact is that “[w]herever life exists, there also is 
inconsistency, division, strife” (326) and that a human being is “a series of distinct 
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psychological states, a colony of diverse personalities” (402). Not disregarding “every 
element of human nature” (327), we should aim to achieve “self-harmony” (325) as the 
“life-worshipper.” Huxley himself avows: “I prefer to be dangerously free and alive to 
being safely mummified. Therefore I indulge my inconsistencies. [. . .] I try to be 
sincerely all the numerous people who live inside my skin and take their turn at being 
the master of my fate” (371). Logically, the diversity and fluidity of the self appear to 
allow one to live freely or irresponsibly in a certain sense. In “Personality and the 
Discontinuity of the Mind” in Proper Studies (1927), Huxley, after mentioning several 
“frameworks” of “personality” that human beings have been searching for since ancient 
times, goes on to attack Marcel Proust for his “strange moral poverty”; instead of 
“suggest[ing] what we ought to do,” he is “content to live the life of an intermittent 
being,” whose philosophy of life is intolerable “for those whose life is mainly passed 
out of the sickroom” (AHCEII, 267-68). On the other hand, Huxley in his later work 
consistently impressed on readers the importance of transcending the self and being 
aware of the Divine Ground: “man’s obsessive consciousness of, and insistence on 
being, a separate self is the final and most formidable obstacle to the unitive knowledge 
of God. To be a self is [. . .] the original sin, and to die to self, in feeling, will and 
intellect, is the final and all-inclusive virtue” (PP, 36). 
Although it goes without saying that Huxley’s later perspectives were formed 
under the influence of his deepening concerns about religion and mysticism, his 
consistent refusal to see the self as something single or static can be attributed to his 
well-known familiarity with literature and philosophy. For example, one of his favourite 
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poets, William Blake, in his Milton (c. 1804-08), inserts a scene in which Milton talks 
with the “Seven Angels” about the essence of human beings: “We are not Individuals 
but States: Combinations of Individuals” (Plate 32). D. H. Lawrence, who greatly 
influenced the younger Huxley, associates his view of identity with his philosophy of 
life. In “Democracy” (written c. 1920 and published in Phoenix [1936]), Lawrence 
insists that “[c]reative life is characterized by spontaneous mutability: it brings forth 
unknown issues, impossible to preconceive” and that the notion of “personality” (the 
“ideal self”) is “just a machine,” “a fixed, static entity, an abstraction, an extraction 
from the living body of life” (711).6 In the area of philosophy, Huxley’s view of the self 
may remind one of the empiricist David Hume, who in A Treatise of Human Nature 
(1740) refers to the instability of the self, based on his concept of the mind as “a bundle 
or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable 
rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement” (239). In Appearance and Reality 
(1893), one of Huxley’s favourite philosophers, F. H. Bradley, argues that the “self” is 
“made of inconsistencies” and “has no power to defend its own reality from mortal 
objections” (89).7 However, Huxley’s view of identity, as long as it is outlined thus, will 
never appear rare or unique in the period of modernism, which was characterized by an 
experimental way of representing the self with a narrative style of “stream of 
consciousness.” 
From another angle, I will reconsider Huxley’s attitude towards identity to reveal 
the intertextuality of his text with discourses about culture and politics in his own time 
and beyond. We know that the period from the end of the nineteenth century up to the 
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present has been a turbulent age for notions of identity, which we may call the era of 
identity crisis (not in a strict sense of psychology). A Western philosophy of the self as 
sameness or continuity can be traced to René Descartes (Cogito ergo sum), but the 
nineteenth-century psychologist William James challenged this dominant view by 
highlighting a more mentally flexible nature of the self, and Sigmund Freud secured this 
image of the self in Western thought, introducing a study of psychoanalysis to more 
closely focus on hidden aspects of the mind, such as repressed desires. Of course, such 
intellectual quests for redefining the self developed with public campaigns both in 
politics and culture. Strictly speaking, the self and identity are different concepts; 
identity is not always based on the self but can take various forms of collective identity, 
subscribing to the same groups of nation, race, gender, sexuality and class. It may be 
remarked that the age during which Huxley lived was the first time in history when such 
categories of identity began to be shaken considerably and to be reinforced seriously. 
Certainly, Huxley himself witnessed—if not literally—women ‘invading’ former male-
dominated spheres of culture and politics, the colonized resisting Western imperialism 
and ‘civilization,’ and the working class promoting their positions in parallel with the 
rise of socialist countries. Following his death, before our eyes—again, not literally—
these tendencies and streams became more radically accelerated, reflecting or being 
reflected by a postmodern dismantling of the self which theoretically (as the sociologist 
Anthony Elliott argues) has “promoted a suspicion of identity norms, given values, 
established hierarchies, and traditional social practices” (17).8 How did Huxley react to, 
or to what degree was he able to anticipate, such phenomena? Attempting to answer this 
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question may provide a new understanding of our seemingly antiquated theme, Aldous 
Huxley and identity. 
Undoubtedly, in literary studies, the issue of identity has been energetically and 
repeatedly taken up, and even in only modernist literature in recent years, we have seen 
several important publications that are relevant to this subject. For example, in Self 
Impression: Life-Writing, Autobiographiction, and the Forms of Modern Literature 
(2010), Max Saunders carefully follows formalistic aspects of works on the self from 
the latter part of the nineteenth century to the present, finding ever-intensifying 
confusion between genres of auto/biography and fiction: “Where fin de siècle 
autobiografiction [such as John Ruskin and Proust] was tentative and anxious, and 
modernist engagements with life-writing [such as Joyce, Ezra Pound and Woolf] were 
formally more experimental, Postmodernist autobiographies like these [such as 
Vladimir Nabokov and Doris Lessing] are more ludic and performative in their 
explorations of the aesthetic life” (492). On the other hand, Meghan Marie Hammond 
contributes to an understanding of the self and the other by noting a shift from 
“sympathy” (feeling for; depending on some distance from others) to “empathy” 
(feeling with; instead attempting to obliterate this distance) in the literature and 
psychology of the modernist era (Empathy and the Psychology of Literary Modernism 
[2014]). Although my research does not necessarily concentrate on life-writing or 
psychological aspects of literature, it introduces a perspective on Huxley that may 
suggest a new approach to the issue of identity in literary studies. 
For a re-evaluation of Huxley’s literature, I propose presenting my discussion and 
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arguments in four chapters, which are outlined below. 
Chapter I, “Self,”9 primarily addresses Huxley’s first piece of published fiction, 
“Farcical History of Richard Greenow” (1920). During the Great War, Huxley, 
disqualified from military service, appears to have become wary of war, influenced by 
the tragedies of his many enlisted friends as well as the pacifist atmosphere of 
Garsington Manor; this ‘single-track’ understanding is reviewed in this chapter. By 
comparing his novella with contemporary anti-war fiction, the chapter points to his 
deeper insights into human aggression before moving to another comparison of his 
work with psychoanalysis by focussing on how Freud simultaneously dealt with human 
aggression and how Melanie Klein and recent critics of psychoanalysis have developed 
Freud’s views in more complicated and paradoxical ways. In addition to “Richard 
Greenow,” Huxley’s two other pieces published in the same year, “Happily Ever After” 
and the poem “Soles Occidere et Redire Possunt,” are together presented for 
consideration in a bid to gain some hints for approaching the author’s psychology in and 
after the wartime. This chapter’s discussion of the young Huxley’s view of the self leads 
to the following chapters’ discussions of his later views on Others. 
Chapter II, “Woman,” provides an intensive reading of Huxley’s masterpiece 
Point Counter Point (1928), which has been regarded as a typical “novel of ideas” in 
which the plot appears to unfold with a focus on male characters. The collapse of a 
mother-child relationship frequently appears in his fiction and is particularly 
conspicuous in this novel, which sheds light on the ways in which less maternal or 
feminine women live, feel and suffer. This chapter looks at this issue firstly by 
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comparing contemporary discourses on gender and reproduction, as seen in the To-day 
and To-morrow series (1923-31), secondly by considering biographical information 
about the author’s wife Maria, friend Naomi Mitchison and lover Nancy Cunard, and 
finally by discussing the novel with reference to theoretical remarks on the maternal and 
the feminine, including those by Julia Kristeva and Judith Butler. This chapter, together 
with the following two chapters, challenges the generally accepted image of Huxley as a 
conservative elitist. 
Chapter III, “Savage,” is also devoted to a close analysis of Huxley’s best-selling 
futuristic novel Brave New World (1932), observing particularly its representation of 
“savages” beginning with Chapter 6. To reconsider the author’s attitude towards 
imperialism, this chapter reads the novel not so much as a text categorized as either 
dystopia or eutopia but just as a story that is set in the twenty-sixth century. Having 
examined reports on American Indians by anthropologists, Huxley imagined the future 
of Indian society and the destiny of a “savage” hero with a complex identity. To what 
degree is this text free from or bound by contemporary ideology regarding Others? With 
reference to postcolonial criticism such as that of Edward W. Said, this chapter takes a 
closer look at how Huxley maintains or subverts concepts of race, nationality, 
civilization, savagery and primitivism. 
Chapter IV, “Mass,” follows Huxley’s later work, mostly from his turning-point 
story Eyeless in Gaza (1936) to his final novel Island (1962). This chapter is 
particularly interested in his pilgrimage towards utopian ideas, which may be read as 
reflecting his experiences since the 1930s, such as his tours of industrial towns (“Alien 
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Englands”), engagement with pacifist campaigns and involvement in popular cultures, 
religions and drugs. Although he has been repeatedly defined simply as anti-Marxist or 
a satirist of socialist countries, how did Huxley truly view Marxism and Russia? His 
two utopian pieces, Eyeless in Gaza and Island, deserve special attention with regard to 
Marxist criticism, especially Fredric Jameson’s discussion of how to think of utopia and 
totality in the postmodern era. This final chapter also functions as a bridge between our 
understanding of Huxley in the previous chapters and the Conclusion, in which we can 
review his long struggle with the issue of identity historically, biographically and 
theoretically to acknowledge the significance of his literature in and beyond his time. 
                                                
1 Márquez wrote this article, “Otra vez el Premio Nobel,” under the pen-name of Septimus. Gide received 
the Nobel Prize in 1947, Hesse in 1946. 
2 See the Nobel Prize Nomination Database. Huxley was nominated for the Nobel Prize in Literature in 
1938, 1939, 1955, 1959, 1960, 1961 and 1963. 
3 Modern Library also announced Readers’ List, which ranked Ayn Rand’s Atlas Shrugged first and Brave 
New World eighteenth. 
4 The board consisted of Daniel J. Boorstin, A. S. Byatt, Christopher Cerf, Shelby Foote, Vartan 
Gregorian, Edmund Morris, John Richardson, Arthur Schlesinger Jr., William Styron and Gore Vidal. 
5 For example, Leonard Woolf, one of Huxley’s acquaintances, recollects: “His curiosity was so intense 
and his intellect so strong and subtle that his imagination never entirely broke loose from the reasoning 
part of his mind. That is why, I think, his novels, with all their merits, are never in the highest class. But 
his essays, where there is a perfect marriage of intellect and imagination, are masterpieces, works of art” 
(NT, 37-38). In his introduction to the volume of Huxley in the series “Bloom’s Modern Critical Views,” 
Harold Bloom mentions Antic Hay (1923) and Point Counter Point as “very literate Period Pieces” and 
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Brave New World as fiction that “scarcely sustains rereading,” and concludes: “Aldous Huxley was a 
superb essayist but not quite either a novelist or a sage” (1-2). David Bradshaw’s historicist studies on 
Huxley’s engagement with social and political activity and Huxley specialists’ focus on the mystic 
Huxley seem to eventually contribute to the perception of Huxley as a thinker and essayist. Of course, this 
can also be partly attributed to Huxley’s definition of himself as a novelist of ideas (see PCP, 353-86). 
6 Another influential figure in literature is Proust, whom Huxley appears to have consistently disliked. In 
“The Intermittences of the Heart” from Sodom and Gomorrah (1923-24), the narrator, remembering his 
grandmother, expresses his mental state: “the self that I had just suddenly become once again had not 
existed since that evening long ago [. . .]. The self that I then was, that had disappeared for so long, was 
once again so close to me” (147). Although Proust’s image of the mind is certainly “intermittent,” the 
“Lost Time,” which he spent idly with such a state of mind, is sublimated together into the meaningful 
“Time Regained.” This structure appears similar to that of Eyeless in Gaza, in which Huxley again attacks 
Proust (6-7). As discussed in Chapter IV of this dissertation, the final chapter of this novel offers some 
meaning to the divided days which the hero has thus far defined as meaningless. 
7 In 1934, Huxley also wrote another piece on personal identity, entitled “Personality,” which he 
developed as Anthony’s notebook in Chapter 11 of Eyeless in Gaza. For a detailed analysis of the impact 
of Romanticism on Huxley’s theory of “personality,” see Robert S. Baker, The Dark Historic Page: 
Social Satire and Historicism in the Novels of Aldous Huxley, 1921-1939, 126-35; for a discussion in 
philosophical contexts, see Lothar Fietz, “The Fragmentariness of the Self: Continuity and Discontinuity 
in the Works of Aldous Huxley” (1994). In her recent doctoral dissertation, “Reading the Self / the Other: 
Aldous Huxley and Ethical Criticism” (2012), Facultatea de Litere reads Huxley’s Point Counter Point, 
Eyeless in Gaza and The Genius and the Goddess, using a philosophical approach to his notions of the 
self and the other. 
8 For the outline above, see Anthony Elliott, Concepts of the Self (3rd. 2014), 12-24. 
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9 Throughout my dissertation, I use ‘Chapter’ plus a Roman numeral for one of chapters included in this 




Chapter I Self 
—Early Writing— 
War and Psychoanalysis 
 
1. Introduction 
As Sybille Bedford, a friend of Aldous Huxley and his first wife Maria, remarks 
in her 1974 biography, the Great War gave Huxley “the second isolation,” making him 
“a stranger to the world of contemporary experiences” (48). Unlike most of his Oxford 
friends, he could not enlist due to poor eyesight, from which he had suffered since three 
years previously, when he had developed keratitis punctata—this had been the cause of 
his first isolation, when he had dropped out of Eton. There can be no disagreement that 
the person “Aldous Huxley” must have been formed to a great extent by these two 
isolations, as well as by the death of his mother (when he was fourteen), and the suicide 
of his brother Trevenen (immediately after the beginning of the war). Moreover, few 
people would disagree with the view that his wartime life as a sort of outsider affected 
the writer “Aldous Huxley,”  especially with regard to certain aspects of his literary 
career, e.g., his satirical spirits, by which he could see society from the isolated 
viewpoint of an intellectual.1 However, the present chapter, by analysing Huxley’s early 
post-war writings, particularly his literary pieces reflecting the unconscious, aims to 
reveal unknown sides of his relationship to the war (or war in general), reconsidering 
how Huxley consciously or unconsciously reacted to it and how it affected his 
subsequent views of the world and of human beings. 
22 
 
The chapter draws on psychoanalysis, especially psychoanalytical criticism of 
war and the destructiveness of the human mind. My intention here is not so much to 
interpret the author’s texts and psychology by applying psychoanalytic theory but to 
consider a hitherto undiscussed intertextuality between his work and psychoanalytic 
discourses of his time and beyond. Psychoanalysis definitely provides an important 
perspective for a general discussion of war (as suggested by the well-known 
contribution of the Great War to later Freudian psychoanalysis), and it is no less useful 
for a specific focus on Huxley, who referred to the subject repeatedly throughout his 
life. Surprisingly little attention has been paid to Huxley’s relationship to 
psychoanalysis, and the previous studies on this issue tend to centre on Brave New 
World (1932) and Sigmund Freud, especially his concept of the Oedipus complex. 
Revealing psychoanalytical significances of Huxley’s work, the present chapter will 
thus supplement existing studies to a certain degree by acknowledging some of his 
minor writing and the discourses of psychoanalysis provided by Freud and more recent 
critics. 
 
2. Huxley’s War Fiction: “Farcical History of Richard Greenow” 
Huxley’s Oxford days, beginning in October 1913, were supposed to be one of 
the happiest periods of his life. In the first year he was blessed with many friends, but 
the climate changed in August 1914, when England declared war against Germany. 
Within a few weeks, Trevenen killed himself at only twenty-four because of his failure 
in the civil-service examination and his unrequited love for a maid in his family. Many 
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Oxford students soon enlisted; Huxley himself applied a few times but naturally was 
rejected due to his damaged eyes. Leaving college, where remaining students were 
almost exclusively women and foreigners, Huxley lived with the Haldanes, and towards 
the end of 1915 he first visited Garsington Manor, home of Philip and Ottoline Morrell, 
where he became acquainted with the Bloomsbury intellectuals, his future wife Maria 
Nys and D. H. Lawrence.2 After the introduction of conscription in January 1916, 
Huxley was repeatedly called before medical boards only to be confirmed unfit for 
military service.3 In June, Huxley graduated from Oxford with a first in English—the 
honour was reported on page 12 of The Times, 3 July 1916, where much more space 
was devoted to “Roll of Honour” lists of military casualties. In September, his first 
book, The Burning Wheel, came out (his first published verse had already appeared in 
Oxford Poetry [1915]). As his civilian duty in wartime, he worked on Philip Morrell’s 
farm from September 1916 to April 1917, and was then engaged in a clerical job at the 
Air Board until July 1917. While teaching at Eton from September 1917 to February 
1919, he published two poetry books, Jonah (1917) and The Defeat of Youth (1918). 
The armistice was announced in November 1918. Huxley’s life now seems like smooth 
sailing: he started an editorial job on the Athenaeum with Middleton Murry (April 1919 
to October 1920), and married Maria in July 1919, who gave birth to their son Matthew 
in the following April.4 
Although the objective “facts” are as above, what did Huxley think and feel about 
the Great War? Certainly, his wartime letters were strongly coloured by his anxiety 
about the safety of his enlisted friends and his grief over the death of some of them (see 
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especially Smith 63-84; Sexton 18-19, 28-29). As David Bradshaw aptly expresses, 
Huxley’s “poor eyesight had preserved him from the carnage of the Front, but it had not 
prevented him witnessing the decimation of a generation” (“BSHM,” 219). It would be 
natural—especially considering the probable influence of Garsington pacifists—to 
expect that his sorrow over the war may have developed into a war-weary or anti-war 
feeling. Indeed, Huxley wrote to his family complaining about belligerent atmosphere 
without reason as well as the unfair treatment of conscientious objectors (see his letters 
to Leonard Huxley, 2 and 10 March 1916, Smith 69-71, 91-94), and confessing: “The 
longer this war goes on, the more one loathes and detests it. At the beginning I shd. have 
liked very much to fight: but now, if I could (having seen all the results), I think I’d be a 
conscientious objector, or nearly so” (letter to Julian Huxley, 31 March 1916, Smith 
97).5 Critics thus tend to stress his pacifist mood in the later period of the war, and some 
of them further argue that from this time Huxley “never wavered in his opposition to 
war” (Birnbaum 105; see Dunaway HH, 15-19; see also Poller “TMHW”). 
Of Huxley’s wartime works, the only poem that provides a direct narration of the 
war is “The Oxford Volunteers” (published in Jonah), in which he describes “the 
lamentable spectacle of them [a group of soldiers] marching along” (letter to Gielgud, 
30 September 1917, Smith 135), suggesting his own disgust. His two poetry collections 
reflect the gloomy situations both of society and himself. The Burning Wheel, Huxley 
himself states, is “like going through my own private Morgue where every alcove is 
occupied by a corpse of myself” (letter to Julian, 7 September 1916, Smith 112). In The 
Defeat of Youth, the title poem, depicting the downfall of youthful idealism in love, 
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could be an echo of “the disillusionment of the men who fought in the trenches where 
they found not heroism but only futility” (Rosenhan “VBAH,” 236).6 Another poem, 
“Decameron,” might be partly a reflection of “guilt cloaked in satire against the 
pretentious escapism of his friends. They travel to a kind of rustic Bloomsbury to avoid 
reality and live the life of the mind” (Meckier AHPM, 71). These poems offer some 
insight into the possibility that Huxley’s attitude towards the war was more complex 
than what is clearly displayed by his letters. 
To more deeply, or more daringly, consider Huxley’s relationship with the war, I 
will analyse his first piece of published fiction, “Farcical History of Richard Greenow” 
in Limbo (1920), which has hardly ever been discussed closely by critics, but which 
devotes more space to a narration of wartime than any other of Huxley’s works. True to 
the word “farcical” in its title, Huxley developed “Richard Greenow” with a fund of 
humour throughout the story, which certainly gave it a funny tone, but behind its 
farcical façade he actually dropped hints as to what he seriously thought and felt about 
his time and himself at the outset of his novelistic career. This tale, written between 
around the time between the announcement of armistice and early in the new year,7 
must reflect Huxley’s conscious or unconscious reactions to the war just after its end. 
In his childhood, Dick (Richard Greenow), born in the same year as the author, 
secretly enjoys playing with dolls—in contrast to his sister Millicent, who prefers 
practical matters. In preparatory and public schools, Dick is “something of prodigy” (6), 
displaying his talents in mathematics and criticism of art and literature, and sometimes 
gets an inspiration for a poem from his love for a beautiful boy called Francis. Dick has 
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tended to repress his sentimental, imaginative characteristics in favour of his rational, 
logical characteristics, but finally, when he is at Oxford, the repressed aspects emerge as 
an independent and nocturnal personality—Pearl, a female writer. Thanks to this 
spiritually “hermaphrodite” nature (37)—specifically, thanks to the sales of Pearl’s 
sentimental novels—Dick can enjoy his life as an unproductive intellectual. However, 
after the declaration of war, he begins to suffer from neuroses, including his 
unspeakable fear of the crowd, and later realizes that Pearl is “invading” the sphere of 
his daytime life by writing pro-war propaganda (61-62), although he is engaged in an 
anti-conscription campaign, together with Hyman and other pacifists, believing in 
internationalism and socialism. Because Pearl, who apparently wants to be a land-girl, 
disturbs his application for the status of an absolutist conscientious objector, Dick is 
ordered at the local tribunal to work on a farm and is severely criticized for this by both 
Hyman and Millicent (now an exemplary patriotic civilian); their mutual attack on Dick 
ironically contributes to their getting married. After the war, Pearl goes to a public 
office to apply for suffrage, but because of her male appearance she is sent to a lunatic 
asylum where Dick, going on hunger strike, is killed as a result of force-feeding. 
What made Huxley hit upon such a bizarre story? Biographically, the opposition 
between Dick and Pearl can be associated with the ambiguous wartime position of the 
author as the nephew of a belligerent propagandist, Mrs Humphry Ward, and as a 
member of an anti-war intellectual circle in Garsington Manor (see Svarny 56-57).8 In 
terms of historical contexts, what motivated the author to think up some aspects of this 
text might have been his masculine fear or hatred of a contemporary ‘invasion’ of 
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women into male-dominated spheres, including literature (see Gilbert 131; see also 
Huxley Limbo, 95-96), or his heterosexual anxiety that “authorship is a sign of 
inversion,” as suggested by Havelock Ellis (Sheets 208). 
A perspective lacking in these explanations concerns non-combatant anti-war 
fiction. Certainly, a vast number of sentimental pieces of “home-front fiction” 
appreciated the war not just as an inevitable event but as something positive that would 
have a beneficial effect on a selfish, decadent society; many were written by women, 
including Mrs Humphry Ward, who, apart from her non-fictional contribution to the 
War Propaganda Bureau (as satirized by her nephew), wrote novels, such as Missing, 
which describes a tragic but strong-willed heroine who decides to work for the war after 
finding out about the death of her lover at the front. There was also some moderate war 
fiction, such as H. G. Wells’s Mr Britling Sees It Through (1916) and May Sinclair’s 
The Tree of Heaven (1917), both of which endorse the war but are critical of the anti-
German racism or narrow patriotism sweeping the country. Though never popularized, 
anti-war fiction was also published, casting doubt upon the legitimacy of the war.9 It 
seems that Huxley’s “Richard Greenow,” centring on a conscientious objector’s life, 
owes something to anti-war fiction written by non-combatants in wartime. 
For instance, Mary Agnes Hamilton presents in Dead Yesterday (1916) the 
horrible image of crowds in London streets in August 1914: “a mob of people and an 
indescribable inferno of sound”; “the whole wide street seemed to have become part of 
the seething, hideously shouting mass, all crying, as with one hungry bloodhound 
throat—‘War. War. War’” (231-32). The image is very similar to Huxley’s nightmarish 
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description of the Glasgow crowd around the same time, followed by the scenes in the 
train and on London streets (Limbo, 54-56). Rose Macaulay’s Non-Combatants and 
Others (1916), which is the most famous novel of this genre, narrates the experience of 
Alix, a young female artist with a disability who cannot contribute to the war. Curiously, 
the civilian heroine develops “the war disease”—not only because of her brother’s death 
but also due to the wartime atmosphere itself—in the same way as the civilian hero of 
Huxley: “you might quite truly look at the whole thing as a mental case; a case of 
nervous breakdown. The war’s playing the devil with your nerves” (138-39).10 In the 
end Alix joins an anti-war campaign because, in her words, “I can’t be fighting in the 
war, I’ve got to be fighting against it” (173); here, a pacifist campaign appears as a 
substitute to a military one, just as for Dick, as demonstrated below.11 
A text more likely to have directly influenced Huxley’s novella is the now almost-
forgotten novel Despised and Rejected (1918) by Rose Allatini. This was published 
under the pseudonym A. T. Fitzroy, the name used by Huxley in the title of Dick 
(Pearl)’s novel, Heartsease Fitzroy (see Limbo, 33); Allatini’s book was regarded as a 
male writer’s just as Dick’s work is misrecognized as written by a woman. The novel 
soon became controversial for its advocacy of pacifist and homosexual rights, and under 
the Defence of the Realm Act the government destroyed unsold copies and prosecuted 
the author and publisher. Huxley, though not sure to have read the text, could have 
known the story before writing his own.12 
The musician Dennis in childhood did not like “manly” play, and has secretly felt 
in himself something like an unknown self, which he has turned into music (see 13, 66). 
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He recognizes himself as “[a]bnormal,” homosexual or hermaphrodite, “stand[ing] mid-
way between the extremes of the two sexes” (90, 294), and suffering “the two 
conflicting strains of his nature”: “the continuous struggle between brain and body, the 
continuous struggle to suppress his instincts [including his homosexual love] and force 
them into ways not natural to them” (256).13 The role of war in the arts is ambiguous: 
the beastly atmosphere of wartime society makes Dennis neurotic, suggesting the 
incompatibility of arts with war (see 133, 203, 289), whereas the “nightmare” of the war 
also inspires his music as if it (and homosexual desire) were a trigger for creative 
activity (134-36; see 172, 202-03, 267-68). Believing in internationalism and socialism, 
Dennis and his friends are engaged in a pacifist campaign as conscientious objectors 
(see 169), with a desperate fate waiting for them in any case: either being sent to the 
front under compulsion, being ordered to do non-combatant service (followed by the 
criticism of their comrades as traitors [219, 228]), or being put into prison, where they 
will encounter “punishments that may injure them for life,” such as having food forced 
“through tubes up their noses if they won’t eat” (253). At the local tribunal,14 Dennis 
gets the second result, being made to do very hard labour, and the story ends with his 
friend’s expressing the expectation that hermaphrodites like Dennis are “a new 
humanity [. . .] in the process of evolution,” and making their sacrifice for those in the 
future (294-95).15 Despised and Rejected may have affected Huxley’s tale of Richard 
Greenow, especially the plot and the characterization of the hermaphrodite hero. 
In his debut work of fiction Huxley, while employing the model of anti-war 
fiction cited above, delves more deeply into destructiveness or aggression in the human 
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mind. In short, by describing Dick, who promotes war through his alternate personality 
and who cannot accomplish his pacifism, Huxley tries to reveal that people out of the 
mainstream (such as COs, socialist artists and others who are judged unfit for service 
[including homosexuals and the disabled]—those whom Allatini and Macaulay expect 
to be pacifist16) are inherently as aggressive or destructive as many people in the 
mainstream (such as the beastly crowd for which Hamilton shows intense hatred); by 
doing so, he also seems to satirize this genre.17 It is exactly this point, namely Huxley’s 
acute and pessimistic understanding of the human mind, which proves that the 
significance of this text cannot be reduced to the contexts of preceding (anti-) war 
fiction, and encourages us to compare it with the discourses of psychoanalysis, which 
was radically developing in those days, beginning to probe deeply into human 
aggression. 
 
3. “Richard Greenow,” Psychoanalysis and the Death Instinct 
3.1. Aldous Huxley and Psychoanalysis 
As is often pointed out, a vital relationship can be seen in modernism and 
psychoanalysis, both of which, for example, interdependently attempted the extension 
of reason (or language, science) into the sphere of emotion (or the mind, the 
unconscious). In Britain, psychoanalysis developed as a literary rather than a scientific 
discourse. Although, soon after the publication of Josef Breuer and Freud’s Studies on 
Hysteria (1895), psychoanalysis, or a new study that would become “psychoanalysis,” 
had received due attention from British sexologists such as Havelock Ellis as well as the 
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Society for Psychical Research, the strongest contributor to British psychoanalysis was 
of course the first English-speaking practitioner, Ernest Jones. As early as 1913, Jones 
established the London Psycho-Analytical Society, and in 1919, after dissolving this 
organization, formed the British Psycho-Analytical Society, incorporating two suffragist 
doctors, Jessie Murray and Julia Turner. Partly because of this, psychoanalysis 
developed uniquely in Britain in rapport with radical ideas such as feminism and 
socialism. In disseminating psychoanalysis in British culture, Bloomsbury played a key 
role, particularly by the publication in the 1920s of Freud’s Collected Works, although 
Bloomsbury characters, including Virginia Woolf, did not necessarily trust 
psychoanalytic treatment. In 1925, Jones invited Melanie Klein to London, but her 
arguments—especially on the nature of the infant and the centrality of destructiveness—
stirred controversy with Freud and Ann Freud, who also came to London in 1938. 
Under the growth of Nazism and Fascism, it can be said that psychoanalysis 
experienced a shift from Freud to Klein, paternal to maternal, the sexual impulse to that 
of death—the trajectory attuned to the concerns of some varieties of modernism.18 
It is thus natural that, throughout his life, Huxley maintained an interest in 
psychoanalysis or psychology, recognizing its importance in understanding and 
improving the conditions of human beings and society. In his writing, the name “Freud” 
appears more frequently than that of any other psychologist (Freud is probably even the 
third most frequently referred to intellectual figure after D. H. Lawrence and William 
Shakespeare), sometimes accompanied by his mention of Freud’s works, such as The 
Interpretation of Dreams (1899), The Schreber Case (1911) and Totem and Taboo 
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(1913).19 Certainly, Huxley is well aware of the impact of Freud’s psychoanalysis upon 
the public, especially his interpretation of “sexual behavior” (Do What You Will [1929], 
AHCEII, 345) and “the Unconscious” (“Genius” [1956], AHCEVI, 327). Yet apparently 
Huxley is very critical about Freud’s analytical style and some parts of his arguments, in 
which he found “logical deficiencies,” “one-sidedness and an over-simplification of the 
problem”: “The basic Freudian hypothesis is an environmental determinism that ignores 
heredity, an almost naked psychology that comes very near to ignoring the physical 
correlates of mental activity” (Literature and Science [1963], AHCEVI, 140). From his 
late interest in mysticism and drugs, Huxley criticizes Freud’s apathy towards the 
“higher Not-Self within and beyond the self,” as well as the Freudians’ neglect of the 
positive aspects of “LSD or mescalin” (letters to an unknown recipient, c. 20 July 1952, 
Smith 647; to Mrs Ellen Huxley, 6 December 1956, Smith 813).20 As for Freud’s 
followers, Huxley appreciates to some extent C. G. Jung’s theory of psychological 
types, while attacking Alfred Adler and making no mention of Klein.21 Behind Huxley’s 
dissatisfaction, there was his belief that psychology can be effective only in cooperation 
with non-psychological studies, and that the human mind has often been analysed more 
accurately by non-psychological media such as fiction.22 
In fact, of Huxley’s published writing, the “Farcical History of Richard Greenow” 
is the first text that refers to psychology and Freud. After the beginning of the war, Dick, 
fearing Pearl, whom he can no longer control, visits Rogers—an amateur psychologist 
who is very familiar with “Freud, Jung, Morton Prince, and people like that” and who 
may “help him to lay the ghost Pearl.” Dick asks for his “professional advice,” saying: 
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“I believe I’m getting a bit neurasthenic”; “I want you to nose out my suppressed 
complexes, analyse me, dissect me” (63-64). Employing free association, Rogers asks 
Dick many questions, believing that “the majority of kinks and complexes date from 
childhood” and expecting that his replies reveal Rogers’s “favourite incest-theory,” 
“trace of those sinister moral censors, expurgators of impulse, suppressors of happiness” 
(66-67). Having “consulted a text-book,” Rogers declares that his friend’s present 
trouble is caused by “a great Freudian passion for his aunt,” just because he answered 
“Bosom” for the word “Aunt.”23 Probably disappointed at this, Dick never goes back to 
this amateur psychologist: “it wasn’t worth taking any more trouble” (66-68). 
What can be deduced from this scene is Huxley’s thinking that Freud’s 
psychoanalysis, centring on his theories of sex such as the Oedipus complex, cannot 
understand, much less resolve, Dick’s problems—his neurotic condition as well as his 
alternate personality’s threat to him—the symptoms that began with the start of the war. 
Why did Huxley think so (which parts of Freud’s psychoanalysis dissatisfied him)? 
What sort of view of the mind did Huxley himself use to characterize Dick and make 
this story? The following sections consider these questions with reference to 
psychoanalytic discourses, especially on human destructiveness, provided by Freud, 
Klein and recent critics. 
 
3.2. “Richard Greenow” and Psychoanalysis (1): Sigmund Freud 
As early as the 1870s and 1880s, the French neurologist Jean-Martin Charcot 
worked on hysteria, hypnosis and dual personality, and it was one of his students, Pierre 
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Janet in Psychological Automatism (1889), who introduced the concept of 
“dissociation” as well as the distinction between conscious and subconscious. In Britain, 
Frederic W. H. Myers, one of the founders of the Society for Psychical Research, 
proposed the existence of the “subliminal self”—a concept similar to Jung’s “collective 
unconscious”—in the context of an attempt to explain paranormal events (see 
Phantasms of the Living [1886]). The most important psychologist in the late nineteenth 
century, however, was probably William James, the “Father of American Psychology,” 
whose The Principles of Psychology (1890) is particularly famous for the term “stream 
of consciousness,” a psychological metaphor for the transitory nature of the mind. In 
1909, Morton Prince, whom Huxley mentions in “Richard Greenow,” published one of 
the most well-known studies of multiple personality, The Dissociation of a Personality. 
Of course, the theme of consciousness or the phenomenon of multiple personality 
became popularized by Robert Louis Stevenson’s Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde (1886), which 
is also mentioned in Huxley’s novella (see 37). It may certainly be argued that pre-
Freudian psychology contributed to some formal aspects of Huxley’s debut piece of 
fiction; for instance, his description of Pearl as a “ghost” (63) or “devil” (71) appears to 
owe something to the then closeness between psychology and spiritualism (or psychic 
research). 
However, the most important influence on Huxley in characterizing Dick was 
surely Sigmund Freud himself, especially his understanding of the conscious and the 
unconscious. Even before the publication of the authorized translation of Freud’s 
works—which certainly helped propagate Freudian psychoanalysis—some of his books, 
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including The Interpretation of Dreams, had already been available in English, and 
Huxley might have read them. It is at least likely that he came into contact with the 
basic tenets of Freud’s theory through his friendships with the Bloomsbury/Garsington 
intellectuals or the Haldanes.24 In the 1890s, Freud, through his clinical experiences 
with Breuer, became sure that neuroses (or hysteria) are physical expressions of 
emotional turmoil, and that the symptoms can disappear once unconscious memories of 
the past are narrated on the conscious level by the employment of hypnosis or free 
association (see Studies on Hysteria [1895], in which Breuer reports the famous case of 
Anna O., who had multiple personality, and Freud supplements this with eighteen cases 
of his). While recognizing the decisive role of sexuality in causing hysteria, Freud went 
on to argue that the mind is composed of three levels—the conscious, the preconscious 
and the unconscious—and that the ego is associated with the conscious, as opposed to 
the unconscious or the repressed. According to The Interpretation of Dreams, for 
example, repressed (e.g., incestuous) desire appears in dreams after having been 
distorted by a censor, and in this sense dreams are nothing less than an attempt at wish 
fulfilment. Freud also put forward the idea of the pleasure principle (the instinctual 
attempt to want pleasure and avoid pain), proposing two sorts of energy, namely the 
self-preservation drive and the sexual drive, both of which were later categorized under 
Eros, the life drive (see “Drives and their Fate” [1915]). 
Formally or superficially, Huxley seems to employ some knowledge of Freud’s 
views of the mind.25 In a sense, Dick for example can be seen as the ego, while Pearl is 
a symbol of something that is repressed into the unconscious of his mind. Dick therefore 
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appears to pursue wish fulfilment, such as his repressed desires for romance, through his 
nocturnal personality. However, what is to be noted here is that Huxley critically 
supplements Freud’s sexuality-oriented model of the mind by incorporating unconscious 
instincts for aggression. Although or perhaps because the pacifist Dick has repressed his 
own destructiveness, it reappears in Pearl’s work for pro-war propaganda. She, or her 
“frightful” or “horrible” writing (62), is thus nothing less than the projection of his 
originally familiar elements. Rogers cannot make a correct diagnosis of Dick not simply 
because of his lack of clinical ability but due to the deficiencies of his favourite 
Freudian textbooks. It may be argued that through this work of ‘war fiction’ Huxley, in 
narrating the tragedy of Dick, is pointing to the destiny of the whole of humankind. Just 
as Dick, who has tried to control his aggressiveness in his endeavour to be rational and 
pacifist, remains a slave to it, human beings, despite having prohibited violence in the 
name of law and order, have never lost their violent disposition since ancient times, and 
this disposition has led them to engage in various kinds of atrocity, including the Great 
War. 
Against his intention of satirizing Freud, Huxley curiously came to echo what 
Freud was thinking about the human mind during and after the war. Freud’s analysis of 
the war is seen in Timely Reflections on War and Death (1915), especially the first 
part.26 We may feel “disillusioned” by “the lack of morality shown outwardly by the 
states” and “brutality in the behaviour of individuals” (MMM, 174), but Freud astutely 
calls these disillusions groundless, “based upon an illusion” (179). Originally, 
individuals have “‘bad’ [egoistic] drives,” which usually do not become problematic 
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because of their “susceptibility to civilization,” the results of “the external factor” (e.g., 
“the compulsion of upbringing”) and “the internal factor” (i.e., being mixed with 
“drives of eroticism”) (176-77). However, once the wartime situation abolishes “moral 
restrictions,” individuals easily experience the “regression” of their mental life, just as 
we “cast aside our hard-earned morality” every night in “the sleeping state” (179-80).27 
Because such development and regression of the individual can apply equally to “the 
collective of individuals of humanity, nations” (182), it is still difficult to abolish war 
(182).28 
In 1919—while Huxley was writing the novella—Freud published “The 
Uncanny,” a text that is not directly relevant to the war but could not have been written 
without its influence on Freud’s thinking.29 Freud’s argument here is paradoxical: an 
“uncanny element is actually nothing new or strange, but something that was long 
familiar to the psyche and was estranged from it only through being repressed” (U, 
148). In other words, individuals have an “uncanny” feeling when they encounter 
“something familiar [‘homely,’ ‘homey’] that has been repressed and then reappears” 
(152). Apart from typical examples of the uncanny, such as “repressed childhood 
complexes” (154-55), Freud also remarks that an “uncanny” feeling emerges in facing 
an “evil” person like the “Devil” who has “special powers,” or by suffering “madness” 
which a person “can dimly perceive in remote corners of his own personality” (150).30 
Huxley in his novella seems to have fictionalized these arguments of Freud, bringing 
together his two essays despite never having read them. For Dick, Pearl is the 
“uncanny” self,31 or the expression of the emotion and violence which he has repressed 
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through his reason and his pacifism. Something like Freud’s “uncanny” logic was 
crucial in Huxley’s response to the war between states and the brutality of individuals in 
the wartime. 
Gradually Freud moved towards metapsychology, which was speculative rather 
than grounded upon his clinical experiences. In The Ego and Id (1923), Freud modified 
the opposition between the ego (the conscious) and the unconscious, arguing that the 
ego contains something unconscious. In the depths of the unconscious, “the life drive” 
and “the death drive” reside in conflict with one another in the element called the “id.” 
The death drive originally is a force of self-destruction, but it may be easily directed 
towards other objects (e.g., typically during war) for relief.32 As well as the ego and the 
id, there exists the “superego,” the element that has internalized social rules or morality, 
and which can be traced back to the Oedipal experience. 
Here again, Freud’s model of the mind appears to help us understand, to a certain 
extent, what happens in Dick’s mind. On the one hand, Dick’s ego must heed his 
superego’s orders—‘do not love the same sex,’ ‘do not kill’ (both were illegal), and so 
on. On the other hand, his ego must be concerned with the opposing id, which tries to 
let him love—as the embodiment of Eros (the life drive)—or to engage in brutal 
behaviour—as the realization of Thanatos (the death drive). In short, his ego is torn 
between two conflicting drives. Dick therefore finds a compromise: under the pen-name 
of Pearl, he begins to fall in love with fictional boys and propagandistically urges others 
to work for the war (that is, mass murder/suicide). Although Huxley’s novella thus 
seems to correspond to Freud’s analyses of the mind and the war, going far beyond a 
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commonplace understanding of psychology, in my view it is crucial to look elsewhere—
namely, beyond Freud’s psychoanalysis—for a more appropriate evaluation of the work. 
 
3.3. “Richard Greenow” and Psychoanalysis (2): Melanie Klein and Beyond 
By applying dualisms (reason vs. emotion, peace vs. war), I have so far discussed 
Dick’s mind under the assumption that his relationship with Pearl is essentially that of 
contrasting personalities. This view appears to accord with Huxley’s calling the text 
“my dual personality story,” and critics’ reading of it within a framework of “a dualistic 
opposition.”33 But are Pearl and what she represents really in opposition to Dick? This 
section will carefully analyse this “dual personality story,” attempting to challenge this 
predominant view in search of a better understanding of the significance of the text. 
First of all, the emergence of Pearl, an emotional and aggressive personality, 
never means that Dick ever loses the disposition symbolized by her. The two 
personalities, Dick and Pearl, do not stand at opposite ends of a spectrum. For instance, 
at a meeting of pacifists Dick still cannot deny the existence of his “senseless irritation” 
with members of the lower classes and of his “pleasure” as incompatible with “reason”; 
his lecture also depends mainly on his “inspiration” and “passion” rather than logic (78-
81). Moreover, it is very doubtful that Dick is really a pacifist, especially when he 
regards other members as “queer” hypocrites interested only in “the salvation of their 
own souls,” disregarding “the welfare of humanity at large” (72), and when he even 
finds “a hot geyser of chauvinism bubbling up in his breast” (80).34 
Our doubt turns to certainty through a close reading of the scene soon after the 
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beginning of the war—the most detailed description in the text, stretching over several 
pages. On hearing of the war while in Scotland, Dick cannot keep still because of an 
unusual “horror,” and sets out for London in order to “act, or at least create the illusion 
of action,” leaving his sister behind (53). Due to his “nervous agitation” he cannot 
“sleep” in the train. In Glasgow, before the next train comes, he spends a few hours 
wandering about the “streets,” but the inhabitants of the city speaking their 
“incomprehensible” words make him “shudder,” causing him to feel as if he were 
standing in “an alien place” or “hell” (54). In the “crammed” train for London, he is 
surrounded by Italian passengers sleeping like “carcasses,” whose “breath,” in his 
“nightmarish” imagination, is something like poison gas that may cause “suffocat[ion]” 
and “disease” (54-55). After suffering from visual and auditory hallucinations (e.g., 
hearing the wheels shouting “the War, the War, the War”), he reaches London but still 
cannot stop the “twittering and jumping” of his “nerves,” the “tic in his face” or the 
“twitching of the muscles” (56). Feeling “exhausted” and “faint,” he is conscious of 
feeling physically and mentally “divi[ded]” or “broken,” which prevents him from 
engaging in ordinary activities such as “walking” and “speak[ing]” (56-58). 
In this scene, I would argue that Dick is simulatively undergoing the experience 
of a soldier heading for and standing on the front. For the military “action” in the 
“illusion,” he gets on a train, is sent off by his sister, and in the city “streets,” which can 
be identified as trenches, he encounters “hideous” “alien[s].” The train for London is 
also suggestive of a battlefield, or trenches in which soldiers are at times attacked by the 
enemy’s “suffocating” gas and also witness their “carcasses.”35 The disorders that Dick 
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undergoes as a virtual soldier are seen as the typical symptoms of “shell shock”: 
“fatigue, poor sleep, nightmares, jumpiness” and “a variety of somatic symptoms such 
as palpitations, chest pain, tremor, joint and muscle pains, loss of voice or hearing and 
functional paralysis” (Edgar Jones 23). Dick’s feeling of himself being divided or 
“broken” is also associated with the image of returned soldiers who were often called 
“Broken Soldiers,” as seen in, for example, articles since September 1916 in The Times 
(see also Cole 191-92).36 
Although he decides to join a pacifist movement, Dick, through this activity, is 
again fighting like a member of the army without being aware of it. Just as the army 
consists of young men grouped together beyond class distinctions under the name of (to 
use Siegfried Sassoon’s words) “Death’s Brotherhood,” this anti-war club is mainly 
based on male comradeship irrespective of class, especially in the friendship between 
the “leading spirits,” Dick and Hyman (72). Moreover, just as combatants on the front 
are forced to sacrifice themselves for the nation or the cause, Dick, at the tribunal for 
conscientious objectors, needs to prepare for being “killed” for his pacifist organization 
or because of his “belief” in “the solidarity of the human race” (83, 86). The similarity 
of Dick’s activity to military affairs is also suggested when the former is described using 
such words as “the cause worth fighting for,” “campaign,” “power[s],” “action,” “bold,” 
“strengthen” and “faith” (71-75; see also “army of vices” [74]), expressions clearly 
associated with the latter. After all, Dick, not being able to stick to “his principles,” is 
scurrilously denounced by Hyman and his sister as a “coward” who has “escaped” from 
his friends and beliefs, thus committing “treason” (88, 97-99); this scene is also 
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suggestive of the reaction of the army and the general public to deserters or shell-
shocked soldiers.37 
Towards the end of his life, Dick more straightforwardly undergoes simulated 
experience as a soldier. In a lunatic asylum, Dick attempts a hunger strike and is 
subjected to “forcible feeding,” a process in which he explicitly shares the sufferings of 
soldiers: 
He thought of the millions who had been and were still being slaughtered in 
the war; he thought of their pain, all the countless separate pains of them; 
pain incommunicable, individual, beyond the reach of sympathy; infinities 
of pain pent within frail finite bodies; pain without sense or object, bringing 
with it no hope and no redemption, futile, unnecessary, stupid. In one 
supreme apocalyptic moment he saw, he felt the universe in all its horror. 
(109) 
After all, his resistance brings Dick the wound by which he soon dies, simulatively 
experiencing the soldier’s end. What emerges in my reading is that Huxley’s text, 
despite appearing to be a simple story of opposing personalities (pacifist, cultural, 
rational vs. belligerent, violent, emotional), in fact carefully deconstructs this 
framework. In other words, Dick can never be fully analysed with a superficial 
understanding of Freud’s models (as shown in the previous section), i.e., in terms of 
mental dualism. This is a significant value of this text, I believe. 
Freud’s concept of “the death drive” was so problematic and controversial that 
even his daughter Anna was reluctant to use the term (though recognizing aggression in 
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general); it was Melanie Klein who, throughout her career, studied the death instinct 
most acutely and persistently.38 Despite Julia Kristeva’s remarks that Klein “did not 
focus on the political aspects of madness that tainted the twentieth century” (MK, 15), 
Klein’s thought—influential even now, especially in British psychoanalysis—has an 
aspect that indirectly addresses the question of war. As Michal Shapira clarifies, during 
the Second World War, Klein devoted much attention to the reactions of patients to war 
events (such as the Nazi invasion of Austria), and found a reciprocal connection 
between destructiveness in the outside world and destructiveness in the self, which one 
patient referred to as “the Hitler inside me.” Although Shapira appreciates Klein’s 
psychoanalysis as “unique” in that “it looked at the social and political issues of the 
time through a very personal perspective of the individual” (109), in his early writing 
around twenty years before Klein, Huxley had in fact made a similar attempt to draw a 
parallel between the actual war and the internal war of a civilian (see Limbo, 62, 70). 
What is more important to us, however, is Klein’s inquiry into human 
destructiveness, which has the radical potential to disturb the opposition between 
morality and violence, or possibly even peace and war. This can typically be seen in her 
view of the superego. While positioning the superego as cultural agency opposed to the 
violent id, Freud himself recognized the ambiguity of the superego, seeing in its 
sometimes harsh nature “a pure form of the death drive” (“The Ego and the Id” [1923], 
BPPOW, 143; see also “The Economic Problem of Masochism” [1924]). Although in 
“The Psychological Principles of Early Analysis” (1926) she had already begun to view 
the introjected hostile mother as the basis for an early persecutory superego, in the early 
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1930s Klein adopted Freud’s concepts of the life and death instincts to argue that the 
superego originates in the death instinct, which is fused with the life instinct.39 Here, we 
can no longer rely on a rough map displaying the superego as opposed to the id, and the 
life instinct as separated from the death instinct. 
This is one of the reasons that Klein’s thought has recently received much 
attention from critics interested in psychoanalysis. In The Culture of Redemption (1990), 
Leo Bersani, questioning a commonplace belief in culture’s ability to symbolize or 
repair sexuality and violence, through his reading of Klein, Freud and others, gives 
another perspective on culture, namely as a non-symbolizing or non-reparative result of 
sexual or violent energy (see Chapters 1 and 2). Lyndsey Stonebridge, in The 
Destructive Element: British Psychoanalysis and Modernism (1998), finds in both fields 
“the intractable complicity between the destructive element within and cultural and 
social violence without” (16); she also insists on the importance of Klein, who not only 
stresses Freud’s “image of a super-ego which does not simply repress murderous desires 
but draws from them and repeats their ferocity with all the violence that it at the same 
time prohibits” (7) but also comes to a paradoxical conclusion regarding the death 
instinct: “the culture of redemption [. . .] ultimately testifies to the omnipresence of 
aggression” (44). Influenced by their arguments, Fuhito Endo, in his essay “Radical 
Violence Inside Out: Woolf, Klein, and Interwar Politics” (2006), highlights the radical 
potential of Klein to psychoanalytically deconstruct “the conventional opposition of 
culture vs. violence”; in Klein’s theory, “the superego, far from being a cultural 
repression/sublimation of the id, is a form of the same primal sadism as the id. The 
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id/violence can be the radical core of the superego/culture, an ominous example of 
Freud’s paradox of the uncanny” (176).40 
Unfortunately none of these critics takes Huxley into account. I would argue, 
however, that the Kleinian attempt at deconstruction was already being practised 
effectively in Huxley’s early literary text. Dick appears to be cultural, following 
morality (=the superego), while Pearl seems much more violent, controlled by instincts 
(=the id); however, Dick, who, as my reading shows, simulatively experiences war 
through a pacifist campaign, is no more cultural or peaceful than Pearl, and may in 
some way be more violent than her—after all, she only writes about her support for the 
war. By showing this confusion, the text can be read as suggesting that the cultural and 
moral elements of rational order in the individual could paradoxically be 
indistinguishable from their supposed opposite—instinctual and violent elements which 
allow the individual to be selfish. 41 In Huxley’s story, culture’s redemptive aspect is 
diluted in two ways: culture—whether it is high (Dick’s philosophical work) or low 
(Pearl’s popular writing)—is never a peaceful, redemptive result of controlling violence 
but something rather more dangerous that recapitulates violence, or may be an act of 
violence itself. 
In “Notes on Some Schizoid Mechanisms” (1946), Klein compiled her previous 
theories, introducing new concepts such as “the paranoid-schizoid position” (as opposed 
to “the depressive position”) and “projective identification.” Very young infants feel that 
there exist a ‘good’ mother (loving them and being loved by them) and a ‘bad’ mother 
(hating them and being hated by them); this is the paranoid-schizoid position. Later, 
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realizing that these ‘good’ and ‘bad’ objects are the same mother as one object, infants 
come to feel guilt; this is the depressive position. The ego and the superego are formed 
through this process.42 Unlike Freud’s chronological notion of “stages,” Klein’s 
positions continue in relationships with others even after maturity, although the ratio of 
each position changes according to the time and depending on the person (generally, 
leaning towards the depressive side is a ‘normal’ state, while leaning the other way 
leads to mental illness). In the paranoid-schizoid position, individuals suffer persecutory 
anxiety: in an unconscious phantasy called “projective identification,” aspects of an 
internal object (such as aggression) are split off and attributed to an external object.43 
This perspective may be applied to proceed towards an explanation of the psychology of 
human beings that lies behind war. In peacetime, most people can manage to see the 
other in an ambiguous manner, as naturally having both good and bad sides, but in war, 
people enter into collective paranoia, entirely projecting an internal bad object onto the 
other and thus making the enemy a purely bad object to be destroyed.44  
In Huxley’s text, Dick is naturally cast into paranoia with a triple structure 
because he faces three sorts of war—namely, the war outside (against Germany; see 
113), the war inside (against Pearl; see 62, 70) and what I have called the simulative war 
(against the imaginary enemy). Among them, the first type of war is clear and natural in 
wartime, but the second and third types of war are peculiar and worth examining. Of 
course they do deconstruct the relationship between the self and the other, or the friend 
and the enemy, but I would discuss another aspect—namely, the reasons for Dick’s 




In the third type of war, the enemy appears for Dick as a form of ‘the masses.’ His 
hostility towards the masses is repeatedly described, but the two most conspicuous 
examples are the scenes where Dick sees the crowds in the street45 and when he talks 
with working-class participants of a pacifist meeting. In the former scene, Dick is 
surprised by the sight of the masses “so numerous and so uniformly hideous”: “Small, 
deformed, sallow, they seemed malignantly ugly, as if on purpose” (53). In the latter, 
Dick reluctantly dines and talks with pacifists of “the middle classes, the lower middle 
classes, the lower classes” (77), feeling a “senseless irritation”: “They degraded what 
was noble; beauty became fly-blown at their touch. Their intellectual tradition was all 
wrong. [. . .] When they talked about war and the International, Dick felt a hot geyser of 
chauvinism bubbling up in his breast” (80). It should not be surprising to see such 
persecutory anxiety held by an upper-middle-class intellectual, considering that in 
wartime, as is often noted, class differences were to some extent relativized because of 
the stress placed on national identity; the periods before and after the war saw the 
masses ‘invading’ politics and culture—territories formerly occupied by the upper and 
upper-middle classes—e.g., through extended suffrage and the improved status of 
craftsmen (see 30, 79). The text takes care to show that hateful pictures of the masses 
are a result of something like paranoia, where an upper-middle-class intellectual 
projects his own hateful image onto them.46 For instance, Dick, although shocked by the 
monstrous image of the crowd, is himself later seen by others similarly as “a kind of 
monster” (56). Despite his hatred towards pacifists of the lower classes, Dick also feels 
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like “a bloodsucker” living parasitically off them, whose subject is thus composed of the 
object he hates. 
Another of the objects of Dick’s persecutory anxiety is women. Of course, this 
may be explained in the same way as his anxiety about the masses; as Dick tells 
Millicent, both during and after the war there was a certain male horror of women, who 
were ‘invading’ areas formerly occupied by men, such as politics (95-96, see also 69, 
100-02). I would adopt another perspective, however, to consider Pearl, who associates 
femininity with aggression. It will be helpful in this respect to refer to Freud’s Leonardo 
da Vinci and a Memory of His Childhood (1910, trans. 1916).47 In some respects, Dick 
appears to resemble Freud’s da Vinci. For example, Freud describes him as an 
ambiguous genius who has talent in both the arts and science, and who is both a pacifist 
and an inventor of weapons; da Vinci is a rare case who “succeeded in saving the 
greater part of his libido from repression by sublimating it into a thirst for knowledge” 
(U, 104). More importantly, in Freud’s view, da Vinci was a homosexual or 
hermaphrodite with a “womanly” personality, internalizing his lost mother within 
himself (see 50, 73-74). It is probably interesting to look at Dick’s hermaphrodite or 
homosexual nature in the same way: Pearl can be identified as his lost mother, although 
he represses his memories of her (see 65). However, while da Vinci’s mother as depicted 
by Freud is a pacifist woman who loves her son, Pearl is a belligerent mother who sends 
her son to the battlefield. Certainly, Dick’s mother is dead. Yet if she were alive, she 
would drive her son to death like other mothers at the time, saying: “Go! It’s your duty 
lad. Join to-day.”48 This terrible nightmare can be seen in the context of Dick’s 
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paranoiac horror of women.49 
It might be more than speculation to identify such paranoia as being shared by the 
author. The image of the mother here comprises two women—his real mother and his 
aunt, Mary Ward. Huxley certainly drops hints at his deep affection towards Ward: Dick 
has “a great Freudian passion for his aunt,” vividly remembering his “kneeling on 
Auntie’s lap,” pressed to her “[b]osom” (66, 68).50 Indeed, there even exists a 
photograph of Huxley and his aunt in the same pose (as printed in Bedford, after page 
232). Ward was certainly similar to a mother in several ways: she was Aldous’s 
godmother, helped develop his literary talent, and took on the role of mother to the 
Huxley siblings after their real mother’s death.51 If we assume this identification to be 
operative, and consider the fact that this quasi-mother really was writing war 
propaganda,52 it would not be strange if Huxley, when characterizing Pearl, had in mind 
his real mother, who would have sent him to the front if she had been alive and he had 
not been disqualified from military service. Because of this secret paranoia, Huxley may 
have put the bellicose image of the mother into the hermaphrodite protagonist, instead 
of Freud’s basically peaceful one.53 
By deconstructing seemingly evident distinctions between reason and instincts, 
culture and violence, peace and war, and friends and the enemy, “Richard Greenow” 
links itself to psychoanalytic issues that are still current. However, this radical potential 
of the text cannot be necessarily attributed to the author’s original intention of writing a 
“dual personality story”; Huxley may have made such a complicated story, consciously 
or unconsciously reflecting his personal feelings about the war. Of course, we must be 
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careful about simply identifying a fictional character’s psychology with the author’s, but 
it may be possible to take from it a lead for approaching hidden aspects of the author’s 
attitude towards the war. 
 
3.4. Huxley’s Unconscious Desires: Two Other Pieces of His War Writing 
Let us turn our attention to Huxley’s other works on the war, written in the same 
time. “Happily Ever After,” included in Limbo, is a short story set during the war. The 
plot can be summarized as follows. In the fourth year of war, Jacobson, an old 
academic, calls on his friend Petherton, a philosopher in Wiltshire who has a daughter, 
Marjorie. When summer comes, the house becomes alive with three visitors, Rogers 
(Petherton’s brother), and two returned soldiers, Guy (Marjorie’s fiancé) and George (a 
friend of the family), who soon return to military service. The trio of three elderly men 
regard war as necessary, and Marjorie feels it is a matter of little relevance to her, but 
after a while they are made painfully aware of the distress (and perhaps irrationality) of 
war by finding out that George has lost a leg and Guy has been killed. The story ends 
describing Marjorie in a self-reproachful mood, being comforted by George, with the 
ironic suggestion that these two will be married. 
The final scene between Marjorie and George appears to reflect the author’s guilt 
as a survivor. On hearing of Guy’s death, Marjorie, who was loved by him and who also 
liked him, criticizes herself as a “beast,” realizing that she has been “awful” and “hated 
him,” and that she can still “laugh” in this situation (188). Soon more positive feelings 
emerge in her and George, however: “We who knew him and loved him must make our 
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lives a memorial of him”; “our darling Guy is with us here even now” (191). This scene 
may remind us of Freud’s discussion of mourning. A survivor’s ambiguous attitude 
towards the dead (e.g., unconscious desire for the death of the loved) is mentioned in 
Totem and Taboo (1913, trans. 1918), later associated with the background of guilt and 
morality in Timely Reflections on War and Death. In Mourning and Melancholia (1917), 
Freud defines melancholia as the state of internalizing the love-object (identifying 
oneself with the dead), which is unlike the mourning in which the object can be 
relinquished; in both cases, however, the individual shows “self-reproach for having 
been oneself responsible for the loss of the love-object, of having wanted that loss” 
(MMM, 211). Freud’s arguments would be endorsed by Marjorie’s ambiguity and self-
reproach concerning this tragedy, and more importantly by her and George’s feeling of 
identification with the dead, Guy. On the other hand, the story, by suggesting that these 
survivors will live “happily ever after,” hints at another function of mourning, that is, 
establishing identification also between survivors. This may put the text beyond Freud 
again. In The Psychic Life of Power: Theories in Subjection (1997), Judith Butler, by 
referring to Klein’s concept of “guilt” as “a way of preserving the object of love from 
one’s own potentially obliterating violence,” mentions the possibility that “guilt 
emerges in the course of melancholia not only, as the Freudian view would have it, to 
keep the dead object alive, but to keep the living object from ‘death’” (25).54 Butler 
goes on to argue that the constitutive aspect of melancholia, i.e., (in Jacques Derrida’s 
words) “the affirmative incorporation of the other [into the ego],” has the subversive 
potential to question the ontological notion of “autonomy” (195). 
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Like Marjorie (this means, incidentally, that the author puts himself on the female 
side), Huxley probably felt guilt because of his ambiguous position with regard to the 
war: certainly it brought immeasurable misfortune on many people, and of course some 
of this was suffered by Huxley too, but at the same time it gave him moments of great 
happiness, such as his encounter with Maria, a Belgian refugee who stayed in 
Garsington for a time.55 Some of Huxley’s wartime letters seem to testify that such 
guilt—naturally shared by many civilians and returned soldiers—had a psychological 
function of forging or deepening a survivor’s ties not only with the dead but with other 
survivors. For instance, he writes to Jelly d’Aranyi: “one way that people survive after 
they are dead is in the society to which they belong and particularly in their friends” (c. 
13 July 1916, Sexton 28); here, he appears to relativize the distinction between the war 
dead and the survivors. On the other hand, an example of relativizing the distinctions 
among survivors can be found in another of his wartime letters to d’Aranyi, in which he 
mentions the “long casualty lists,” including many names he knew, and insists on the 
importance of “friendship” and “love”; he then turns his thoughts to his memories of his 
mother and Trevenen, who had died of causes unrelated to the war (October 1915, 
Smith 83). Here Huxley, placing his mother and brother on the same level as war 
casualties, seems to identify himself with bereaved families. 
If we are to understand that Huxley stands on the side of the war dead, “Happily 
Ever After” might be read as more radically disclosing some of his secret desires. 
Indeed, Huxley apparently empathizes with Guy, an introspective and shy poet who, 
having served for the Air Board, is “too clever” and “rather inhuman” (180). I would 
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argue that Huxley, through this character, tried to consciously or unconsciously 
experience the tragic but heroic destiny of a soldier that he in reality could not 
undergo—an alternative destiny in which Huxley, free from disability, goes to the front 
for the Cause, leaving behind a woman he loves.56 In “The Creative Writer and 
Daydreaming” (1908), Freud, regarding the “literary work” as “a continuation of, and a 
substitute for, the earlier play of childhood” (U, 32), contends: “Unsatisfied desires are 
the motive forces behind fantasies, every fantasy being a wish-fulfilment, correcting an 
unsatisfactory reality” (28). Huxley’s unsatisfied desire to be a soldier may be seen as 
being driven by something like the death instinct, but at the same time it was probably 
supported by something more similar to the life instinct, the search for a sense of 
belonging, originating not so much in patriotism but in the loneliness that, having been 
unable to join the army, he experienced in wartime and beyond. This secret desire may 
be the very thing that makes his “Richard Greenow” so complex, far beyond the simple 
story of a man with contrasting pacifist and militarist personalities that Huxley probably 
originally had in mind. In the novella, Dick, reflecting the author’s repressed desire, 
comes to simulatively experience war, wishing for a sense of togetherness, which he 
finally attains with soldiers on the front—though only for a “moment.”57 
Another example of his war writing is the long poem “Soles Occidere et Redire 
Possunt,” published in Leda (1920). In the foreword, Huxley declares that the poem is 
dedicated to his friend, John Ridley, who was killed in February 1918, and who, five 
weeks before his death, made a “request” to him in a letter: “if I should perish—and one 
isn’t exactly a ‘good life’ at the moment—I wish you’d write something about me” 
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(CPAH, 109). The poem, setting up this dead friend as its “subject” (109), recounts a 
brief time in the life of a young man called John, who is staying at home because of a 
wound but will soon be sent back to the front. It begins with a youth’s dream before the 
dawn. Having risen from his bed, he goes to lunch at his aunt’s, and at night, stays with 
his lover, Jenny.58 
Apparently Ridley, depicted both in the foreword and the main text, was very 
similar to Huxley. According to the foreword, he was “an adolescent, and suffered from 
that instability of mind” and was “so feebly sceptical, so inefficient, so profoundly 
unhappy” (110); the fictional Ridley is interested in writing (116), has an indecisive 
character (111, 122-23) and prefers being an individual to being in a crowd (113, 118-
19)—just like most protagonists in Huxley’s early works, such as the poet Denis Stone 
in Crome Yellow (1921), Guy, and Dick, who has an aunt with the same nickname as 
Ridley’s. Here again, the poem may be seen as the fulfilment of Huxley’s hidden wish 
for a soldier’s tragic destiny. At the same time, this identification with the dead Ridley 
can also signify the author’s guilt as a survivor, or the work of mourning for this friend. 
From this angle, the title—“Suns May Set and Yet Rise Again,” borrowed from 
Catullus, where a boy tries to persuade a girl to seize the day and make love with him 
as, unlike the sun, they are mortals—would come to represent the author’s ambiguity 
towards the present situation: he is grateful to be privileged to be still able to see the 
sun, and yet feels guilt for this. However, considering that Ridley does not seem to have 
been an especially close friend of his,59 it is probable that the poem embodies another 
sort of wish fulfilment: by embellishing his relationship with Ridley so it seems closer 
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than it was, Huxley may be consciously or unconsciously seeking to simulatively 
undergo the serious mourning and guilt that are only allowed between men on the front, 
based on their sincere friendship.60 
In contrast to his wartime tendency towards pacifism as avowed in his letters and 
confirmed by previous studies, a reading of these literary pieces, together with “Richard 
Greenow,” suggests hidden aspects of Huxley’s mind in and shortly after the war, such 
as his longing for a soldier’s fate. 
 
4. Conclusion 
Through a close reading of his early writing, I have so far addressed hitherto 
unanalysed sides of Huxley and his work in relation to psychoanalysis and the Great 
War. “Richard Greenow” narrates a man with two personalities as a pacifist and a 
militarist, by representing the human mind more pessimistically and complicatedly than 
other contemporary war fiction, such as anti-war novels that expect minority groups 
(e.g., homosexuals, the disabled, artists and intellectuals) to be pacifist. Although 
because of his acute interest in aggression Huxley was critical of Freud’s early theory 
focused on sexual matters, his text displayed curious parallels with, or even anticipated, 
some facets of Freud’s writing on the war or his metapsychology centred on the death 
drive. By reflecting his conscious or unconscious mind, Huxley’s novella also deviated 
from his probably originally-intended framework of a story of contrasting personalities. 
The protagonist simulatively experiences war when he behaves as Dick, a rational and 
cultural pacifist, as if to prove this personality to be no less aggressive than Pearl, an 
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instinctive and violent propagandist. This deconstruction of the apparently opposing 
relationship between the cultural and violent elements in the mind allows the text to be 
compared with some significant aspects of psychoanalysis—particularly the paradoxical 
arguments shared by Klein and more recent critics of psychoanalysis—such as the 
scepticism towards the position of the superego as opposed to the id, and towards the 
notion of culture as a redemptive product of controlling and repressing violence. 
His personal situation during the war could have also prompted Huxley to write 
such a text, despite his limited knowledge of psychoanalysis. The radical potential of 
Freud’s and Klein’s work can be seen as attempts at questioning and subverting the 
distinctions or categories that have been established or acknowledged by many, 
including the analysts themselves. As has often been stated, psychoanalysis itself was 
born as a discipline that questioned the existing ones, and has developed through 
‘outsiders’—e.g., Jews, women and foreigners—who may in themselves have subverted 
conventional concepts such as ‘home’ and ‘friends.’61 Freud and Klein, though both 
civilians, built their theories under the influence of the two world wars, and lived under 
the shadow of death—not only their own but also that of family members. Curiously 
enough, having been unable to join the army, Huxley came to find himself during the 
Great War in a solitary position like that of a woman or a foreigner,62 consistently 
exposed to the thought of death, represented firstly by his suicidal brother and later by 
the many war casualties among his friends. 
Two other pieces of Huxley’s war writing, “Happily Ever After” and “Soles 
Occidere et Redire Possunt,” may help us to conceive of some hidden aspects of the 
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author’s mental state in and after the war. It can be argued that Huxley, led not only by 
something like the death instinct but by something like the life instinct as well, held 
secret desires to become a soldier and have male friendships, i.e., a sense of 
togetherness on the battlefield. These hidden wishes of the author, which contributed to 
the complexity of “Richard Greenow,” may bring to light the other side of his mind, 
which is different from the anti-war tenor evoked by his wartime letters. 
Why did Huxley call the story a “Farcical History” and recount it as a farce? 
Perhaps we should not seek out division but harmony or unity between his serious 
insights into the war and human psychology and his unserious style of narrating them.63 
Precisely in his despair over what he had realized during wartime, Huxley likely had no 
choice but to laugh at it, or to treat it as ludicrously improbable, partly because of his 
reluctance to accept it as the truth. As a result of developing the tale under his funny 
touch, Huxley succeeded not only in stressing the desperation of the desperate all the 
more but also in making the story worth reading until the end. Already in this debut 
piece of fiction Huxley demonstrated one of his primary literary styles—writing about 
the miserable or the hopeless with a façade of farce—the method that would work most 
effectively in Brave New World. 
Although the main interest of the present chapter is in his early writing, it is worth 
briefly discussing how Huxley subsequently faced his personal memories of the war and 
the theme of war in general, in order to reconsider his relationship with psychoanalysis. 
In the first three novels, Huxley seems to have repressed his memories of the war64; 
only in Point Counter Point, published ten years after the armistice, did he begin to 
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represent his traumatic war. The novelist Philip Quarles appears to be “thankful” to have 
been unfit for military service due to his lame leg,65 but actually lives with a sense of 
guilt and inferiority.66 This is typically suggested in the scene where, after travelling 
from overseas, Philip hesitates to jump across the “chasm” between the ship and the 
launch (as if to display his own anxiety that he might not be accepted by his country), 
and is helped by a military man, but irrationally becomes disturbed when the man asks 
whether his leg was damaged in the war (297-99).67 
Later, Huxley consistently tried to find ways to prevent war in the future, but it is 
doubtful that he could ever completely escape from the image of war. Brave New World 
envisages the world state of the twentieth-sixth century, most of which is civilized and 
peaceful as a result of political and scientific methods, including Freudian theory,68 but 
some of which is preserved as “Savage Reservations,” where people still live with 
violence and pain. The main plot is the uncanny return of the Savage into civilized 
society, suggesting that aggression cannot be completely eliminated from humanity. 
Facing the danger of another world war, Huxley concerned himself with absolute 
pacifism (which can be seen as an attempt at the absolute repression of war and of his 
memories of the Great War), based on his scientific and religious belief in the “unity” of 
all creatures and existences—as described in Eyeless in Gaza (1936).69 After the Second 
World War,70 Huxley wrote Ape and Essence (1948), a nightmarish story of the future 
after a nuclear war, displaying his despair over human beings, who have been repeatedly 
brought back to war as a repetition-compulsion as if led by “the Devil” or the death 
instinct (see especially 37). In his last novel, Island (1962), Huxley dreams up an ideal 
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society of pacifists, using all his knowledge of Western and Eastern cultures, but 
destroys it himself through invasion by militaristic countries.71 
Objectively and subjectively, Huxley thus suffered the uncanny return of war 
despite his consistent longing for peace; it looks as if he himself tried to prove—through 
his failure to solve the problem of war—what in his debut work of fiction he had argued 
and suggested about human aggression. This may remind us of what Jacqueline Rose, a 
critic of psychoanalysis, calls “the ethics of failure” (WW, 36). If in the name of 
“absolute truth” we try to unify or master chaotic or diverse things into one theory, this 
can lead to repeating dictatorship, violence or war—the very object we criticize (see 23-
24, 35-36). The ethical, anti-war value can thus be found—again, paradoxically—in the 
failure of Freud and other critics to theorize the death instinct and war, and their 
hesitation to instantly solve the problem (36-37).72 By this logic, “Richard Greenow” 
appears as a pacifist text, in that it critically identifies the violence of pacifism (Dick) 
with that of war itself (Pearl).73 Paradoxically, the repeated failures of pacifism in 
Huxley’s writing guarantee an anti-war ethic, and his own recognition of the difficulty 
of abolishing war also means the author’s maximum effort at being a pacifist. 
To turn again to Huxley’s relationship with psychoanalysis, his persistent 
dissatisfaction with this discipline may be explained by his capacity to gain deep 
insights into human psychology without relying on it. In a certain sense, Huxley proved 
his own claim that literature could address the mind more accurately and essentially 
than so-called psychology or psychoanalysis.74 He gradually directed his interest 
towards mysticism and religion to see the mind from another angle, while severely 
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attacking psychoanalysis and most aspects of psychology for paying little attention to 
these fields.75 Yet, thanks to his reluctance to earnestly study psychoanalysis, his 
literature successfully anticipated some arguments of current psychoanalytic criticism. 
Lastly, let us return to the overall theme of this dissertation, the issue of identity. 
In his early writing, as demonstrated above, Huxley had already consciously or 
unconsciously questioned the concept of self, suggesting that Otherness (the woman, the 
alien, the masses) is immanent in the self and that the image of Others can be forged 
through the projection of that of the self. Yet Huxley did not attempt to close the 
distance between himself and Others, instead showing his paranoid horror of belligerent 
women, monstrous masses and beastly aliens.76 Ideologically, could Huxley later 
grapple with political and social issues related to these Others? Personally, could he 
come to feel empathy for them? These are the questions that I will approach in the 
following three chapters. 
                                                
1 Huxley’s wartime isolation is suggested by Randall Stevenson as a possible reason “why he went on to 
write fiction [such as Brave New World] in which enclaves of cultured individuals often flourish only 
through isolation—essential but precarious—from the vicissitudes of a wider society” (118; see also 115). 
2 In 1915, Huxley met Lawrence, and from 1926, deepened his friendship with him. In 1927, Huxley 
recorded in his diary: “He is one of the few people I feel real respect and admiration for. Of most other 
eminent people I have met I feel that at any rate I belong to the same species as they do. But this man has 
something different and superior in kind, not degree” (“D. H. Lawrence,” published in Olive Tree [1936], 
AHCEIV, 88). Huxley stayed with Lawrence while he was on his deathbed in 1930, and after his death 
edited The Letters of D. H. Lawrence (1932). 
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3 See his letters to Leonard Huxley, 21 January 1916, Smith 89-90; to Lewis Gielgud, late May 1917, 
Smith 125. 
4 For this paragraph, see Bedford 750-51; see also Ronald W. Clark, The Huxleys, Chapters 7, 8 and 10. 
For details on Huxley’s Oxford days, see David Bradshaw’s recent essay, where he cites many 
unpublished materials, including Huxley’s diary: “‘A Blind Stay-at-Home Mole’: Huxley at Oxford, 
1913-1916” (2014). 
5 Huxley also intimates the need for an immediate ceasefire: “the war becomes more ghastly day by day 
and every day it becomes most obvious that it is a folly and a crime to go on” (letter to Julian, May 1917, 
Smith 124). 
6 Comparing the attitudes towards the war of two Oxford non-combatants, Huxley and Vera Brittain, 
Claudia Rosenhan demonstrates that, despite the differences of gender, character, background, etc., 
between these authors “exists a sympathetic connection rooted in their specific kind of indirect 
witnessing—an authentic act of testifying to the horrors of wanton death and destruction” (“Vera Brittain 
and Aldous Huxley: A Testament / Defeat of Youth—A Gendered Response to Education and War?” 
[2014], 239). 
7 See his letters to Julian, 20 November 1918 and 5 January 1919, Smith 170, 174. See also Bedford 108. 
8 Unlike Sandra M. Gilbert, Susan Gubar and Robin Ann Sheets, Erik Svarny finds in this text something 
like progressive significance: “[It] leads us to consider the construction of masculinity [i.e., the blurring 
of gender identity] within the larger context of combatant war writing and cultural practice [by Robert 
Graves, Siegfried Sassoon and those around them]” (68, see 65, 72). For the relationship of Ward with 
Huxley, see e.g., Helen Small, “Mrs Humphry Ward and the First Casualty of War” (1997), 18-20. 
9 For details on wartime fiction, see George Robb, British Culture and the First World War (2002), 151-
54. 
10 In 1919, Huxley contributed many articles to the Athenaeum and other journals; his subjects included 
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Macaulay (see Bedford 107). Macaulay also appreciated Huxley’s early novels (see A. Crawford 78). 
11 Curiously, the last chapters of Non-Combatants and Others are reminiscent of Huxley’s Eyeless in 
Gaza (1936). For Alix, a guru equivalent to Anthony’s Miller is her mother, Daphne Sandomir, an 
international activist who, on meeting her daughter, can correctly guess the state of her health, giving 
medical instructions—just as Miller does for Anthony. Like Anthony’s, Alix’s pacifism is also based on 
her belief in unity. In the 1930s, both Huxley and Macaulay organized the Peace Pledge Union, and their 
literature and political activity may be worthy of comparison in the light of pacifism. 
12 In February 1919, Ottoline Morrell had tea with Allatini. Virginia Woolf describes this in her diary (25 
February 1919): “Allatini has had her novel burnt by the hangman. Allatini [. . .] had to be fed on bath 
buns, which Ottoline had by her—& confided, of course, the story of her unhappy love, which made it 
necessary for her to be fed on Bath Buns” (Diary I, 246). See also Woolf’s letter to Vanessa Bell, 26 April 
1919, Nicolson II, 150. Meanwhile, in 1914, Allatini published Happy Ever After, a title similar to 
Huxley’s short story in Limbo, “Happily Ever After.” 
13 As Dick secretly fights against Pearl, Dennis undergoes “the perpetual war against part of their [his] 
own selves [self]” (66). 
14 In the tribunal scene, a suffragist appears as a person equivalent to Dennis, both suffering a cruel 
destiny due to their political beliefs (see 259). The same sort of allusion is adopted by Huxley, who sends 
Dick to an asylum because of his (her) application for suffrage and kills him by force-feeding, a technique 
often used on imprisoned suffragists (see Gilbert 133; see also Showalter FM, 162-64). 
15 In fact, there is another main character, Antoinette (probably modelled after Allatini), who is lesbian or 
bisexual. This novel, especially this ending, inevitably reminds us of Edward Carpenter—an advocate of 
homosexual rights and an opponent of the war—whose book Towards Democracy Dennis reads in the 
story (see 239). In Lesbian Empire: Radical Crosswriting in the Twenties (2001), Gay Wachman argues 
that Carpenter’s works, particularly Love’s Coming-of-Age, The Intermediate Sex, and Intermediate Types 
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among Primitive Folk, are “the sources for Allatini’s powerful representation of the link between 
compulsory heterosexuality and imperialist capitalism” (106). For a comparison of this novel with 
Hamilton’s and Macaulay’s work, see e.g., Claire M. Tylee, The Great War and Women’s Consciousness: 
Images of Militarism and Womanhood in Women’s Writings, 1914-64 (1990), Chapter 4. 
16 Courtney Andree argues: “both novelists [Macaulay and Allatini] draw attention to what their disabled 
characters are capable of accomplishing with their anti-war activities. While both are shown to be 
outsiders on a number of levels, their mental fortitude and creativity are revealed to be more necessary 
than ever before in the midst of a society struggling with war” (“Non-Combatants and Other Peace 
Activists: ‘Everyday’ Disability in a Time of War” [2014], see the last paragraph of this unpaginated 
essay). 
17 Of course, this satire could be directed at Huxley’s acquaintances. Bertrand Russell was energetically 
engaged in the anti-war movement, believing that under the “honour of human nature,” it was his 
“business to protest, however futile protest might be,” even though it is “hardly supposed that much good 
would come of opposing the War” (18). Yet Huxley mentions Russell coldly: “Not a thing I’d choose to 
be sentenced on—it is so curiously foolish. [. . .] He is appealing, but I dont suppose that will make any 
difference” (letter o Julian, 3 March 1918, Smith 146). Lytton Strachey, despite having the potential to be 
rejected for military service (and he really obtained this result), deliberately applied for the status of a 
conscientious objector and joined the pacifist campaign with Russell. Strachey was homosexual, like 
Dick, and some of his experiences at the tribunal—such as his statement that his application was not 
religious, and being questioned before his sister(s) about what he would do if he saw a German soldier 
attempting to rape his sister—are seen in Dick’s experiences (Holroyd 626, 628-29; Huxley Limbo, 85-
87). Clifford Allen, Chairman of the No-Conscription Fellowship, who was imprisoned as a conscientious 
objector, was also a guest of Ottoline Morrell between June and September 1916 (see Miranda Seymour, 
Ottoline Morrell: Life on the Grand Scale [London, 1993], 357-58). 
64 
 
                                                                                                                                          
18 For the above outline of modernism and psychoanalysis, see Stephen Frosh, “Psychoanalysis in Britain: 
‘The Rituals of Destruction’” (2003). As is well known, war neuroses prompted—through W. H. R. 
Rivers (a psychiatrist who treated neurotic soldiers, including Siegfried Sassoon)—the promulgation of 
Freud’s theories in British psychiatry (see e.g., Showalter FM, 189). 
19 For The Interpretation of Dreams, see Antic Hay (1923), Chapter 4; Huxley’s letter to Julian, 17 May 
1935, Smith 395; Brave New World Revisited (1958), Chapter 9. For The Schreiber Case, see his letter to 
Julian, 12 December 1957, Smith 837. For Totem and Taboo, see After Many a Summer (1939), Part 3, 
Chapter 1. For Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-Year-Old Boy, see “Two or Three Graces” (1926). 
20 Huxley’s ultimate dislike of Freud remains “a vexing problem” (Baker DHP, 112). On the one hand, 
Huxley’s negative feelings can be explained from the difference of their opinions, as described above; in 
Jerome Meckier’s view, for Huxley, Freud was an “egocentric prisoner” of his “own reductive system,” 
based on the simplistic, “behaviorist” understanding of the mind (AHMSNI, 131; see also Thody 53-55). 
Yet some critics try to prove Huxley’s positive acceptance of Freud’s theories. According to Robert S. 
Baker, Freud’s concepts, including “the Freudian family romance,” play important roles in Huxley’s 
novels, from Point Counter Point to After Many a Summer (DHP, 142-43). Brad Buchanan also argues 
that in Brave New World Huxley’s “satirical attack” is grounded on the validity of the “Oedipus 
Complex” (118). If so, there must have been more personal, emotional aspects of Huxley’s dislike of 
Freud. Regarding this point, Philip Thody indicates the appropriateness of “Freudian” theories in relation 
to Huxley’s feelings towards his parents, such as his “adoration of his mother” and “intense jealousy for 
his father” (16). The possibility is also suggested by Charles M. Holmes that Huxley’s denial of Freud’s 
psychoanalysis is “unconscious rejection” because of “Freud’s emphasis on sex and Huxley’s near-
obsession with it” (AHWR, 147). However, it is difficult to fully understand why Huxley had to attack 
Freud so severely throughout his writing career—as if obsessed. This is one of the questions that I would 
like to reconsider in the present chapter. 
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21 For Huxley’s interest in Jung’s theories, particularly his psychological types, see Proper Studies (1928), 
AHCEII, 150, 170; Adonis and the Alphabet [1956], AHCEV, 196, 342. In Mysterium Coniunctionis 
(1956), Jung also refers to Huxley’s Grey Eminence (1941) (376). In this book, Jung pays much attention 
to the medieval concept of the “unus mundus,” which is the “potential world, the eternal Ground of all 
empirical being” (534). Among pre-Freudian psychologists, Huxley appreciated F. W. H. Myers and 
William James for their deep (non-monolithic) understanding of the unconscious (see “Genius,” Esquire 
[1956], AHCEVI, 327; “The Oddest Science,” Esquire [1957], AHCEVI, 83; BNW, 204). In his essays and 
letters, Huxley mentions more recent studies on psychology or psychoanalysis, e.g., those written by Ira 
Progoff, Erich Fromm and William Sheldon (see “The Oddest Science,” AHCEVI, 77-81). 
22 See Proper Studies, AHCEII, 150; The Art of Seeing (1942), preface; Perennial Philosophy (1945), 
Chapter 6; Literature and Science (1963), AHCEVI, 140-41; Island (1962), 141. 
23 Since Dick replies “Wilkinson” (whose nick-name is “God”) to the question “God,” Rogers stupidly 
tells that a cause may be Dick’s “passion, almost religious in its fervour and intensity, for somebody 
called Wilkinson” (67-68). 
24 The first English book of Freud’s writing, Studies on Hysteria (org. 1895), translated by A. A. Brill, 
appeared in 1909. The Bloomsbury intellectuals, James and Alix Strachey, were familiar with Freud as 
early as the mid-1910s (see Bloomsbury/Freud: The Letters of James and Alix Strachey, 1924-1925 
[1986], ed. Perry Meisel and Walter Kendrick, 27). J. S. Haldane, a physiologist, investigated Germany’s 
use of poison gas and invented the gas mask. During the war, his son, J. B. S. Haldane, fought in the 
army, while his daughter, Naomi Haldane (Mitchison), served as a nurse. 
25 In terms of gender or sexuality, too, there may be some intertextuality between Dick/Pearl and 
psychoanalysis. In a letter to Julian (5 September 1927), Huxley states: “according to Freud, [. . .] I have 
secret homosexual tastes” (Smith 290). Some of Freud’s writing on sexuality, such as Three Essays on the 
Theory of Sexuality (1905, trans. 1910), were available (see also Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of His 
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Childhood, mentioned below). By using the concepts of Anima and animus, Jung describes the 
unconscious female image in men and the unconscious male image in women; the early version of this 
idea already appeared in his Psychology of the Unconscious (1912, trans. 1916). 
26 The book was translated in 1918; it did not become particularly well known, however, so, Huxley 
probably did not read it. 
27 In addition, Freud observes that even intellectuals experience the same “regression” because “our 
intelligence,” such as “reasons” and “logical” ability, is never “autonomous” and can be a slave to “strong 
emotional impulses” (see MMM, 181). This seems to fit well with the relationship between Dick and 
Pearl. 
28 In his open letter to Albert Einstein (Why War? [1932]), Freud repeats, though more plainly, almost the 
same argument on war and peace. 
29 In March 1919, when the borders of his home country were changed by foreigners as a part of the post-
war settlement, it was realized by Freud how interchangeable the concepts of home and alien were: “we 
are not permitted to join Germany but must yield up South Tyrol. To be sure, I’m not a patriot, but it is 
painful to think that pretty much the whole world will be foreign territory” (qtd. in Gay 380).  
30 The concept of the uncanny is important in terms of “the intersection of different generic affiliations in 
Freud’s oeuvre” (Masschelein 20), but strangely enough, Freud subsequently referred back to this essay 
only a few times—as if the text itself had been “uncanny” for him. 
31 Furthermore, the images associated with Pearl, such as “nocturnal existence” (62), “ghost” (63), “devil” 
(71) and “double” (82), are typical images or examples of the concept of the uncanny mentioned by Freud 
or critics. For the “double” and “ghost,” see Freud U, 142-43, 148; for the “night,” see e.g., Bronfen 52. 
32 In Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920), Freud introduces the notion of the death drive to explain the 
repeated nightmares of returned soldiers—a “repetition-compulsion” which is apparently incoherent with 
the pleasure principle. 
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33 See his letters to Julian, 20 November 1918 and 5 January 1919, Smith 170, 174. Critics have also 
regarded the text as a tale of two opposing values: “This story set out a dualistic opposition between mind 
and world, contemplation and action, and indeed between philosophy and the novel, which remained 
central to Huxley’s work of the 1920s” (David Ayers, English Literature of the 1920s [1999], 164); “the 
real fear that motivates the dualism of the text is [. . .] the fear that ‘creative’ literary activity, with its 
deployment of sensibility and emotion, might be intrinsically ‘female’” (Svarny, 68; but see also 72); 
“‘Richard Greenow’ is [. . .] presenting Richard’s pacifism as reasonable (as opposed to Pearl’s 
nationalism)” (Poller “TMHW,” 69). 
34 My reading of the text throws doubt on the evaluation of it as “a saga of a pacifist” (Dunaway HH, 16) 
or as being “consistent with Huxley’s [pacifist] attitude towards the war from late 1915 onwards” (Poller 
“TMHW,” 69). 
35 During the war, images of city streets and of the trenches were often interchangeable—some of the 
battlefield trenches were given names such as “Bond Street” and “Park Lane.” Bertrand Russell also 
remembers his impressions at the start of the war: “After seeing troop trains departing from Waterloo, I 
used to have strange visions of London as a place of unreality. I used in imagination to see the bridges 
collapse and sink, and the whole great city vanish like a morning mist. Its inhabitants began to seem like 
hallucinations, and I would wonder whether the world in which I thought I had lived was a mere product 
of my own febrile nightmares” (Autobiography [1956], 18). Russell mentions the impact of his talk of the 
above experience upon T. S. Eliot’s The Waste Land (1922), but this might be so for Huxley, too. 
36 Dick’s symptoms can be diagnosed as civilian war neuroses. As early as 1915, The Lancet (October 
23) reported on civilian patients with “mental disorders directly due to the war,” such as “a woman with 
seven sons serving at the front, five of whom had been wounded” or “the wives of soldiers and young 
recruits” who were put under stress (“Incidence of Mental Disease Directly due to the War,” 931). 
Civilian war neuroses also appeared in literary texts during and after the war, and Trudi Tate in 
68 
 
                                                                                                                                          
Modernism, History and the First World War (1998) discusses this in minute detail, mentioning as 
examples Rudyard Kipling’s “Mary Postgate” (1915; a woman becomes neurotic after hearing of the 
accidental death during military training of her employer’s nephew, whom she raised), Rose Macaulay’s 
Non-Combatant and Others (1916; see above), Rebecca West’s The Return of the Soldier (1918; a woman 
has a nightmare about the trenches, influenced by her cousin, a neurotic returned soldier) and others (see 
Tate, Chapter 1). Compared to these examples, Dick’s case may be unique in that the patient is a man 
whose neuroses develop immediately after the beginning of the war and without any direct contact with 
the realities of the front. 
37 Dick’s relationship with other members, especially with Hyman, sounds somewhat homosexual, as 
does the brotherhood of combatants. The members are described “queer” (72), a word already being used 
in the early twentieth century as slang for homosexuality (see Showalter SA, 112). 
38 For general accounts of psychoanalysts’ engagement with the death instinct and war, see Richard 
Overy, The Morbid Age: Britain between the Wars (2009), Chapters 4 and 5; Jacqueline Rose, Why War? 
(1993), Part 1, Chapter 1; Daniel Pick, War Machine: The Rationalisation of Slaughter in the Modern Age 
(1993), Chapter 15. 
39 “[The] earliest measure of defence on the part of the ego constitutes, I think, the foundation-stone of the 
development of the super-ego, whose excessive violence in this early stage would thus be accounted for 
by the fact that it is an offshoot of very intense destructive instincts, and contains, along with a certain 
proportion of libidinal impulses [life instinct], very large quantities of aggressive ones” (Klein, “The 
Early Development of Conscience in the Child” [1933], LGROW, 250). For a more detailed development 
of her view of the superego, including a comparison with Freud, see Spillius 147-65. 
40 The essay is also included in The Death Drive and Modernism: British Interwar Literature and 
Psychoanalysis (in Japanese, 2012), in which Endo sheds light upon substantial intertextuality between 
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psychoanalytic discourses, British modernist literature and even the political situation in modern-day 
Japan. While I was troubled by reorganizing my argument in this chapter, I encountered, and was greatly 
influenced by, Endo’s stimulating writing on psychoanalysis. In particular, my reading of Klein, Rose and 
Judith Butler in this chapter owes much to his discussions on their work. 
41 This is symbolically shown by the impressive ending of the novella, in which Dick, who purports to be 
a pacifist, becomes eventually indistinguishable from his counterpart Pearl (see Limbo, 110-15). This 
ironical identification may be compared with Rose’s proposal of “the ethics of failure” (see below). 
42 “I have often expressed my view that object-relations exist from the beginning of life, the first object 
being the mother’s breast which to the child becomes split into a good (gratifying) and bad (frustrating) 
breast; this splitting results in a severance of love and hate. I have further suggested that the relation to the 
first object implies its introjection and projection, and thus from the beginning object-relations are 
moulded by an interaction between introjection and projection, between internal and external objects and 
situations. These processes participate in the building up of the ego and super-ego and prepare the ground 
for the onset of the Oedipus complex in the second half of the first year” (Klein EGOW, 2). 
43 “Much of the hatred against parts of the self is now directed towards the mother. This leads to a 
particular form of identification which establishes the prototype of an aggressive object-relation. I suggest 
for these processes the term ‘projective identification.’ When projection is mainly derived from the 
infant’s impulse to harm or to control the mother, he feels her to be a persecutor. In psychotic disorders 
this identification of an object with the hated parts of the self contributes to the intensity of the hatred 
directed against other people” (Klein EGOW, 8). 
44 Hanna Segal, an important follower of Kleinian analysis, discusses wars in general and the present 
threat of total annihilation by nuclear weapons by applying Kleinian theory (including the ideas of 
“splitting” and “projection”) to group behaviour and psychology (see Psychoanalysis, Literature and 
War: Papers 1972-1995 [1997], Chapter 13). Across factional lines, the concept of war in much 
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psychoanalytic writing has been frequently associated with something paranoid (see Rose, Why War? 
[1993], 18-19). 
45 In his dream Dick later recollects the “hideous” masses as a “hideous” flock of “camels” that consists 
of both “the familiar and the strange” (111-12). According to the 1911 Britannica, the camel is “too stupid 
to turn aside [. . .] [and] too dull to turn back [. . .]. In a word, he is first to last an undomesticated and 
savage animal rendered serviceable by stupidity alone.” This definition may fit intellectuals’ image of the 
masses. Like returned soldiers’ nightmares, Dick’s dream describe above would be deemed the result of 
the death instinct. 
46 On this issue, it is helpful to consider Endo’s essay, in which, through a Kleinian reading of Woolf’s To 
the Lighthouse (1927), he argues: “high modernism [. . .] could be seen as a middle-class aesthetic 
reaction to the crises of political representation in the 1920s. As such, it projects its own ideological 
anxieties onto class/racial others, figuring them as ‘the masses’ through a series of cultural stereotypes. 
Klein’s theory can thus be seen as a radical critique of high modernism’s politics of representation, 
revealing ‘the masses’ to be an ideological projection” (“RVIO,” 185). 
47 Huxley may have known Freud’s discussion of da Vinci because he was interested in this genius to such 
an extent that he wrote two essays specifically about him: “The Mind of Leonardo” (1919); “Leonardo, 
Then and Now” (1952, unpublished typescript). 
48 The typical image of warlike mother appears, e.g., in Good-Bye to All That (1929) by Robert Graves, 
Chapter 21. With Pearl as his first attempt, Huxley, as if traumatized by such an image of mother, 
repeatedly described women who intentionally or unintentionally (try to) put their children to death (see 
Chapter II of this dissertation).  
49 From this viewpoint, Dick’s simulative experience of war can be read as a result of Pearl’s sending her 
son to the imaginary battlefield. 
50 Here Dick remembers his “kneeling on Auntie Loo’s lap and arranging a troop of lead soldiers on the 
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horizontal productive of her corsage” at the same time. This is interesting for us because it evokes the 
ambiguous image of the wartime mother who loves her son (and is loved by him) but who can send him 
to his death as a soldier. 
51 As a tribute to Ward, Aldous was named after the hero of her novel Marcella (1894) (see John 
Sutherland, Mrs Humphry Ward: Eminent Victorian Pre-Eminent Edwardian [1990], 167). Huxley 
himself calls his aunt “a kind of literary godmother to me” (Writers at Work: The Paris Review Interviews 
[1963], ed. George Plimpton, 167). Ward’s Robert Elsmere is one of Dick’s favourite books (see Limbo, 
3-4). Huxley’s novella was “one of the last books she read. She did not like it.” Yet she may “have 
recognized traits of kinship in its author” (Enid Huws Jones, Mrs Humphry Ward [1973], 164). When she 
died in March 1919, Aldous was “much affected” and in the funeral he, with “tears streaming down his 
face, wept openly” (Bedford 108). In Eyeless in Gaza, Huxley reproduced Ward in a more complex way 
as Mrs Foxe, who deeply loves her son Brian (partly modelled on Trevenen) but whose extravagant 
expectations consequently drive him to suicide. 
52 Her son, Arnold Ward, volunteered for the army and survived; her three nephews, however, were killed 
(see E. H. Jones 161-62). 
53 Strictly speaking, Freud finds not only affectionate but also cruel images in da Vinci’s mother, the 
strength of whose love made her son impotent (at least in a heterosexual relationship); for Freud, this 
ambiguity in da Vinci’s mother contributed to his painting “Gioconda” with its enigmatic smile. Huxley’s 
image of the mother, at least the image reflected in Pearl, is something more dangerous, and so is his 
interpretation of “Gioconda,” as seen in the title of his story of a woman bringing ruin upon her lover: 
“The Gioconda Smile” (published in Mortal Coils [1921]). 
54 For Butler’s more recent analysis of Klein’s theory of melancholia, see Butler, Frames of War: When Is 
Life Grievable? (2009), 173-77. 
55 Maria Nys was the eldest child of Norbert Nys and Marguerite Baltus. In a letter to Julian (30 June 
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1916), Huxley mentioned Maria: “I have at last discovered a nice Belgian: wonders will never cease” 
(Smith 105). For Maria’s stay at Garsington, see Bedford, Part 3, Chapter 8. 
56 For example, it is probably impossible that Huxley did not think of his alternate destiny when he made 
Guy talk to Marjorie as follows: “I know that when I am dead, I shall be dead; there isn’t any afterwards. 
If I’m killed, my immortality will be in your memory. Perhaps, too, somebody will read the things I’ve 
written, and in his mind I shall survive, feebly and partially. But in your mind I shall survive intact and 
whole” (162; a similar passage appears in Ridley’s letter to Huxley as cited in the foreword of the poem 
discussed below [see CPAH, 110]). 
57 Analysing H.D.’s “Kola and Ka” (1934)—in which after the war a civilian man speaks as if he were an 
ex-soldier—Trudi Tate indicates a possibility that while “combatants often tried, unconsciously, to escape 
the war through illness,” “civilian men might flee into illness for the opposite reason—to enter the war 
and share its suffering” (23). For a sense of inferiority held by non-combatants (including Huxley 
himself), see Philip in Point Counter Point, mentioned in the next section. In my view, Huxley’s wish for 
a sense of togetherness or unity was developed later to be an essential concept that supported his pacifism 
(see Chapter IV of this dissertation). 
58 It seems that this text has so far been closely analysed only by Meckier, who points out that “Ridley is a 
disillusioned idealist who anticipates the many youthful failures in Huxley’s early fiction,” and that 
Huxley’s portraying way of “the happenings of a single [ordinary] day” predicts the modernist technique 
or form adopted later by Woolf and James Joyce (see AHPM, 130-37, 140). 
59 “Nobody,” according to Bedford, “remembers Huxley referring to the dead friend and his weird legacy” 
(111), and he never mentioned Ridley in his published letters. At least, Ridley was not a member of 
Balliol, as he is not listed on the Memorial Tablet (see Balliol College War Memorial Book, 1914-19 
[1924] xiii, xv, xvii, xix). Of course Huxley may have changed the name of the model, or created Ridley 
as a plausible pretext for the poem. Meanwhile, Soldiers Died in the Great War, 1914-19 (originally 
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published in 1921, printed on CD-ROM in 1998) lists one soldier with the same name, who was born and 
enlisted in Newcastle, and died fighting in France and Florence on 20 February 1918 (see the soldier with 
No: RTS/2819). 
60 Sarah Cole, using the term “friendship” as “individualized relations of amity or love between men” and 
the term “comradeship” as “corporate or group commitment, a relation particularly to war,” (144-45), 
finds in war writing some examples of the antagonism between these concepts. As well as some 
“comradeship” with contemporaries on the front, Huxley seems to be looking for a “friendship” when he 
stresses his personal bond with Ridley. This may also suggest that Huxley was in fact not necessarily 
satisfied with his seemingly intimate “friendship” with members of Garsington or with the Haldane 
family. 
61 For example, Peter Gay’s detailed biography repeatedly reveals that in his private life and in 
psychoanalysis Freud frequently realized the unreliability of the distinction between home and alien, 
friends and enemy. During the war, because his enlisted sons and many of his followers left for the front, 
Freud in a letter confessed that he felt “alone” and “deserted” (qtd. in Gay 361); ironically, Freud 
exchanged a large number of letters with his intimate friend on the enemy side, Ernest Jones (see 350). 
62 In a letter to Julian (1 February 1915), Huxley mentions the state of Oxford, calling it “the quiet life of 
Anglo Saxon lectures amid a crowd of painful young women” (Smith 66). T. S. Eliot supplements this, 
recollecting: “beyond the Rhodes scholars from America and the Commonwealth there were hardly any 
left except for those who, like Aldous, were wholly unfit for military service” (30). Objectively, only 
12.5 % of the male population—approximately six million British men—served in the war (the number 
includes non-fighting members of the armed forces; see Tate 25); thus a position like Huxley’s was not 
unusual. Indeed, Leonard Woolf and Lawrence, though both senior to Huxley, do not seem to have cared 
so much about their own physical unfitness for military service (see Woolf’s autobiography, Beginning 
Again: An Autobiography of the Years 1911 to 1918 [1963], Part 3; see also Lawrence’s autobiographical 
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novel, Kangaroo [1923], Chapter 12). Keith Gandal argues that “the ‘quintessential’ male American 
modernist novelists [such as Ernest Hemingway, F. Scott Fitzgerald and William Faulkner] were 
motivated, in their celebrated postwar literary works, not so much, as the usual story goes, by their 
experiences of the horrors of World War I but rather by their inability in fact to have those experiences” 
(5). Although Gandal mentions this point as a difference between American and British war writers (see 
31), Huxley’s work shows the diversity of British war writing. 
63 Peter Edgerly Firchow also mentions the ambiguous nature of the work, pointing out its “marriage of 
opposites,” such as the “combin[ation of] the apparently disparate and certainly explosive elements of 
broad farce and profound satiric analysis” and the “miraculous amalgamation of grotesque [or ugly] and 
beautiful” (AH, 45-46). 
64 As Deborah Parsons states, “the war and its aftermath remained a gap or absence in history that resisted 
representation. The early post-war years, dominated by psychological bewilderment and social and 
economic uncertainty, were a limbo period in which the intensity of horror and loss could not be 
integrated into normal understanding (“Trauma and War Memory” [2008], 177). It is interesting that she 
uses here the word “limbo” to describe the post-war years because it was also chosen by Huxley for the 
title of his collection of stories. An example of the author’s repression of the war is the emphasis on the 
war as being other people’s affair (see Scogan’s unsympathetic comments on war victims in Crome 
Yellow [84], which are shared by the poet Francis Chelifer in Those Barren Leaves [1925] [121-22]). 
Meanwhile, the unproductivity of such suppression is also suggested by Huxley himself in Antic Hay 
(1923). While strolling in London streets, Theodore Gumbril, modelled after the author, has to glimpse in 
an uncanny manner miseries of post-war society, including the vestiges of the war such as “the legless 
soldiers” (73-75). Myra Viveash, who seems to possess Gumbril but may be otherwise, appears as 
something like a ghost or a living death (see Poller “AHAH”). 
65 Philip’s bad leg, together with the author’s own poor eyesight, evokes the story of Oedipus and the 
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potential Oedipus complex experienced by both Philip and Huxley. In wartime, Huxley, who hurt one of 
his legs in a domestic accident, was also mistaken for a returned soldier: “We [Aldous and his cousin, 
Gervas Huxley] went round shopping together—and I was immensely tickled to see the huge respect and 
sympathy paid to my limp—while Ger—who was wearing a new uniform—was regarded merely as a 
specimen of K[itchener]’s nth Army! I am thinking, therefore, of keeping up my wounded hero limp for 
the duration of the war. It will always secure seats in buses!” (letter to Leonard Huxley, Mid-June 1915, 
Smith 72). 
66 In Point Counter Point, two other characters may represent the feelings of the author. When the war 
came, Spandrell, an Oxford student, welcomed it as “a chance of getting out of the muck and doing 
something decent, for a change”; he even “wanted to get killed,” like Rupert Brooke (373). However, 
instead of fighting “in a trench” with “danger” and “courage,” he was assigned as “a spy catcher” in the 
intelligence service without “any of the nobler virtues” or anything “heroic” (374). Even after the war, 
Spandrell lives with his “dishonour,” and finally murders to be murdered (375). On the other hand, the 
destructive instinct that appears to lie behind the war and Spandrell’s madness is discussed by Rampion in 
a more complex way. While positively accepting the aggressive instinct as belonging to the essence of 
human beings, Rampion never identifies the war as the result of this instinct (see 121-22, 532), as if he (or 
the author) wished to diminish the heroism of soldiers, heroism of which he might previously have been 
envious. 
67 This scene may remind one of a famous snapshot of the Battle of Ginchy in which two men are helping 
a wounded man across a trench who has escaped from capture. In the above scene, Huxley may indirectly 
express his own anxiety that, unlike the rescued soldier who responsibly fought for the nation, he might 
not be accepted by the nation. 
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Fig. 1. Battle of Ginchy: A photograph taken by John Warwick Brooke on 9 September 1916. © IWM (Q 
4210). 
68 Although the text only mentions the impact of “Our Freud” upon civilized society’s abolition of the 
family system (see BNW, 33; Huxley’s letter to Leonard Huxley, 24 August 1931, Smith 351), other facets 
of the depicted future, including pacifism (see 209), might be associated with Freudism. The world 
citizens are conditioned and controlled to be pacifist, having bonded to each other through collective 
ceremonies and freed from aggressive impulses by drugs. Some intertextuality can be found between this 
text and Freud’s writing of the same period: The Future of an Illusion (1927, trans. 1928), Civilization 
and Its Discontents (1930, trans. 1930; see also Buchanan 111-12; Higdon WBNW, 101-02) and Why 
War? 
69 Huxley’s pacifism is endorsed by his scientific and mystical idea of “unity,” which in Eyeless in Gaza 
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he depicts using words related to water (see 502-03). The same sort of notion called “oceanic feeling,” a 
sense of belonging to the world outside oneself, is mentioned, though negatively, by Freud at the 
beginning of his Civilization and Its Discontents, where he responds to Roman Rolland’s question about 
it. In this idea Rolland’s thinking owed much to an Indian philosopher, Swami Vivekananda. In fact, 
Huxley wrote a foreword to the English translation of The Gospel of Sri Ramakrishna, a biography of 
Vivekananda’s teacher, published in 1942. Curiously, the feeling of unity that Huxley believed in and 
Freud denied might be (partly) traced back to the same source. 
70 In After Many a Summer, Huxley portrays a multimillionaire in Hollywood—a world seemingly 
unrelated to images of death or war—who cannot free himself from the horror of his coming death or an 
element like the destructive instinct that eventually leads him to kill a young man. Time Must Have a Stop 
(1944), written during the Second World War, also clearly attacks the human tendency to justify war and 
any sort of violence in the name of time. 
71 The journalist protagonist, who has been travelling around the world seeking incidents of the death—as 
if he were obsessed by the death instinct—arrives at Pala, a peaceful utopia where he develops as a 
person, discovering ways to love people under the influence of the pacifist inhabitants (see Chapter IV of 
this dissertation). 
72 For the survival of psychoanalysis itself, this “failure” may be important, as Cathy Caruth remarks: 
“Freud suggests that psychoanalysis, if it lives on, will live on not as the straightforward life of a known 
and understood theory, but as the endless survival of what has not been fully understood. If 
psychoanalysis is to be continued in its tradition, it is paradoxically in what has not yet been fully grasped 
in its survival that its truest relation to its insight must be found” (Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, 
Narrative, and History [1996], 72). 
73 From a feminist perspective, such a violent aspect of psychoanalysis can be seen in Freud’s attitude 
towards Dora. By “constructing his own ‘intelligible, consistent, and unbroken’ account of her hysteria,” 
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Freud “asserts his intellectual superiority to this bright but rebellious young woman. He uses his text to 
demonstrate his power to bring a woman to reason, and to bring reason to the mysteries of woman” 
(Showalter FM, 160). However, in “Richard Greenow,” Dick (the believer in reason) and Rogers (the 
believer in psychoanalysis) cannot possibly compete with Pearl, a female patient; this may be an example 
of the text’s “ethic of failure” in a feminist sense. 
74 For example, as well as Freud’s and Klein’s opinions about the death instinct and war, Huxley’s 
“Richard Greenow” echoes some facets of Edward Glover’s discussion of peace and war in the 1930s. In 
War, Sadism and Pacifism (1933), this Freudian analyst criticizes an optimistic view of human nature held 
by many pacifists, pointing out the “identity of impulses concerned in war and peace”: “a large part of 
the energy that drives a peace organization has precisely the same source as the energy that lets loose 
war” (13). To elucidate the psychology behind the waging of war, he also relies upon “projection,” which 
is “an attempt to convert an inner (psychic) stimulus into an outer (reality) stimulus, an inner enemy into 
an outer enemy” (27-28). Although Overy mentions the impact of Glover on Huxley in the mid-1930s, 
my reading has suggested, on the contrary, that Huxley was in advance of some aspects of Glover’s 
arguments on pacifism. 
75 How can we explain Huxley’s persistent dislike of Freud? Paradoxically, it might be attributed to the 
similarity of their arguments on war and human aggression. Bearing in mind Huxley’s pacifism in and 
after the 1930s, which was based on his mystic and scientific visions, we can imagine that Huxley could 
not be tolerant towards Freud’s failure to see the significance of mysticism and to show any concrete way 
to achieve peace. In this sense, Freud was an uncanny being for Huxley, who also originally experienced 
a similar pessimism concerning the mind, but who subsequently tried to repress or overcome this by any 
means, including mystical ideas. 
76 Huxley’s xenophobia or racism can be detected in “Richard Greenow” in his comments on Italians (54-
55), Germans (113-14), Jews (see 6, 69) and Asians (see 10, 54). These are supplemented by the author’s 
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wartime comments on foreigners and different races (see e.g., his letters to Julian, 1 February 1915, Smith 
65-66; to Leonard Huxley, Mid-October 1915, Smith 82); “Soles Occidere et Redire Possunt” also 
describes the hero’s dream of abusing “niggers” (CPAH, 123; see also Schneider 219-20). At the same 
time, the author implies that such feelings are the result of something paranoid; for example, in “Richard 
Greenow,” just before his death, Dick realizes that, whether “Engl. or Germ.,” all of human kind are 
equally “all beasts” (110; see also John’s wish “to eat the black sweat of niggers” [“SORP,” CPAH, 123], 
which could suggest a possible identification of himself or the author with “niggers”). 
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Chapter II Woman 
—Point Counter Point— 
Motherhood and Feminism 
 
1. Introduction 
A theme that repeatedly appears in Aldous Huxley’s fiction is the failure of the 
mother-child relationship. We can easily find this image in his descriptions of women 
afraid of motherhood (Crome Yellow, Point Counter Point, Brave New World and 
Eyeless in Gaza),1 women without maternal affection (Point Counter Point and Brave 
New World),2 and women who lose their children (Point Counter Point, Eyeless in Gaza 
and Ape and Essence),3 as well as, conversely, children who lose their beloved mothers 
(Brave New World and Eyeless in Gaza).4 Although this point appears to be an 
important perspective for considering Huxley’s work and life, there has not been enough 
discussion.5 
The issue of the mother-child relationship is essentially relevant to how to 
comprehend women. What kind of view of women did Huxley have? Biographically, 
the loss of his mother in his teens must have greatly influenced his subsequent life, and 
thus, through his frequent return to the collapse of the mother-child relationship, he may 
have attempted to overcome his own childhood trauma. As Chapter I suggested, this 
motif may have been evoked by persecutory anxiety about women, which the author 
formed during wartime when seeing, for example, mothers who sent their sons to the 
battlefield. In 1919, Huxley married Maria Nys, who died of cancer in February 1955, 
81 
 
and in 1956, he married Laura Archera, a musician and psychological counsellor; both 
women appear to have devotedly supported their husband’s work. These pieces of 
information might suggest Huxley as a man with a conservative view of women. 
Certainly, some of his early writing seems to back up this image, which definitely fits 
well with D. H. Lawrence’s frank comment on “a fellow-writer”: “after all in your work 
women seem not to have an existence, save they are the projections of the men” 
(Huxley, “D. H. Lawrence,” published in The Olive Tree [1936], AHCEIV 74). A typical 
example is “Two or Three Graces” (the title piece of Huxley’s fourth collection of short 
stories, 1926), in which the main woman seems to rely on men, simply projecting their 
characters onto her own. 
Such a reactionary aspect of Huxley has been, to some extent, shared and stressed 
by earlier studies. After analysing his utopian pieces, Brave New World, Ape and 
Essence and Island, and focusing on the female characters there, June Deery concludes 
that “the fate of women alone does not define these societies as eutopian or dystopian, 
and it is not something to which Huxley pays a great deal of attention” (115). That 
Huxley is “not clearly especially sympathetic to women” seems to be an assumption for 
Angus McLaren when he discusses Huxley’s writing in relation to the interwar contexts 
of sex and reproduction (14). However, it is also true that Huxley was almost always 
surrounded by unconventional or revolutionary types of women—such as his wife, 
Maria Huxley (an intelligent and bisexual woman; 1899-1955), his friend, Naomi 
Mitchison (a feminist and socialist writer; 1897-1999) and his shot-time lover, Nancy 
Cunard (a critic and political activist; 1895-1965).6 Is it not conceivable that his 
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associations with these women influenced his life and writing so that he viewed women 
more complexly or ambiguously than critics have recognized so far?7 
To query again Huxley’s attitude towards women or issues related to them, due 
attention should be directed to his literary masterpiece, Point Counter Point (1928). 
Certainly, the novel may seem masculine in that the author composed it as a specimen 
of what he called “the novel of ideas” (PCP, 386), showing in a contrapuntal way 
ideological varieties of male characters mostly modelled after his acquaintances.8 At the 
same time, in Point Counter Point Huxley spares more space for women than in any 
other of his works, describing contrapuntally the lives of female characters, some of 
whom are based on actual women around him. It must be particularly noted that most of 
the women in the novel, especially the main female characters, do not conform well 
with the traditional ideal of womanhood—the feminine and the maternal. 
Marjorie Carling, for example, is a spiritual and cultured woman of the middle-
middle class who leaves her husband for her lover Walter, and who is now expecting a 
baby but cannot bear this fact. Elinor Bidlake Quarles is an intelligent and rational 
woman of the upper-middle class who has run out of patience with her husband Philip, 
and who cannot behave maternally towards her child Little Phil, losing him in the end. 
Lucy Tantamount is an upper-class lady with an independent spirit who is seen as a 
femme fatale and likened to a man by others.9 In the present chapter, I will analyse Point 
Counter Point by focussing on these three characters in order to demonstrate hidden 
significances of this text with regard to the maternal and the feminine, and to understand 




2. Women and Reproduction in the Interwar Period 
The condition of women in the interwar period can be characterized by ambiguity. 
The upheaval of the Great War shook gender distinctions, bringing a reformist stream in 
which women obtained the rights to vote and stand for parliament, and in which the 
dissemination of contraceptive information reduced the average size of the family. On 
the other hand, great importance was certainly attached to the roles of women at home, 
including mothering, and this tendency was supported by the post-war atmosphere, 
which sought domestic peace, avoiding conflicts or competition between men and 
women.11 
These situations of women’s lives in transition are also reflected in To-day and 
To-morrow, a series of more than a hundred titles, published between 1923 and 1931.12 
It is true that J. B. S. Haldane’s Daedalus or Science and the Future (1924) influenced 
the setting of the future in Brave New World (1932), in which every citizen is born 
through ectogenesis, but it is also conceivable that Huxley was familiar with some of 
the other volumes, judging from his intellectual curiosity about culture and society.13 
Although the series contains many volumes discussing reproduction, they share in 
common the recognition that motherhood is in crisis. Symbolically, both the anti-
feminist Anthony M. Ludovici—Lysistrata or Woman’s Future and Future Woman 
(1924)—and the feminist Dora Russell—Hypatia or Woman and Knowledge (1925)—
criticize British society for underestimating the value of the body by using nearly the 
same phrase, respectively: “the greatest revolt against the old notions of Life, 
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Motherhood, and Domesticity” (30); “A revolt against motherhood” (42). In Point 
Counter Point, quite a few women, including the above three characters, have some sort 
of difficulty with motherhood.14 
However, and more importantly, there is also a difference between the series and 
Huxley’s text. Beyond the disparity of their political stances, the To-day and To-morrow 
contributors tend to idealize the maternal as a virtue. Some regarded motherhood or 
reproduction as a public/scientific issue of a nation, race or human beings—Ludovici, 
C. P. Blacker and Norman Haire15—while others assumed that motherhood is not only 
vital to society or humankind but also essential to a woman’s personal life—Russell, 
Vera Brittain and Eden Paul.16 They seem to share the premise that two aspects of 
motherhood—the objective (i.e., the public, the scientific) and the subjective (i.e., the 
private, the mental)—can be reconciled, and this should be done to break through the 
crisis of motherhood. 
In contrast, in Point Counter Point, the maternal is presented more negatively,17 
and this negativity is often associated with irresistible feelings or senses of individuals. 
For example, Marjorie’s fear of childbirth, as well as her hatred of the baby, depends 
entirely upon her own sensibility, especially her anxiety about her possible death from a 
miscarriage or bloodpoisoning (see PCP, 4-5, 194-96). Elinor, too, has a very bad 
impression of childbirth, arguing for birth control, because she does not like suffering or 
the recollection of it (see 91). Here, the objective and subjective aspects of motherhood 
are shown as difficult to reconcile, and thus the situation of motherhood is viewed all 
the more seriously and pessimistically. Huxley’s representation of motherhood cannot 
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be fully reduced to the intellectual debate of his time and may be seen as a kind of 
deviation. Let us analyse this deviation by paying attention to the three major women in 
the novel. 
 
3. Questioning the Maternal: Marjorie and Elinor 
Since “Richard Greenow,” Huxley frequently displayed his scepticism towards 
the self as something single and consistent, as reflected in his remarks in Antic Hay 
(1923), Proper Studies (1927) and so forth. In Point Counter Point, this issue is 
addressed on the largest scale, and is chosen as the main subject, as clearly declared in 
its epigraph, the proverb of Fulke Greville in Mustapha (1609): “Oh, wearisome 
condition of humanity, / Born under one law, to another bound, / Vainly begot and yet 
forbidden vanity, / Created sick, commanded to be sound. / What meaneth nature by 
these diverse laws, / Passion and reason, self-division’s cause?” (Act V, Sc. 4.). Indeed, 
a variety of “self-division” can be found in the lives of the characters—e.g., in the form 
of reason/emotion, body/mind (Walter), past/present (John Bidlake), reality/ideal 
(Burlap) and theory/practice (Illidge). The diversity and fluidity of the self, the state in 
which different elements coexist in oneself at the same time or on different occasions, 
seems to be most strongly realized by the novelist Philip Quarles, who asks the 
“question of identity,” feeling as if his mind were an “amoeba” with “a power of 
assimilation” (253), and answers it by himself: “The essential character of the self 
consisted precisely in that liquid and undeformable ubiquity; in that capacity to espouse 
all contours and yet remain unfixed in any form, to take, and with an equal facility 
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efface, impressions” (254).18 In fact, the text also sheds light upon another sort of self-
division—the issue of identity that women may undergo with regard to motherhood—
by mainly describing Marjorie in pregnancy and Elinor with a young child. 
Let us start with Marjorie. Pregnancy is evidently a self-division in that the other 
is being created within the self, but this division brings about another kind of division, 
that is, the ambiguity of pregnancy in terms of appreciation. On the scientific/public 
level of representation, pregnancy is admired as embodying the greatness of life and 
contributing to society, while it can be, on the mental/private level of experience, 
realized just as a source of anxiety or distress, as is depicted in the first scene of the 
novel: 
Something that had been a single cell, a cluster of cells, a little sac of tissue, 
a kind of worm, a potential fish with gills, stirred in her womb and would 
one day become a man—a grown man, suffering and enjoying, loving and 
hating, thinking, remembering, imagining. And what had been a blob of 
jelly within her body would invent a god and worship [. . .]. [. . .] The 
astounding process of creation was going on within her; but Marjorie was 
conscious only of sickness and lassitude; the mystery for her meant nothing 
but fatigue and ugliness and a chronic anxiety about the future, pain of the 
mind as well as discomfort of the body. (2) 
Subsequently, again, the text relies on the same contrast: “A cell had multiplied itself 
and become a worm, the worm had become a fish, the fish was turning into the foetus of 
a mammal. Marjorie felt sick and tired” (194).19 In fact, Point Counter Point has a 
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metafictional layer in which Philip develops his idea of the novel in his notebook, 
thinking of, for example, “biological” fiction that addresses characters in strictly 
scientific terms (see 114, 414, 433).20 Thus, Point Counter Point can be, at least partly, 
read as a work written by Philip, the quasi-scientist himself. In the cited scene, scientific 
discourse representing pregnancy (apparently based on Ernst Haeckel’s recapitulation 
theory21) can be identified as Philip’s, which is then contrasted with the personal 
narrative of Marjorie, who is actually experiencing pregnancy. This division regarding 
the appreciation of pregnancy can also be seen as a reflection of a gender opposition or 
asymmetry. 
Elinor embodies how this division may arise for women after giving birth. She 
cannot love her child in the same way that many mothers are generally assumed to do, 
and mainly entrusts the care to her mother and Miss Fulkes, a governess. After coming 
back from her overseas trip with Philip for ten months, Elinor unintentionally surprises 
her mother-in-law Rachel by confessing what she feels about Little Phil: “I don’t 
believe nature ever meant me to have children. Either I’m impatient with them, or else I 
spoil them”; “I didn’t imagine I could be so glad to see him again. But it was really a 
wild excitement” (339). Indeed, Elinor has complicated thoughts of Little Phil. When 
seeing him after a long absence, she feels as if her own child were a stranger, surprised 
by the wonder of life as suggested by this, and horrified by the weight of her social 
responsibility as a mother: 
she was oppressed by a sudden realization of the mysteries and 
complexities of life, the terrible inscrutabilities of the future. Here was her 
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child—but he was also Philip, he was also herself, he was also Walter, her 
father, her mother; and now, with that upward tilting of the chin, he had 
suddenly revealed himself as the deplorable Mr. Quarles. And he might be 
hundreds of other people too. [. . .] A whole population of strangers 
inhabited and shaped that little body, lived in that mind and controlled its 
wishes, dictated its thoughts and would go on dictating and controlling. 
[. . .] She looked at the child with a kind of terror. What a responsibility! 
(319-20) 
Elinor finds an inerasable sense of distance or division between herself and her child. 
This division is associated with another sort of division, that is, a contrast between the 
gravity of mothering on the biological/social level and the difficulty of it on the 
emotional/personal level. 
In Point Counter Point, there is a key link between the two divisions that mothers 
can face: the state of being physically and psychologically separated from the child, and 
the opposition between motherhood as privately and mentally experienced on the one 
hand and motherhood as publicly and scientifically represented on the other. Surely, the 
recognition of women’s interests being potentially confronted with science (e.g., its 
progress) was not so rare in those days, as seen in Brittain’s volume in the To-day and 
To-morrow series.22 However, the way of underscoring this division by dividing the 
narrative itself was not often adopted by contemporary authors, and thus might be 
considered as experimental or even unique. 
Rather, these descriptions of Marjorie and Elinor can be compared with 
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subsequent criticism of the mother-child relationship. For instance, Julia Kristeva, a 
feminist and psychoanalytic theorist, basing her work on her own experience of 
motherhood, wrote an autobiographical and experimental essay, “Stabat Mater” (1977, 
rev. 1985).23 She characterizes the “maternal” as being “ambivalent,”24 and confesses 
her situation before and after childbirth by using the image of physical and 
psychological division of her identity: 
A mother is a continuous separation, a division of the very flesh. And 
consequently a division of language—and it has always been so.  
Then there is this other abyss that opens up between the mother 
and the child. What connection is there between myself, or even more 
unassumingly between my body and this internal graft and fold, which, 
once the umbilical cord has been severed, is an inaccessible other? My 
body and … him. No connection. Nothing to do with it. [. . .] The child, 
whether he or she is irremediably an other. [. . .] Trying to think 
through that abyss: staggering vertigo. No identity holds up. (KR, 178-
79) 
What is crucial is that, as seen in our reading of Point Counter Point, Kristeva not only 
associates the physical and psychological division undergone by a mother with the 
division of the objective and the subjective appreciation of motherhood but also adopts 
the contrasting narratives, i.e., the account of representation and that of experience, in 
order to express this division effectively. On the right side of the page, Kristeva 
addresses how the maternal, such as the Virgin Mary, has been admired by masculine 
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theology and science, while on the left side, she personally recollects her anxiety and 
agonies before and after childbirth by using bold letters.25 
While recognizing the difficulty with motherhood, Kristeva ultimately grasps it 
positively, believing that the maternal has the potential to free women from, and to 
assist them in opposing, patriarchal society or masculine discourse.26 However, it is 
doubtful whether such an expectation can be deduced from Point Counter Point, as is 
suggested in Elinor’s subsequent story. 
Unable to adapt herself to mothering and frustrated by her husband’s aloofness, 
Elinor begins to seek the “interest” of her “own independent happiness,” and decides to 
have an affair with Webley: “Taking a lover had seemed to Elinor, theoretically and in 
advance, a matter of no great difficulty. Morally wrong she did not think it. All the fuss 
that Christians and the heroines of novels managed to make about it!” (434). However, 
while waiting for Webley for a tryst, Elinor receives a telegram informing her of her 
boy’s illness, which turns out to be meningitis. She goes home in haste, “reproach[ing] 
herself for not having realized that he was working up for an illness”—“I ought to have 
taken more care” (481). At the same time, Webley is killed by Spandrell and Illidge, and 
the news naturally shocks her. Viewed objectively, all these things happen as a 
coincidence. However, losing her usual reason or calmness, Elinor intuitively realizes 
that (the telegram about) the outbreak of her boy’s illness was “a warning” or 
“prohibition” against her attempted affair (480) and, seeing his suffering before her 
eyes, finds herself caught by some sort of great power: 
She felt as though she too were trapped. [. . .] Trapped by that obscure 
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sense of guilt, that irrational belief (but haunting in spite of its irrationality), 
that ever more closely pressing and suffocating conviction that it was all, in 
some inscrutable fashion, her fault, a punishment, malevolently vicarious, 
for her offence. (540; see also 544) 
What is this “fault” or “offence”? Elinor probably thinks not only of the affair itself but 
also of her less maternal behaviour thus far. Her own “sense of guilt” suggests that 
Elinor, despite seemingly being free from traditional morals, has actually internalized 
the patriarchal value.27 The image of a mother’s division appears here again as a form of 
a dilemma in which a woman is faced with a difficult choice, whether to perform a 
social duty to be a good mother or to seek her individual happiness outside the home. 
The scene leading to the death of Little Phil is probably the most realistic in Point 
Counter Point. On the one hand, the text follows Elinor’s consciousness, especially her 
wishes to nurse her child without rest, but on the other, it makes a scientific comment on 
the situation in which she is a human being or living creature before being a mother, and 
thus cannot deny her appetite or need for sleep, desire even in such a situation (see 545). 
The division of the ideal and the real mother can be found in this comparison, too. 
For his portrayals of Marjorie and Elinor, Huxley owes much to actual women. Of 
course, one possible source is his intelligent wife, Maria. In a certain sense, Huxley’s 
work was produced through cooperative efforts with her. From their marriage in 1919 to 
her death in 1955, Maria was multiply engaged with his career by reading to her 
husband because of his poor eyesight, typing his books, driving him around for research 
and giving him insights for his creations (see Murray 73-74). As indicated by many of 
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her acquaintances, Maria was bisexual or lesbian, and throughout her life, had sexual 
relationships with women—including Ottoline Morrell and Sybille Bedford—of which 
Huxley must have been aware to some extent.28 It is suggested in Point Counter Point 
that the three main female characters do not adjust to heteronormativity very well.29 Just 
as Marjorie and Elinor are terribly afraid of their coming or past childbirth, when Maria 
gave birth to her son Matthew on 19 April 1920, it was an extremely difficult delivery 
from which she nearly died of a haemorrhage and which convinced the couple of the 
impossibility of having another child (see Bedford 109).30 The division of appreciation 
of motherhood in Point Counter Point could be traced back to Huxley’s letter of 1920 in 
which he unconsciously contrasts the suffering that his wife has undergone with his 
admiration of the greatness of life.31 
Huxley’s depiction of Elinor in the dilemma substantially depends on his long 
friendship with Naomi Mitchison, née Haldane. Just like the Huxleys, the Haldanes are 
a family of scientists: her father is the well-known physiologist John Scott Haldane, her 
elder brother is the equally famous biologist J. B. S. Haldane, and Naomi herself is 
renowned for her science fiction as well as her devotion to feminism and socialism. In 
the second volume of her autobiography, You May Well Ask: A Memoir, 1920-40 (1979), 
Mitchison recollects: “Aldous and I had been on affectionate terms over the between-
war years. For me he was part of the family, a sort of brother” (95). Mitchison even 
confessed her love to Huxley, who, however, rejected it, marrying another intellectual 
woman a few years later (see Bedford 56). 
Since her marriage with Gilbert Richard Mitchison (later a Labour Member of 
93 
 
Parliament) in 1916, Naomi Mitchison lived in line with her feminist belief that 
“intellectual” women should be allowed to have “both worlds” in their life, i.e., “to live 
as women, to have masses of children” and “to do their own work, whatever it may be” 
(Comments on Birth Control [1930], 25). From a realistic position, she affirmatively 
accepted birth control, writing a positive review on the “work of civilization” in birth 
control clinics (see “Motherhood” [1924], 249-50). Although having given birth to her 
first child Geoff in 1918, Mitchison could not adapt herself particularly well to 
motherhood, gradually feeling herself “trapped,” and there was a time when she went 
overseas with her husband, entrusting the care of Geoff to her mother, nurses and maids 
(Calder 50). In 1927—even as Huxley was writing Point Counter Point—Geoff 
developed meningitis and, despite her devoted nursing, quickly died at the young age of 
nine. The qualms of her conscience were acute, especially because for some of the 
period of his illness she was away (see Calder 80-81)—why she was absent is not 
described by any of her biographers, but she had an affair with another man, which 
might have been the reason. Even after more than fifty years, Mitchison could not 
“completely” set herself free from her “pain” and sense of being “guilty”: “I still wince 
away, inevitably blaming myself, thinking if I had taken more trouble at the beginning 
when he first got ear-ache. If only. If only” (Mitchison YMWA, 30). Jenni Calder, the 
biographer who interviewed Mitchison, sympathetically understands her situation, in 
which “she was living a complex professional and personal life” and “she gave time to 
people and causes in which she believed” (81). The “complex” life is, in Mitchison’s 
own words, to have “both worlds” inside and outside the home, and she found herself in 
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the patriarchal “trap,” which catches Elinor as well. However faithfully a mother usually 
tries to follow her beliefs, respecting her life outside the home, once something tragic 
happens at home, she has to (or is made to) drive herself into self-reproach, attributing it 
to the other aspect of her life. 
To some extent, the dilemma in which Mitchison was placed reflects the 
confrontation of two kinds of ideology regarding a woman’s way of life—the discussion 
to which Mitchison herself contributed. In Point Counter Point, Elinor finds an “abyss” 
between herself and her mother-in-law Rachel, who is intelligent, religious and 
basically conservative on maternity. I suggest that this distance or conflict is also based 
on Mitchison’s case. Being “desperately unhappy after Geoff’s death,” Mitchison 
visited her brother Jack and his wife Charlotte in Cambridge, but she “not only got no 
sympathy or affection but painful accusations” (Mitchison YMWA, 77; see also Benton 
54-55; Calder 81). Here, it is worthwhile to pay attention to Charlotte Haldane, another 
intellectual female writer.32 In Motherhood and Its Enemies (1928), published in the 
same year as Point Counter Point, Haldane—for whom childbirth and childrearing are 
not so much a problem of the individual woman but of the whole nation, and who is 
critical of birth control (117)—deplores the contemporary dislike for motherhood, 
which in her view should be the most important vocation for women. “Only the normal 
wife and mother,” according to her, “will consider her interests identical with those of 
her husband and her children,” whereas the “‘amateur’ prostitute [i.e., a group of 
“abnormal” women, including some feminists] will, after marriage, allow her own 
interests to compete with those of husband and children” (158). Naturally, there is 
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antagonism between “normal” and “abnormal” women (158-59), which appears, for 
example, as a generation gap between “wives of sixty” who are “obedient and 
abstaining and religious,” and “wives of thirty” who lack these characteristics (see 194). 
Regarding the “maternal instinct,” Haldane argues that “mothers are to some extent 
‘born,’” even though the instinct is also put under the influence of civilization or 
education (174-75). Following Haldane’s standard, Mitchison, a feminist advocate of 
birth control who treated as equal the lives of herself, her husband and her children, and 
who lost her eldest child, would be classified as an “abnormal” woman lacking in 
“maternal instinct,” viz., the “enemy of motherhood.” 
It is probable that Huxley, a close friend of the Haldanes, fictionalized the conflict 
between Mitchison and her sister-in-law as the conflict between Elinor and her mother-
in-law. Indeed, the definition and criticism that Haldane offers in her book would apply 
to not only Mitchison but also Elinor, who, because of her apparent lack of “natural 
instincts,” is regarded as “strange” or “queer” by Rachel, and who sees a generation gap 
between herself and her mother-in-law (see 339).33 Mitchison was offended upon 
finding in Point Counter Point a description of the death of a child like her son, and 
Calder regards her reaction as natural (see 82; see also Mitchison YMWA, 30; Benton 
54). However, what must not be overlooked is that Huxley fictionalized not only the 
death of Mitchison’s child but also her dilemma and agonies before and after this, as 
well as the ideological conflict regarding women’s lifestyles behind her tragedy.34 
Through these scenes, Huxley tried to represent her feelings and the situation 
surrounding her on behalf of Mitchison, who during this period could not engage herself 
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in writing (see Benton 55) and who, after more than fifty years, still could not deeply 
recount the experience in her autobiography, which definitely traumatized her. 
Certainly, Mitchison must have been offended by Point Counter Point, but this is not 
because she felt betrayed by Huxley, whom she had privately told about her tragedy, but 
because she found in his writing some truths behind the matter which she never wanted 
to touch upon—or have anyone else do so. 
What has come out through our reading is that any discourse stressing 
motherhood as the essence of women could put pressure on mothers, making their 
mothering even more difficult. This may remind one of more recent discussions of the 
mother-child relationship beyond the essentialist notion of mother. Jacqueline Rose, 
another critic of psychoanalysis and feminism, admits that “Kristeva [. . .] has been 
attractive to feminism,” but warns against a risk of her “image of femininity,” inveigling 
us into “that essentialism and primacy of the semiotic which is one of the most 
problematic of aspects of her work” (Sexuality in the Field of Vision [1986], 157).35 
According to Rose’s article, “Mothers” (2014), what makes the mother-child 
relationship difficult, bringing ruin upon mothers and children, is before anything else 
the simplification of the relationship, i.e., the attitudes of idealizing motherhood and 
emphasizing the maternal instinct (this tendency, incidentally, is nowadays noticeably 
shared by neoliberalism and essentialist feminism). In fact, actual mother-child 
relationships can never be easily grasped because of their complexity, which Rose 
persuasively underscores, citing many examples of mothers and children, from Greek 
myth to recent critiques. On a mother’s affection towards her child, for instance, while 
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most of us (including Freudians) refuse to recognize any sexual impulse there—women 
being allowed to be the object of children’s sexual desire, but not vice versa—her 
breastfeeding is actually followed by her erotic pleasure. A mother’s love, despite our 
hope of its purity, is in fact something ambivalent, mixed with hate. It is thus vital to 
take account of such diversity or complexity and to construct an environment in which 
women can calmly experience being mothers. The need of understanding mothers more 
flexibly can be particularly deduced from Elinor’s ambivalent attitude towards Little 
Phil, finding fear and strangeness in him, as well as his unexpected death, which is no 
doubt the worst of all the possible endings for a mother and her child.36 
 
4. Questioning the Feminine: Lucy 
While motherhood puts Marjorie and Elinor in the divided state, what happens to 
Lucy, who is not a mother? In fact, Lucy’s life, too, does not seem to be compatible with 
the general notion of identity; she is repeatedly emphasized in the text as a changeable 
being who cannot be easily grasped by anyone, especially in her temporary relationships 
with other people (in Molly’s words, she enjoys “float[ing] through life instead of 
trudging” like a butterfly that “flits from flower to flower” [115]) and in her incessant 
movement in search of a “new life” (as she herself says: “I find it’s really impossible to 
stay in one place more than a couple of months at a time” [294]). This inevitably leads 
us to another question about women’s identity, that is, femininity. 
Since the 1980s, feminist theory has displayed a strong tendency to reconsider 
and doubt the concept of the female subject, on which it had constructed itself. In 
98 
 
Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (1990), Judith Butler declares 
that the feminist critique should “understand how the category of ‘women,’ the subject 
of feminism, is produced and restrained by the very structures of power [such as 
language, science and politics] through which emancipation is sought” (3-4). The most 
daring facet of her theory is to reveal the constructive nature of gender: “gender proves 
to be performative—that is, constituting the identity it is purported to be. In this sense, 
gender is always a doing, though not a doing by a subject who might be said to preexist 
the deed” (34).37 Provided gender is only a discursive construct, it is naturally possible 
for us to act it in subversive ways, not the ways that reinforce existing structures of 
power—even though “those who fail to do their gender right” are “regularly punish[ed]” 
by society (190). Although by a dialectic approach she has deepened and corrected her 
argument in her subsequent writings, including Bodies That Matter (1993) and Undoing 
Gender (2003), her attention has been consistently directed to the issue of subjectivity 
and identity.38 
Compared with other female characters in Point Counter Point, Lucy has lived 
free from the traditional way of female life to such an extent that other people feel as if 
she were “a man” (199, 378).39 In her relationships with men, Lucy always “want[s] to 
assert her will” and “pride,” trying to maintain her “independen[ce]” and “free[dom]” in 
various aspects of her life (200, 226, 262-63); even before Rampion, the most self-
assertive man in the story, she cannot but feel it “insufferable that people should do 
things she didn’t want them to do” (172). What is remarkable is that Lucy appears to stir 
up gender trouble not only in individual relationships but also in the broader context of 
99 
 
culture, as symbolically depicted in a scene following her affair with Walter: 
Aesthetically, with a connoisseur’s appreciation, she had really been 
admiring him as he lay there, pale, with closed eyes and as though dead, at 
her side. 
[. . .]  
[. . .] He had looked dead [. . .]. Herself alive, wakefully and 
consciously alive, she had studied his beautiful deadness. Admiringly, but 
with amused detachment, she had looked at this pale exquisite creature 
which she had used for her delight and which was now dead. “What a 
fool!” she had thought. (266) 
From the perspective of a male “connoisseur,” Lucy observes Walter—ironically—in 
the same way as his father, the great painter John Bidlake, has so far observed many 
women, reducing each of them to just an object of his pictures that has “anything worth 
having beyond a pair of legs and a figure” (61).40 It is not difficult to find here the 
reverse of the traditional form of gender,41 or even a woman’s retaliation for what men 
have done to women. In another scene, Lucy harshly criticizes John as an artist, 
including his view of women: “Lucy [. . .] wondered why the old man’s painting had 
fallen off so much of late. This last exhibition—it was deplorable; “[Speaking as a 
woman,] I always find your bathers rather an insult”; “Do you really find us so 
profoundly silly as you paint us?” (59-60). In short, Lucy allows herself to be an 
observer of John, the observer of women. 
What is noticeable is that Lucy has aspects of not only a male critic but also a 
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male scientist. This is significant given the structure of this story. As stated before, 
Philip’s scientific narrative frequently appears in the text, and the same sort of approach 
is shared by other male-scientific observers—such as Lord Edward, Illidge (professional 
biologists) and Rampion (an amateur zoologist like Philip [see 173]). Thus, by 
observing, analysing and even ridiculing them, Lucy plays a role in relativizing and 
challenging the male-scientific narrative (see 179, 200-01, 227, 410). When Lucy is 
identified as a kind of scientist, it is not only in the sense of “nineteenth-century 
naturalism,” which remains engaged in observation, but also of “twentieth-century 
experimental biology,” of which “intervention” is characteristic.42 Having inherited 
“scientific curiosity” from her father, Lucy calls her American mother’s party a “bear 
garden” and enjoys “experimenting, not with frogs and guinea-pigs, but with human 
beings” (107-08). Although her experiment is approached by “the method of Darwin 
and Pasteur” (“You did unexpected things to people, you put them in curious situations 
and waited to see what would happen” [107]), the difference between her and these 
forerunners of twentieth-century biology is that her objects are human beings: “I think 
I’ll take to science, like the Old Man [her father]. Isn’t there such a thing as human 
zoology? I’d get a bit tired of frogs” (200).43 Lucy thus distinguishes herself from her 
male rivals in the novel who content themselves with experimenting with animals 
(Edward and Illidge) or just observing people (Philip and Rampion). Considering that in 
those days women were often reduced by male scientists to the object of their 
observation and experiment (as typically seen in Haire’s volume in the To-day and To-
morrow series; see also Squier, 77-78), Lucy definitely reverses this gender relationship 
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as a kind of challenge to male science.44 
Lucy’s disturbing influence on the notion of gender is stressed in the text by the 
contrasting attitudes of Marjorie and Elinor towards gender. Marjorie, despite her 
seemingly original lack of the maternal, tries to performatively adjust herself to gender 
norms and will become a maternal mother in the near future. For her, Lucy’s daring way 
of life is never “attractive” but just “a horror” (376-78). By deepening her religious 
belief under the guidance of Rachel, who puts a high value on the maternal (see 457), 
Marjorie accepts the fate of becoming a mother and seems to successfully obtain 
“peace” of mind which could provide her with a stable identity as a traditional type of a 
woman, although this might be an illusion (see 468-49).45 As for Elinor, her ordinary 
parody of gender results in a failure. She cannot devote herself to the home and secretly 
maintains her wish to live like Lucy, appreciating her as “very amusing and alive” and 
finding “an enviable talent” in her “masculine” way of life. To put it plainly, Elinor’s 
ambivalent attitude towards her affair—which is described thus: “The spirit was a 
libertine, but the flesh and its affections were chaste”—suggests that she is a compound 
of both Lucy-like and Marjorie-like elements. After all, her half-hearted position drives 
Elinor into an unhappier situation than both Marjorie, who properly enacts an ordinary 
woman, and Lucy, who consistently refuses to do so. Although Butler refers to the 
possibility of social punishment for people who deviate from gender norms, it might be 
insightful or realistic that Huxley prepares the tragic end not for Lucy, the most 
subversive character, but for Elinor, who has the ambiguous position. In a metaphorical 
sense of science, unlike Marjorie, Elinor certainly has an ability to observe people with 
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“the right sort of eye,” which her father and Webley appreciate (see 182, 485), but can 
never play the role of an experimenter like Lucy, as symbolically shown by her 
unsuccessful affair with Webley, which she calls an “experiment” on her husband (357). 
On the whole, Lucy is modelled after Nancy Cunard, whom Huxley mentioned in 
a letter when they both had poems published in Wheels (to Julian, 3 August 1917, Smith 
132), and with whom he was passionately in love, probably between the early autumn 
of 1922 and July 1923 (see Murray 141).46 Cunard was the daughter of an English 
baronet and a sociable American woman. Having acquired social skills and intelligence, 
she grew up to be an independent woman who loved freedom so deeply and lived so 
unconventionally that the “usual labels seem especially inappropriate to what she was” 
and even “people closest to Nancy [. . .] never began to understand her” (Chisholm 13-
14). Concretely, her freewheeling character was reflected in her romances in disregard 
of chastity (thus, she was often represented as a femme fatale),47 her repeated changes of 
dwellings, her preference for self-determination over dependency on others and her 
political activism for liberty from the 1930s onwards.48 Overall, Cunard’s life can be 
viewed as a performative challenge to the stable concept of identity. 
Curiously enough, in fictionalizing Cunard into Lucy, Huxley made some 
alterations. The real Cunard lived with some traumatic or ‘unfortunate’ elements of her 
past: 1) her strange relationship with Lady Cunard (although in childhood she yearned 
for maternal love, Nancy later became estranged from her mother), 2) her unsuccessful 
marriage and the death of her boyfriend during the war, and 3) her hysterectomy, which 
she had in the winter of 1920 in Paris probably as a result of her unexpected pregnancy 
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and abortion (or miscarriage) followed by complications (see Chisholm 101; Gordon 
99). Despite knowing about these matters, Huxley did not incorporate them into the 
character of Lucy. Not having any serious problem with Lady Edward (see 116), Lucy is 
not concerned about her husband, who died two years previously—on the contrary, she 
makes herself look good in mourning black (see 56)—never suffering from a women’s 
disease or hysterectomy. What kind of effect was brought about by this? 
Before answering this question, let us direct ourselves to how Cunard was 
represented by another of her contemporaries. Michael Arlen, the popular novelist who 
was on close terms with Cunard before Huxley’s association with her, fictionalized her 
three times in his writing. In his autobiographical story, “Confessions of a Naturalised 
Englishman” (1929), Arlen recollects Cunard, through Pricilla (a married society 
woman), giving an accurate portrait of her in this heroine, who has grown up without 
her mother’s love and who takes a hostile attitude towards her: “Mrs Byrrh, preoccupied 
with the conquest of London, had entirely neglected Priscilla as a child and a young 
girl”; “Pricilla disapproved very strongly of the mother who had done so much for her” 
(SSMA, 17-18).49 In his earlier two novels, Arlen more daringly constructed characters 
based on Cunard. In his first novel, Piracy (1922), the protagonist Ivy stays with 
Virginia in Paris after the war. Virginia is a married woman of the upper class, who, 
despite appearing unrestrained and energetic, develops a gynaecological illness and is 
forced to undergo a major operation with serious complications: “‘There’s things inside 
me,’ she said, with a sob. ‘Steel things.... They’ve left them in there... holding things 
together.... Oh, it hurts, Ivor....’” (261). The story continues with her modest refusal of 
104 
 
his proposal and her sudden death because of a chill after going out in the rain. Arlen’s 
bestselling novel, The Green Hat (1924), develops almost the same sort of melodrama, 
in which an uninhibited heroine called Iris, having experienced syphilis and a 
miscarriage, kills herself in the end, realizing that she is not the right partner for the 
narrator: “Yes, I would die for purity. I wouldn’t mind dying anyhow, but it would be 
nice to die for purity” (47). What emerges from the above representation of Cunard is 
ambiguous: firstly, she formed her unusual character, including her preference for 
independence and liberty, (at least partly) prompted by her ‘unfortunate’ 
circumstances—thus her deviation might be allowed for such a ‘pitiable’ background; 
secondly, her freewheeling way of life eventually leads her to ruin—as if it were worthy 
of punishment. 
In contrast, Huxley refused the causal relationship between her free-spirited 
character and traumatic past by avoiding representing the latter. An especially important 
point is the hysterectomy. Huxley did not adopt Arlen’s association of being unfeminine 
in gender with being unfeminine/barren in the body/sex—one of the targets of gender 
criticism.50 Regardless of the state of her body or other states peculiar to her, Lucy is 
free. The possibility is thus suggested that anyone can live like Lucy, performatively 
challenging gender identity. Especially given that Lucy, unlike Arlen’s heroine, remains 
energetic to the end of the story, Huxley himself was perhaps not negative about such a 
subversive form of gender, nor did he hope for it to be interpreted that way. 
By showing in a contrapuntal way the three women—Marjorie, an expectant 
woman who is finally forced to accept an ordinary parody of gender, Lucy, an 
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independent lady who refuses it but is labelled a femme fatale, and Elinor, a mother who 
cannot do either and faces the most tragic end51—Point Counter Point exposes the harsh 
realities confronted by women, namely how compulsively and violently the stable 
notion of gender identity baffles or binds women, as well as how unfairly and 




In Point Counter Point, Huxley contrapuntally describes how women with 
different characters and statuses search for their own happiness while resisting, obeying 
or struggling with the contemporary ideology of womanhood. His vivid portraits 
contain some elements questioning the concept of maternity, femininity or identity 
itself, interestingly echoing recent criticism of gender beyond the contemporary debate 
about reproduction and motherhood.52 This significance of the novel owes much to 
Huxley’s relationships with Maria Huxley, Naomi Mitchison and Nancy Cunard, as well 
as his imagination of, and perhaps empathy with, the circumstances and feelings of 
these women, who did not necessarily conform well with the gender norm. Here, we 
may also remember that, as Chapter I indicated, during wartime Huxley himself was 
actually put into a subtle position in terms of gender as a young male civilian. Although 
his attitude towards women has been, and will be, most probably associated with the 
image of the male scientist in Brave New World, a close reading of female characters in 
Point Counter Point leads us to other aspects of this author. In his creative activities, 
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Huxley was definitely influenced by the women around him, and he formed his own 
view of women in a more delicate and complicated manner than has been generally 
assumed. 
Getting back to the failure of the mother-child relationship, this repetitive motif in 
Huxley’s oeuvre could be certainly discussed with his loss of a mother’s love as well as 
his attempts at overcoming this and another trauma, that is, of seeing wartime mothers 
sending their sons to the front. However, we also have to consider his associations with 
his female friends who struggled with gender ideology, by which he probably perceived 
the mother-child relationship as something more fragile, complicated and thus special in 
a certain sense. Huxley’s problematization of the mother-child relationship in Point 
Counter Point and his other writings still sounds a warning to our tendency to simplify, 
idealize and propagate it in various aspects of culture and politics. 
It is natural to wonder how the author’s insight into the issues of women’s identity 
developed in his subsequent career. Although the theme of the collapse of the mother-
child relationship repeatedly appeared in his fiction, his view of women never again had 
such depth as in Point Counter Point. By envisaging the future in which, albeit free 
from reproduction and the home, women still appear to be subordinated to men, never 
participating in political authority, Brave New World questions the impact of 
technological progress upon women’s status; this line of argument may fit that division 
in Point Counter Point between two discourses of male scientists and female 
individuals.53 On the other hand, there can be seen, in his later novels, memorable 
female characters, e.g., Katy in Genius and the Goddess (1955), a Nobel Prize-winning 
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physicist’s wife, who has the mysterious power to heal her husband’s illness, and Susila 
in Island (1962), a psychotherapist on an Asian island who helps the hero Will grow up 
as a human and who is probably partly based on his second wife, Laura. Certainly these 
women are influential in the overall plots of the stories, but they play key roles mainly 
in relation to men, rather than performing themselves. In light of gender criticism, this 
point, which more or less could be applied to women in Point Counter Point, may be 
regarded as the limits of his novels. In his non-fictional writing, Huxley directly 
addresses the theme of mother in “Mother” (Adonis and the Alphabets [1956]). 
Although commercialization propagates the idealized mother, a purely maternal one 
(e.g., some greeting cards for Mother’s Day: “You put the sweet in Home Sweet 
Home”; “The happiness of fam’ly life / Depends so much on You” [AHCEV, 341]), the 
mother has actually and historically been more ambiguous, being “simultaneously the 
Creator and the Destroyer” of life (343), as duly described from the Book of Job 
through a Jungian book by Erich Neumann, The Great Mother (1955). It might be a pity 
that Huxley was not more actively involved with contemporary discussion on the issues 
related to women’s identity, of which he had been, to a certain degree, aware in writing 
Point Counter Point, but it must not be unfair either if we note a sort of development or 
progress from Pearl in his first piece of fiction (partly bolstered by his misogyny) to 
Susila in his final novel. 
As Chapter I demonstrated, Huxley in “Richard Greenow” cast doubt upon 
personal identity from a psychological perspective with a focus on otherness in the self, 
especially the violent element of the mind; his scepticism was also directed against 
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gender identity, as seen in the hermaphrodite hero. His interest in this issue continued 
and made the author conceive of some aspects of Point Counter Point in which he 
suggested the inflexible concept of personal identity as not only unreliable but also 
harmful, by depicting female characters’ difficulty with the notion of femininity or 
maternity. With regard to the theme of identity, this novel, contrapuntally portraying 
characters on multiple levels, can also be viewed from other theoretical angles, such as 
those of class and race. The three main women are from different classes, and this point 
naturally influences the ways in which they live, as suggested by Marjorie’s references 
to Lucy: “‘He [Walter] likes her [Lucy] because she’s attractive. But if I had money.’ It 
wasn’t fair” (194).54 Furthermore, the issue of class casts a shadow over other 
characters, including Walter, who theoretically sympathizes with the lower classes but 
emotionally dislikes them, as well as Illidge, a communist from a lower class in Russia 
who experiences despair after murdering Webley because of his strong passion for 
revolution. These descriptions—evidently affected by contemporary domestic and 
foreign situations, such as the rise of the Labour Party and the appearance of the Soviet 
Union—convey a hint of the author’s view of class, which is the main target of Chapter 
IV, a Marxist analysis of his work. At the same time, Point Counter Point has scenes 
which may reflect what Huxley at that time was thinking of races and cultures different 
from his. For example, he negatively depicted India and Indians, perhaps based on his 
actual stay there, hinting at his own feelings through Philip, who shows no interest in 
the justice or the future of this nation (see Chapter 6).55 On the other hand, Huxley’s 
pessimism concerning the future of his own nation or empire was also laid bare in his 
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negative treatment of home, a metaphor of country. The young Quarles’ “only child,” 
Little Phil, has already learnt—as a would-be supporter of the home—“social virtues 
and why the triangle of India is painted crimson [the same colour as England] on the 
map” (321, see also 238); nevertheless this boy, a ray of hope of the home, is not 
allowed to survive for long. This plot, together with female characters who are less 
maternal, may be deemed as a sign of the collapse of the British Empire, or England, 
showing a striking contrast with its colony, India, where many children are now in fact 
being born and raised (see 91). In the next chapter, let us review how in his next and 
most famous novel Huxley represented non-Western Others and approached matters of 
imperialism. 
                                                
1 See Mary in Crome Yellow (1921), civilized women in Brave New World (1932) and Helen in Eyeless in 
Gaza (1936). For Point Counter Point, see below. 
2 See Linda in Brave New World. For Point Counter Point, see below. 
3 See Californian women in Ape and Essence (1948) and Mrs Foxe in Eyeless in Gaza. For Point Counter 
Point, see below. 
4 See John in Brave New World and Anthony in Eyeless in Gaza. 
5 Probably the study that most extensively discusses the roles of women in Huxley’s oeuvre is Guin A. 
Nance’s article, “Dragons and Dragomen: Huxley’s Heroines” (1995), in which she suggests that “the 
women of Huxley’s novels play a principal role both in the development of most of the central characters 
and in the reader’s perception of those characters” (146). Despite Nance’s important comment on the 
diversity of women in his work (see 156), not many critics have pursued this issue. 
6 As early as 1916, “Huxley was attracted to such female spirits” as Lady Constance Stuart Richardson, 
Iris Tree, Nancy Cunard and Marie Beerbohm (Murray 86). 
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7 In fact, the possibility of another aspect of Huxley is suggested by Susan Merrill Squier, who finds in 
Huxley’s works, including Brave New World, a close association of VT (visualization technologies) with 
RT (reproductive technologies). According to her, an awareness of this point makes it possible for us to 
more flexibly “reinscribe the link between fetus and mother, and to remember that the embryo is [. . .] 
part of a complex mutual relationship [. . .] with birth” (167). Sally Minogue and Andrew Palmer, by 
turning their attention to Huxley’s representation of abortion in Eyeless in Gaza, which was illegal in 
Britain at that time but not described with “disapproval,” read this novel as “a powerful critique of current 
structures of oppression” (114). 
8 To a certain degree, the artist Mark Rampion is based on Lawrence, the editor Denis Burlap is J. M. 
Murry, the fascist leader Everard Webley is Oswald Mosley, Walter Bidlake is the young Huxley, Philip 
Quarles is the present Huxley, etc. For Webley, however, David Bradshaw argues for the influence of 
John Gordon Hargrave, founder of the Kindred of the Kibbo Kift (see “Huxley’s ‘Tinpot Mussolini’ and 
the KKK’s ‘White Fox’: A New Source for Everard Webley and the Brotherhood of British Freemen in 
Point Counter Point” [2003]). Much attention has also been directed to the experimental features of this 
novel, such as applications of music and biology to fiction (see PCP, 384-85, 414). For this aspect of the 
novel, see Jerome Meckier, Aldous Huxley: Satire and Structure (1971), 41-52; Peter Edgerly Firchow, 
Aldous Huxley: Satirist and Novelist (1972), 93-117; Robert S. Baker, The Dark Historic Page: Social 
Satire and Historicism in the Novels of Aldous Huxley, 1921-1939 (1982), 99-126. 
9 There also appear other female characters of marked individuality some of whom are not categorized as 
conventional women. Janet, Elinor’s mother, married John Bidlake, a great but prodigal painter, despite 
her family’s objection, just because she liked his art, and she has indulged in reverie while also having an 
interest in Buddhism. Hilda, Lucy’s mother, is a sociable woman from “the New World” who married 
Lord Edward as she had wished, and who lives as she likes regardless of “traditional” values (50). Mary, 
albeit being of noble birth and despite her parents’ opposition, married Rampion, a talented working-class 
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man, calling him “simply an investment” (142). Their fifteen year-long marriage has been going better 
than that of any of the other couples described in the novel; Mary is a good example of “atavisms” for 
Mark (144) while he fascinates her with his artistic talent and radical ideas. 
10 In an essay on Point Counter Point and feminism, Rupender Kaur evaluates the author’s depiction of 
“women who ultimately become the spokesmen of those issues that form the arguments of feminist 
writers who want the elevation of women from object to subject status” (46). This essay, however, refers 
only to Simone de Beauvoir as a feminist critic and does not take the author’s biographical facts and other 
writings into consideration. 
11 For this paragraph, see Susan Kingsley Kent, Gender and Power in Britain, 1640-1990 (1999), Chapter 
12. 
12 The rationale for this series was “to combine the popularization of expert knowledge with futurology: 
as the title suggests, to lay out the current state of particular disciplines or subjects, and to consider their 
probable future developments” (Saunders “TTPS,” 3). As Aline Ferreira points out, the To-day and To-
morrow series reflects contemporary interest in the situation of women, such as “the [present] plight of 
women” and “possible strategies and policies that would ameliorate women’s position” (33). 
13 On the other hand, Ralph de Pomerai’s volume, Aphrodite or the Future of Sexual Relationships (1931), 
refers to Walter and Lucy in Point Counter Point as a young couple, who “have the misfortune of living 
in a transitional period in which the old standards have fallen into disrepute and new ones have not yet 
been evolved capable of winning approbation and acceptance” (69-70). 
14 Apart from the main characters, the difficulty or failure of making or maintaining the mother-child 
relationship is embodied by several women. For instance, Mrs Knoyle unintentionally destroys her 
relationship with her son Spandrell (a character suggestive of Charles Baudelaire) by her second 
marriage, which finally brings about his suicide, by which he completes his “revenge” upon her (see 283). 
Gladys, a lower-class woman, extorts money from Sydney (Philip’s father) for her unwelcome pregnancy, 
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which is specifically “a humiliation” for his wife (489, see 457) as well as for himself. Miss Fulkes, a 
governess, earnestly takes care of Little Phil, believing that she loves him more than his parents, and 
feeling deeply sad that someday she will “have to leave him” (315). For Rachel, see note 51. On the other 
hand, Mary, who in Rampion’s view “live[s] by instinct” (148), might be expected to have something like 
a maternal instinct, but interestingly her life with her two children is not minutely described in the story. 
15 Ludovici harshly criticizes feminism as a national and racial threat to “motherhood,” which shares the 
recent “body-despising” tendency (33). Blacker advocates birth-control from racial and national 
perspectives (see Birth Control and the State: A Plea and a Forecast [1926]). Haire eugenically attacks 
“humanitarianism,” proposing “compulsory sterilization or contraception” to prevent the birth of 
“unhealthy” people (Hymen or the Future of Marriage [1927], 76-77). 
16 Russell argues for the need to train women to believe “that to create new human beings is worth the 
discomfort and the suffering which she [they] must undergo” (46-47). Brittain tries to harmonize 
women’s self-realization with the interest of the community (see Halcyon or the Future of Monogamy 
[1929], especially 83-86), and predicts a future when motherhood will be well received again after having 
been “identified with the four S’s—sentiment, suffering, sacrifice and stupidity” (67). Paul, sympathizing 
with feminism and considering radically the state of “home,” believes that the maternal instinct is “real,” 
something essential to women, unlike the paternal instinct, which is only “artificial” (Chronos or the 
Future of the Family [1930], 28-30). 
17 In terms of expression, too, this text appears to deal with the maternal negatively. The word 
“maternal[ly]” appears six times, and four of these occasions are used for the description of the three 
spiritual women surrounding Burlap, a lustful hypocrite (see 168 [Beatrice], 217 [Cobbett], 219 [Susan], 
309 [Beatrice]). Burlap, because of his childlike behaviour, seems to arouse something maternal in these 
women, but this (pseudo-) maternal love is grasped as something unusual that is suggestive of “incest” 
(see 219, 221) and which is ultimately to be lost, as symbolized by the death of Susan. The word is also 
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used for Walter’s unrewarded love of Lucy; he treats her as a woman “whom one could maternally protect 
and be maternally protected by” (260), but this love eventually disappears along with his hope for 
something maternal. 
18 A biological observation of the diversity of the self can be seen in the description of Webley’s dead 
body: “Thousands upon thousands of millions of minute and diverse individuals had come together and 
the product of their mutual dependence, their mutual hostility had been a human life. Their total colony, 
their living hive had been a man” (509). As mentioned in the Introduction, Huxley not only emphasized 
the fluid and diverse aspect of identity but also realized that such a view of identity might lead one to live 
freely or irresponsibly. In Antic Hay, for example, Theodore remarks: “when the future and the past are 
abolished, when it is only the present instant, whether enchanted or unenchanted, that counts, when there 
are no causes or motives, no future consequences to be considered, how can there be responsibility”? 
(184). In Point Counter Point, Philip sees the effect of his sense of identity in an ambiguous manner: “his 
liberty was in a strange paradoxical way a handicap and a confinement to his spirit” (255). As stated in 
Chapter IV of this dissertation, Eyeless in Gaza is an autobiographical work which follows his conversion 
into leading a responsible life based on another sort of identity. 
19 This continues: “Fifteen years hence a boy would be confirmed. Enormous in his robes, like a full-
rigged ship, the Bishop would say: ‘Do ye here in the presence of God, and of this congregation, renew 
the solemn promise and vow that was made in your name at your Baptism?’ And the ex-fish would 
answer with passionate conviction: ‘I do.’ For the thousandth time she wished she were not pregnant” 
(194). 
20 In his notebook Philip writes: “Since reading Alverdes and Wheeler I have quite decided that my 
novelist must be an amateur zoologist. Or, better still, a professional zoologist who is writing a novel in 
his spare time. His approach will be strictly biological” (414). For the zoological feature of Point Counter 
Point, see Meckier, “Quarles among the Monkeys: Huxley’s Zoological Novels” (1973). 
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21 In Anthropogenie (1874) and others, Ernst Haeckel demonstrates that the embryonic growth of the 
foetus in the womb recapitulates the entire evolutionary history of the species. Although he supported his 
theory with illustrations showing the process, Haeckel was condemned for his modification of the original 
image. Assuming that Huxley knew of this fabrication (this is probable given his encyclopaedic 
knowledge), it may be that through the above scene the author not only exhibits the apparent contrast in 
two discourses (the objective and the subjective) on gestation but also deconstructs the opposition 
between them, both of which are, in fact, produced by a person’s subjectivity. 
 
Fig. 2. Illustration of the Recapitulation: Tables IV and V in Haeckel’s Anthropogenie: 
Entwickelungsgeschichte des Menschen (1874). 
22 As Squier remarks, unlike Russell, who sees ectogenesis very positively, “Brittain scrutinizes 
ectogenesis, as she does all of the other topics she addresses in Halcyon, in terms of its impact not on the 




                                                                                                                                          
23 Being dissatisfied with an earlier feminism that, by “reject[ing] the image [of motherhood] and its 
misuse,” “circumvents the real experience that fantasy [of motherhood] overshadows,” Kristeva lays the 
notion of mother on the table for discussion, stressing the impact of pregnancy and mothering on women 
(see KR, 161). She also argues that subjectivity is always being formed, never completed. She receives a 
hint at this notion of “the subject-in-process” from a biological view that “a living being is not merely a 
structure but a structure open to its surroundings and other structures” (JK, 26). Such subjectivity thus 
occurs in an open system like an amoeba, consistently being transformed, depending on repeated 
incorporation and exclusion of others, particularly those who are loved. 
24 At the beginning of the essay, Kristeva declares that in our “civilization” the “representation of 
femininity” tends to be “absorbed by motherhood,” and proposes a definition of “maternal” as “the 
ambivalent principle that is bound to the species, on the one hand, and on the other stems from an identity 
catastrophe that causes the Name to topple over into the unnameable, non-language or body” (KR, 161-
63). 
25 “Dividing the essay into two discourses, she writes on one side of the page of the mystical language of 
Christian theology and the rationality of science, while, on the other side, she develops a more private and 
autobiographical account of motherhood. In dividing the narrative of her essay in this way, Kristeva seeks 
to underscore the split or hiatus between the ideal and actuality of maternity” (Elliott 121-22). 
26 See e.g., Kristeva, “unes femmes: The Woman Effect” (1975), rpt. in JK, 103-12; “Women’s Time” 
(1979), rpt. in KR, 187-213. 
27 In a string of incidents, Elinor is put under some obscure power, deprived of her own abilities of 
deciding, thinking and action, and is contrasted with Philip and other male characters who can decide, 
think and act by themselves (see especially 480, 540-44). Unlike the positive impact of motherhood as 
argued by Kristeva, this image of Elinor with “helplessness” (540) underscores another side of being a 
mother, which is partly suggestive of de Beauvoir’s well-known comment on women under the patriarchy 
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system: “The woman who gave birth, therefore, did not know the pride of creation; she felt herself the 
plaything of obscure forces, and the painful ordeal of childbirth seemed a useless or even troublesome 
accident. [. . .] [. . .] she submitted passively to her biologic fate” (94). While Elinor, losing her reason, 
becomes somewhat religious in the above scene, Marjorie is helped by religion to overcome her anxiety 
about becoming a mother. It is thus suggested that thinking may need to be replaced by belief to become a 
good mother (motherhood can make it difficult for women to remain rational and intelligent), and that the 
maternal is something religious or illusory. See also note 51. 
28 According to Bedford, “Maria was bisexual and she did have a series of short-term passionate 
relationships with other people while she was married to Aldous” (qtd. in Murray 72, 140). In Garsington, 
Maria had a lesbian relationship with Ottoline Morrell, which was well known among visitors, including 
Aldous (see Murray 71-72; see also David King Dunaway’s interviews with Rose D’Haulleville [Maria’s 
younger sister] and Francis Huxley [Julian’s second son], published in Aldous Huxley Recollected: An 
Oral History [1995], 16-18). Although in a letter to Julian (5 September 1927) he himself admitted that 
“according to Freud” he had “secret homosexual tastes” (290), it seems that Huxley was not plainly 
engaged with homosexuality. Meanwhile, when he stayed at the Nottinghamshire coalfields to see 
unemployment centres in 1936, the visit was called by Maria the exploration of the “homosexual 
underworld of Nottingham” (Maria’s unpublished letter to her younger sister, Jeanne Neveux, c. March 
1936, qtd. in Murray 292; Murray’s translation of “la basse homosexualité de Nottingham”). Other than 
“Richard Greenow,” Huxley did not directly place the theme of sexuality into his work. However, in After 
Many a Summer (1939), when Pete, a young scientist, asks, “what sort of sexual behaviour was normal,” 
Propter, a philosopher who is mainly the author’s mouthpiece, mentions the relative, constructed nature of 
this concept: “there was no one type of human sexuality that could be called ‘normal’ in the sense in 
which one could say that there was a normality of vision or digestion. [. . .] Thus, if an individual wanted 
to be well thought of in any given society, he or she could safely regard as ‘normal’ the type of sexual 
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behaviour currently tolerated by that local religion and approved by the ‘best people’” (260-62). 
29 Although Marjorie is sure that she loves Walter “by [heterosexual] tradition,” her lover concludes that 
she “doesn’t really like men and is only naturally attuned to the company of women” (15). Elinor’s 
potential discord with heterosexism might be implied by Rachel’s impression of her as being “queer”—
the word which had already been in use as slang for homosexuality at the end of the nineteenth century 
(see Showalter SA, 112). For Lucy’s sexuality, see note 44. 
30 That Huxley’s baby was named “Matthew” after Matthew Arnold (Huxley’s great uncle) definitely 
reminds us that Little Phil is named after his father Philip, and is composed of his many ancestors as 
realized by Elinor. 
31 Huxley writes: “My wife has just had a son and has, I am thankful to say, weathered the tempest safely 
and auspiciously. These works of nature really do put works of art in the shade” (letter to Arnold Bennett, 
23 April 1920, Smith 184; see also his letter to Leonard Huxley, 20 June 1920, Smith 187). 
32 In her review of Brave New World, Charlotte Haldane expresses her dissatisfaction with Huxley’s satire 
on science technology (“Dr. Huxley and Mr. Arnold” [1932]). Six years earlier, she herself published 
Man’s World (1926), envisaging a twenty-first century in which women are divided by a caste system into 
sterilized and breeding groups, controlled by a male scientist. For a comparison of Man’s World and 
Brave New World, see e.g., Firchow EU, 42-43; Judith Adamson, Charlotte Haldane: Woman Writer in a 
Man’s World (1998), 55-56. Haldane’s attitude towards feminism and science appears complex and unable 
to be simplified. For a gender analysis of Haldane’s work, see e.g., Squier, Chapter 3. 
33 As a matter of fact, many other women in Point Counter Point would be classified by Haldane as 
members of “abnormal” groups (see Haldane ME, 134, 157-58). Through these characters, Huxley, being 
probably familiar with Haldane’s tone of argument, which is also assumed to have influenced her 
husband, may satirize her view of women’s lifestyles. In a letter to Julian Huxley (signed with Aldous, 30 
July 1920), Maria, soon after her childbirth, writes: “I hope Mrs Haldane will give me many hints and 
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advices [for mothering]” (Smith 189-90). 
34 When writing Point Counter Point, Huxley wrote a letter to Mitchison in a gentle tone: “I have been 
hesitating to write for some time; for after all there is no consolation and the best-meant letters are 
intrusions. And where a child is concerned the horror is so specially unescapable and inexplicable. Child 
suffering brings the whole thing to a head, summarizes the whole enormous problem. And there is no 
visible solution. One can’t swallow original sin; and equally, I think, one can’t swallow mere chance, 
mere pointlessness, mere mechanisms. The only hope is that there may be a paradox, a living and 
functioning self-contradiction that admits the pointlessness and the wantonness and at the same time 
admits the point and the purposefulness, which one does feel certain of, at moments, as realities” (23 
August 1927, Sexton 198). 
35 One of the arguments against Kristeva is a suspicion that she is subscribing to, if not relying on, 
biological essentialism, although she views sexual differences mainly in psychoanalytic terms. For 
example, in “Stabat Mater,” Kristeva proposes an analysis that allows “an acknowledgement of what is 
irreducible, of the irreconcilable interest of both sexes in asserting their differences, in the quest of each 
one—and of women, after all—for an appropriate fulfilment” (KR, 184). 
36 Considering the status of children, the text, especially the cited passage in which Elinor recognizes 
undeniable strangeness/otherness in Little Phil (PCP, 319-20), can be read as a warning against the 
narcissistic gratification that tempts parents to see their children as clones of themselves. 
37 Butler also remarks: “Gender is the repeated stylization of the body, a set of repeated acts within a 
highly rigid regulatory frame that congeal over time to produce the appearance of substance, of a natural 
sort of being” (45). For Butler’s criticism of Kristeva’s theory, including her view of lesbianism as 
“psychosis,” see GT, 107-27, 181-83. 
38 In Undoing Gender, Butler argues that gender norms necessarily produce the repressed, those who 
cannot follow the norms, and that the norms always involve something latent to attack them: “Gender is 
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the mechanism by which notions of masculine and feminine are produced and naturalized, but gender 
might very well be the apparatus by which such terms are deconstructed and denaturalized. Indeed, it may 
be that the very apparatus that seeks to install the norm also works to undermine that very installation, 
that the installation is, as it were, definitionally incomplete” (42). 
39 Lucy is very cautious of romance, which could collapse this power balance (see 226, 262-63). Her 
behaviour is compared by others to a man’s: “There was nothing of the victim about Lucy; not much 
even, he had often reflected, of the ordinary woman. She could pursue her pleasure as a man pursues his, 
remorselessly, single-mindedly, without allowing her thoughts and feelings to be in the least involved”—
Spandrell (199); “She’s one of those women who have the temperament of a man. Men can get pleasure 
out of casual encounters. [. . .] She has the masculine detachment”—Elinor (378). 
40 The scene is ironic in another sense too, namely that Walter himself works as a ruthless critic (see 213-
14). It can also be a woman’s revenge upon Walter, who has underestimated women’s intelligence (see 
67). 
41 See Hogara Matsumoto, “Three ‘Modern Girl Novels’: The Imperial Development/Revolution of the 
New Woman Fiction” (in Japanese, 2008), 271. In this essay, Matsumoto compares Point Counter Point, 
Michael Arlen’s The Green Hat (see below) and Virginia Woolf’s final novel, Between the Acts (1941). 
42 See, e.g., Evelyn Fox Keller’s mention of this critical change: “One popular description of the 
distinctiveness of biological science since the end of the nineteenth century is cast in terms of the shift 
from an observational science to an experimental one. This shift might alternatively be expressed as a 
shift in aim from representation to intervention (or from description to control)” (96-97). 
43 In another volume in the To-day and To-morrow series, J. D. Bernal, a controversial scientist, envisages 
a future state, as Huxley does in Brave New World, by using a similar expression: “The world might, in 
fact, be transformed into a human zoo, a zoo so intelligently managed that its inhabitants are not aware 
that they are there merely for the purposes of observation and experiment” (The World, the Flesh and the 
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Devil: An Enquiry into the Future of the Three Enemies of the Rational Soul [1929], 95). Although Bernal 
seems to think little of women (or simply does not seriously consider them), Lucy exactly practises such 
“observation and experiment[ation]” towards the people around her, or, in her words, “creatures” (109). 
44 Naturally, Lucy becomes a threat to men—“gender trouble” must be the most troublesome for people 
who have vested interests in the regime of “masculine hegemony” (see Butler GT, 46)—and in this case 
they are male scientists in particular. Whether Illidge (“[Lucy is] Damned, destroyed, irrevocably 
corrupted” [70]; “A refined and perfumed imitation of a savage or an animal” [71]), Rampion (“These 
professional sirens!” [172]; “She gives me the creeps. That poor little Bidlake boy. Like a rabbit in front 
of a weasel” [173]) or Spandrell (“a born bad angel”; “good and faithful succubus” [199]), each of them 
tries to reduce her indefinability to the male-oriented category of femme fatale, bringing ruin upon men. 
On the other hand, Lucy appears to have internalized the homosexual taboo. It is not difficult to detect in 
the text the signs that she has not adapted or satisfied herself by her heterosexual relationships with men, 
including Walter, whom she can never “love” (264). However, she continues to enact a parody of 
heterosexuality. Tired of London, she goes on a visit to Paris, where homosexuality (“les tapettes”/“les 
gousses”) is “fashionable,” but because of her “English respectability,” she soon begins to look again for 
“heterosexuals for a change” (409). Even though it brings to her “grave and attentive suffering” (470, see 
also 466-67), Lucy does not stop performatively acting as a heterosexual woman. 
45 Another example of stable identity can be seen in Webley’s way of life: “He was always so definitely 
himself; he lived up to character” (358). In other writings, Huxley sees this sort of stability of identity 
very negatively as something unnatural for a living being, and refers to Christianity and Fascism as 
examples of that which requires one to live with a stable self (see the Introduction of this dissertation; see 
also EG, Chapter 11). 
46 As for her appearance, Lucy really resembles Cunard, except for her “dark hair,” which contrasts with 
Cunard’s fair hair (56). Huxley’s association with Cunard influenced his characterization of important 
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women in his other novels, such as Myra in Antic Hay, Barbara in Those Barren Leaves and Helen in 
Eyeless in Gaza, each of whom is influential to the protagonist suggestive of Huxley. See also Firchow, 
“Nancy (Myra, Lucy); Carrington (Mary, Anne); and Aldous (Theodore, Walter): Fact and Fiction” 
(2006). 
47 In terms of sexuality, Cunard was mysterious to men, many of whom realized that, instead of feeling 
pure satisfaction, she was undergoing “a kind of ordeal or torture” or “almost self-sacrifice” during sex 
(Chisholm 234-35). Although she had a lifelong tolerance towards, and friendship with homosexuals, she 
was not openly engaged in homosexuality (see Gordon 92). 
48 Cunard is known for her enthusiastic involvement with the Black Rights Movement and the anti-Fascist 
campaign during the Spanish Civil War (see Chapter IV, Section 2.3). 
49 Unlike in his earlier works on Cunard, Arlen does not kill the heroine but saps her of her vitality in the 
last scene: “She [Priscilla] was asleep, her mouth slightly open. Staring at her like one awaking from a 
trance, I felt that as she slept she had lost her superiority over me, that she was the younger and weaker, 
that she was no more than a child and needed protection” (55-56). In terms of gender, this scene presents 
a typical description of man as the observer/protector and woman as the observed/protected, contrasting 
strikingly with Huxley’s description of Lucy and Walter cited above. 
50 For example, Butler rejects the generally accepted view of a necessary relationship between the body 
and gender, regarding sex as a “gendered category” in the sense that “‘sex’ is as culturally constructed as 
gender” (GT, 8-9). 
51 On hearing Elinor’s frank comment about Little Phil (as mentioned earlier), Rachel realizes: 
“something seemed to be lacking in her, something without which no human being could be entirely 
sympathetic to Rachel Quarles. It was as though she had been born without certain natural instincts” 
(339). Of course, this “something” or “certain natural instincts” is so-called maternity or maternal instinct. 
A crucial point, however, emerges in the rest of Rachel’s consciousness. What makes her feel Elinor 
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“strange” or “queer” is not so much the fact that she is lacking in maternal instinct but “Elinor’s calm and 
casual admission of the fact. She herself would have blushed to make such an admission, even if it had 
been the truth” (339). In fact, Rachel herself has mixed feelings about her son Philip—she seems to love 
her lost second son Geoffrey more than Philip, dropping hints about her unconscious wish that Philip 
“had gone to the War” instead of his brother (see 300, 341-42)—and cannot be regarded only as an 
exemplary mother with a maternal affection. Yet at least she never expresses the less maternal side of 
herself on the performative level, so nothing seems to be lacking in her. The maternal is implied as 
something to be acted performatively rather than given inherently or existing objectively. So, what 
enables Rachel to successfully act performatively as a good mother or wife? It is, first of all, her piety. 
The generation gap between Rachel and her daughter-in-law thus appears as whether or not a woman has 
faith in God. Rachel religiously leads Marjorie, who is originally more spiritual than Elinor, to accept her 
destiny to become a mother (see 458-59). For the association of the maternal with religion, see also note 
27. On the other hand, Elinor’s mother, Janet, is also notable in the issue of identity. She appears to be just 
a typical wife and mother as Rachel does (although the former is attracted to Buddhism while the latter 
believes in Christianity), but at times questions herself on her identity and existence: “She [. . .] began to 
repeat her own name, ‘Janet Bidlake, Janet Bidlake, Janet Bidlake,’ again and again, until the syllables 
had lost all significance for her and had become as mysterious, meaningless and arbitrary as the words of 
a necromancer’s spell. Abracadabra, Janet Bidlake—was she really herself? did she even exist?” (549). 
52 Point Counter Point is the longest novel with the most characters in Huxley’s fiction. Although this 
chapter has focused on the main three characters, other facets of the novel will be revealed by a close 
analysis of other women. The end of the novel, depicting Burlap and Beatrice playing happily in the bath, 
which is of course contrasted with the opening portrayal of the miserable couple Walter and Marjorie, 
may also be read as integrating a diversity of gender into something like heterosexism. However, Burlap 
and Beatrice are very ironically presented there (“Of such is the Kingdom of Heaven” [569]), so the scene 
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does not need to be construed as such. 
53 The ideas of ectogenesis and of the abolition of the family first appeared in Crome Yellow, in which 
Scogan predicts these occurrences in a future world (see 23). 
54 Marjorie’s unwelcome pregnancy may indicate that, unlike Elinor, she has little knowledge about birth 
control. 
55 Philip’s racism appears elsewhere, placing Orang-utans equally with people of Chinese, Malays and 
North Borneo (see 251). With regard to his despising India, his father, Sydney, also uses the investigation 
of Indian history at the British Museum as a pretext for seeing Gladys in London; here, before an English 
man, the image of Indians emerges as the object of observation, as does that of women. 
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Chapter III Savage 
—Brave New World— 
Anthropology and Postcolonialism 
 
1. Introduction 
Unusually among modernist writers, there has been very little discussion of 
Aldous Huxley’s work in relation to postcolonialism.1 As the two previous chapters 
have indicated, Huxley, though not rare for people in those days, laid sporadic 
manifestations of racism about black people, Asians and Jews.2 Although his early 
writing tends to avoid describing colonies concretely or mentioning the problem of 
imperialism directly, there are a few exceptions, such as the travel sketch Jesting Pilate 
(1926) and the novel Point Counter Point (1928). After the Great War, before civil 
unrest developed in India, the British Empire was forced to select either conciliation or 
suppression in dealing with the Indian population. In Point Counter Point, upon hearing 
an Indian’s criticism of the injustice of British rule, Philip Quarles feels as if the issue 
were totally unrelated to himself: “what about old appalling India, what about justice 
and liberty, what about progress and the future? The fact is, I don’t care” (92). In Jesting 
Pilate, before the problem of “the capacity or incapacity of the Indians to govern 
themselves,” Huxley cannot show clearly his own position, only commenting: “it is 
easy for me to suspend judgment” (AHCEII, 471). According to Edward W. Said, “the 
fundamental historical problem of modernism” was that “Europe and the West, in short, 
were being asked to take the Other seriously,” but before the appearance of various 
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Others, modernist literature was “unable either to say yes, we should give up control, or 
no, we shall hold on regardless” (“Representing the Colonized: Anthropology’s 
Interlocutors” [1988], 223). This equivocal reaction to Others appears to be shared by 
Huxley, too. After all, his unpopularity with postcolonial criticism is probably due to the 
assumption that one could not really hope to deduce an unexpected or impressive result 
from his work even if interpreted in this context. Huxley looks like what one imagines 
of a typical English, white, upper-middle-class intellectual of those days—namely that 
he was indifferent to the problem of imperialism, or more judgmentally, that he stood on 
the ruler’s side of imperialism.3 
Yet, even though such a conservative image agrees with Huxley’s early writing to 
a certain degree, it must be doubtful whether it can also fit the whole range of activity of 
his career, especially his later work. In light of the fact that Huxley, since the mid-
1930s, appealed for world peace and deepened more and more his interest in Buddhism 
and other aspects of Oriental thought (as discussed in the next chapter), it would not be 
convincing to view him as indifferent to Others (in a racial or a national sense) or as 
being uncritical of the rule of the West over them. If there is a gap between his attitudes 
towards Others in his early and later writings, how should we understand the causes of 
this? Why did he experience such a development or conversion in the decade from the 
later 1920s to the later 1930s? Although it can be explained by the unstable political 
situation of his day or by his close association with pacifist intellectuals (see e.g., 
Murray 284-86; Dunaway HH, 17-32), Huxley was, first of all, a novelist, and it is 
probable that the acts of preparing and writing a novel gave him an opportunity to 
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reconsider and change his posture towards Others. To seriously examine this possibility, 
our attention needs to be directed to the text of Brave New World (1932), the novel 
published in the middle of the period concerned. 
In the present chapter, I will adopt historical and critical approaches to Huxley’s 
most famous text, especially his descriptions of the Savage Reservation and the Savage, 
which have not often been discussed closely, in order to grasp carefully his attitude 
towards non-Western others and the issue of imperialism. My reading places emphasis 
upon the anthropology of those days as well as postcolonial theories of today.4 
 
2. Brave New World and the Popularity of Anthropology 
As is well known, anthropology was in fashion in modernist contexts. In Britain, 
influenced by the anti-slave movement, anthropology grew rapidly between the later 
nineteenth century and the early twentieth century. Although anthropology was first led 
by “armchair anthropologists” such as James Frazer (the author of The Golden Bough 
[1890-1915], an epoch-making comparative study of different customs and religions), it 
was reborn as that which based itself upon fieldwork or participation-observation by the 
achievements of Bronisław Malinowski, who, after living on an island off Papua New 
Guinea, returned to London to advocate social anthropology. This shift also contributed 
to some aspects of the British interwar avant-garde, including the literature of Joseph 
Conrad, D. H. Lawrence, T. S. Eliot, W. B. Yeats and Robert Graves.5 Anthropology, 
finding its origins in the encounters of Europeans with other races, developed in a close 
relationship with politics, and in the interwar period it came to scrutinize not only 
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foreigners but also domestic people, particularly the lower classes, in order to grasp and 
improve their realities or the nation itself. A typical example of this was Mass-
Observation, the movement which started in 1937 by the anthropologist Tom Harrisson, 
the journalist Charles Madge and the filmmaker Humphrey Jennings, and which was 
endorsed by Julian Huxley, who wrote the introduction to their 1937 pamphlet: “it is 
urgent to obtain detailed and unbiased information as to the mode of thinking of the 
larger, more powerful and economically more important groups of human beings,” such 
as “our own group, the English people” (5).6 The necessity of employing anthropology 
to understand the natives of the British Isles was also recognized by some of the To-day 
and To-morrow contributors. For example, in It Isn’t Done or the Future of Taboo 
among the British Islanders (1930), Archibald Lyall attempts to foretell British customs 
in the future, arguing: “Anthropology, like charity, should begin at home a great deal 
more often than it does” (5).7 In Tantalus or the Future of Man (1924), F. C. S. Schiller 
never hesitates to point out the “savage” nature hidden by civilization, defining 
humanity as “Yahoo-manity” in “the clothes” called “civilization” (31-33); it would not 
surprise us if this statement had been uttered by Huxley or Sigmund Freud (see Chapter 
I). This volume cites Raymond B. Fosdick’s The Old Savage in the New Civilization 
(1929), which shows a contrast between the progress of science technology and the 
unchangeability of human nature. 
Before writing Brave New World, Huxley himself was familiar with anthropology. 
In letters from 1929 to 1931, he not only appreciated Malinowski’s The Sexual Life of 
Savages in North-Western Melanesia (1929) and Margaret Mead’s Growing up in New 
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Guinea (1930) but also confessed that he wanted to write the Sexual Life of Gentlemen 
and Ladies by applying anthropological methods to ‘civilized’ society (see his letters to 
Julian, 13 July 1929 and 12 October 1929, Smith 314, 318; to Norman Douglas, 7 
January 1930, Smith 326; to Kethevan Roberts, 28 November 1930, Smith 343).8 In 
fact, this really came to fruition in Brave New World, where the citizens of London are 
engaged in promiscuous sexual behaviour as well as the rituals of solidarity, which were 
probably, as Jerome Meckier remarks, borrowed from what anthropologists reported as 
a result of their research on ‘primitive’ cultures and peoples.9 
It is also presumed that anthropology influenced the descriptions of an American 
Indian society10 and the Savage, who comes from it, but this point has not been 
examined much in previous studies,11 despite the author’s own admission in his 
interview (published in 1963) of his depending upon the anthropology of American 
Indians:12 
I had no trouble finding my way around the English part of Brave New 
World, but I had to do an enormous amount of reading up on New Mexico, 
because I’d never been there. I read all sorts of Smithsonian reports on the 
place and then did the best I could to imagine it. I didn’t actually go there 
until six years later, in 1937, when we visited Frieda Lawrence. (George 
Plimpton’s interview with Huxley, 165) 
In fact, his memory here is not exact, and Huxley must have viewed the Arizona and 
New Mexico landscapes from a railway window when he travelled in America in May 
1926 (Higdon “AHHSD,” 137-39; see Huxley JP, 548-49). However, the fact remains 
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that he never visited Indian societies in New Mexico or any other place. Although the 
“all sorts of Smithsonian reports” that he mentioned are Smithsonian Institution 
publications such as Annual Reports, it is also conceivable that Huxley, who did “an 
enormous amount of reading,” looked over many other books on American Indians. 
What should be noted here is Huxley’s recollection that he “did the best I could to 
imagine” an Indian society, and this suggests he depicted the “Savage Reservation” not 
only by borrowing descriptions of contemporary materials but also by using his own 
imagination. Thus, in order to grasp Huxley’s own views of Indians and the issue of 
imperialism, we need to carefully direct our attention to differences rather than 
similarities between Brave New World, a tale of a twenty-sixth-century world, and the 
contemporary anthropological studies that Huxley relied on. 
 
3. A Hidden History of the Future World 
3.1. The Vestiges of Imperialism 
At first sight, Brave New World appears to be unrelated to the issue of 
imperialism and unsuitable for a postcolonial reading. This is simply because the novel 
narrates a story of a world after a ‘completion’ of imperial policies. In A.F. 632 (A.D. 
2540), there is only one sovereign nation, the World State, which is governed by ten 
World Controllers, including Mustapha Mond in charge of Western Europe. If 
imperialism is defined as the imposition of our patterns of life and culture upon them in 
other regions, it cannot be seen there as an ongoing issue. By the State’s motto 
“COMMUNITY, IDENTITY, STABILITY,” the Controllers basically allow no regional 
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differences: in civilized society, all the people lead a civilized life, i.e., being controlled 
by developed technology, speaking English as the only official language and sharing the 
same sense of values among the same class. The unification of all the regions, or the 
establishment of the World State, means that the historical role of imperialism came to 
an end. Conversely, before the State was founded, imperial policies must have existed 
and progressed in order to achieve the unification of the world. According to Mond, it 
was during the period of the Nine Years’ War (A.F. 141-50 [A.D. 2049-58]) that world 
leaders constructed the general framework of the World State. Although before this 
period there were many sovereign nations, including imperial nations and their colonies, 
the leaders, facing difficult realities such as the ravages of war and an “Economic 
Collapse,” recognized the need for “World Control” to save the world from 
“destruction” (40-41).13 Because English was chosen as the official language, the World 
State must have been established, like the Wellsian World State, centring on the English-
speaking world, such as the British Empire and the United States of America.14 In short, 
all sovereign nations were not equally engaged in the foundation of the World State, and 
they were substantially annexed by Britain and America into their empire. 
Today, almost five hundred years after the establishment of the State, are there 
still any vestiges of imperialism in the Pre-World State Era? The answer is yes. They are 
described in Chapters 6 to 8, set in an American Indian society, to which we now turn 
our attention.15 
 
3.2. Vestige (1): The Existence of a Savage Reservation 
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Although most of the world in the twenty-sixth century consists of civilized 
society, there are a few exceptional regions called “Savage Reservations,” including the 
one situated in New Mexico. In fact, the existence of the New Mexican Reservation 
itself is the most conspicuous vestige of imperialism depicted in the text. In an Eton 
College teacher’s words, a “Savage Reservation” is an exceptional region that the 
Controllers have left uncivilized because “owing to unfavourable climatic or geological 
conditions, or poverty of natural resources, [it] has not been worth the expense of 
civilizing” (141). According to the Warden of the Reservation, “about sixty thousand 
Indians and half-breeds” or “absolute savages” live there, without “communication 
whatever with the civilized world”; they “still preserve their repulsive habits and 
customs,” including “marriage” and “families,” believe in “Christianity and totemism 
and ancestor worship,” and speak “extinct languages, such as Zuñi and Spanish and 
Athapascan” (88-89). 
No doubt the Reservation above is an image of the future of Indian reservations in 
North America. Historically, the purpose of the Indian reservations was to make the 
Indians abandon their ‘uncivilized’ cultures and lifestyles and instead give them 
‘civilization’ by removing them from their ancestral lands to certain areas. By the late 
nineteenth century, virtually all the Indians were made to live in reservations, but there 
also appeared two signs of shifts in government policy from those days to the early 
twentieth century. Assimilation had already begun to be regarded as superior to removal 
in order to more effectively ‘civilize’ the Indians (see e.g., the Dawes Act of 1887 and 
the non-reservation boarding schools), whereas a contrasting movement was being born 
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with the ‘humanitarian’ aim of changing the critical conditions of Indian life in 
reservations, especially after the Meriam Report of 1928.16 Through his investigation 
Huxley was familiar with the above history and situation of Indians,17 but curiously 
enough, he, as of 1931, envisaged in a very different manner the future of Indian 
society. In his twenty-sixth century, an Indian reservation in New Mexico still exists 
(the other reservations were possibly absorbed into this one), where the World 
Government does not carry out any imperial policies, including civilizing the 
inhabitants. Despite their enjoyment of self-government, Indians cannot leave the 
Reservation or mingle with others outside. Why did Huxley present such a bizarre 
vision? 
This is the first mystery that we face regarding the Savage Reservation. The 
question could be replaced by asking: Why has the World Government left some regions 
uncivilized as “Savage Reservations,” instead of pursuing its civilizing policies 
everywhere? Apart from an official reason—which is economic—is there not a 
substantial one behind this? Before answering this question, however, we should see the 
second mystery, namely why civilized people visit a Reservation. 
 
3.3. Vestige (2): Civilized People’s Visits to the Reservation 
Bernard Marx (the protagonist of the early part of the story), an Alpha-Plus 
psychologist who is working for hypnopædia (sleep-teaching) at the Hatchery and 
Conditioning Centre, takes a week off to travel with his Beta co-worker, Lenina 
Crowne, to see the New Mexican Reservation. The permit for their entry is initialled by 
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the Director, who also went there more than twenty years earlier, when he would have 
been Bernard’s age: “I had the same idea as you”; “Wanted to have a look at the 
savages” (83). A journey involving a rocket and a helicopter brings the two Londoners, 
Bernard and Lenina, to Malpais near Santa Fé, while “crossing the frontier that 
separate[s] civilization from savagery” (90). Although the pilot recommends that they 
see the Indians’ “funny” snake dance (91), what they see in the pueblo of Malpais is, for 
Lenina, too shocking. No sooner do they enter the pueblo than she is overcome by a 
strong hatred towards everything there. Seeing the whipping performed as part of the 
ceremony, she shouts, “Oh, stop them, stop them!”; “Too awful! That blood!” (100). 
Her boyfriend Barnard expresses his candid opinion about Indian society: “[It was] [a]s 
though we were living on different planets, in different centuries” (106). 
The civilized people’s visits to the Indian society are one of the vestiges of 
imperialism, namely “Indian tourism” in the Southwest, a kind of ethnic tourism which 
was popular when Huxley was working on this novel. Between the turn of the 
nineteenth century and the First World War, the Fred Harvey Company, together with 
the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway, was “the most powerful agent of tourism in 
the region” (Dilworth 78). This tie-up industry attracted tourists not only from North 
America but also from many other regions by turning Indians (their lives and rituals) 
into a cultural “spectacle” or the object of “touristic consumption.” For tourists, 
according to Leah Dilworth, the encounter with the real Indians was a kind of simulated 
experience of “the Columbian discovery” of America (79). Such Indian tourism has an 
imperialist aspect, not only because of the exploitation of Indians as commodities but 
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also because, through this system, Indians were made to change part of their original 
lives and cultures or be ‘civilized’ so that they could become English-speaking 
salesclerks at souvenir stores or act the role of so-called ‘Indians,’ which matched the 
tourists’ image of them.18 
Although many ethnographers, artists, photographers and writers reported on the 
Indian tourism, it was probably his friend Lawrence’s essays that had the greatest 
influence on Huxley’s description of civilized visitors to the Reservation. Lawrence not 
only reports about Indians from a non-professional yet non-amateur angle—which is 
shared by Bernard, who is also neither a lowbrow visitor nor a specialist in 
anthropology—but also observes carefully lowbrow sightseers’ impressions of 
Indians—which are shared by Lenina. Above all, Huxley’s setting of the Reservation in 
no other place but New Mexico shows the impact of Lawrence, who stayed there for 
two years. 
After leaving Europe in 1922, Lawrence lived and mingled with Indians in New 
Mexico and later Mexico, inspired by them to conceive several pieces, all or some of 
which Huxley must have read.19 Although the impact of Lawrence upon Huxley’s 
depiction of Indians is most earnestly analysed by Katherine Toy Miller, who mentions 
as possible sources Lawrence’s “Indians and an Englishman” (1923, included in 
Phoenix [1936]), “The Hopi Snake Dance” (1924, included in Mornings in Mexico 
[1927]), The Plumed Serpent (1926) and his letters (which Huxley was collecting and 
editing in parallel with writing Brave New World),20 the first two pieces seem to me the 
most influential. In “The Hopi Snake Dance,” for example, Lawrence remembers the 
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ceremony he watched in Arizona, which was certainly positioned by Indians as “a 
sacred religious ceremonial,” but which was in fact just a “show” or “circus-
performance of men handling live rattlesnakes” for three thousand tourists from all over 
the world (MM, 63). The same contrast appears in Brave New World as the difference in 
the attitudes of savages and civilized visitors towards the snake dance.21 When in New 
Mexico he encounters the Savage, who can speak English, Bernard feels as though he 
has come to a “different planet”; a similar phrase is used in advance by Lawrence to 
express his impression of this place: “Supposing one fell onto the moon, and found 
them talking English, it would be something the same as falling out of the open world 
plump down here [New Mexico] in the middle of America” (P, 92).22 
Not having visited an American Indian society, Huxley attempted to make the 
civilized people’s feelings about it realistic by echoing Lawrence’s essays. In Brave 
New World, however, visits by civilized people to the Reservation do not represent the 
imperial system itself but are vestiges of it. Unlike the early twentieth-century industry 
of sightseeing Indians, which was connected with the imperialist system, Huxley 
envisages Londoners’ visits in the future to the Reservation as not depending on such a 
system. Except for “the Indian guide,” the inhabitants live as usual, in utter disregard of 
travellers, and there seems to be no giving and receiving of money between them. 
Bernard is “entitled to a permit” to enter the Reservation because he is a first-rate 
psychologist with scientific interest, Lenina being allowed to accompany him as a sort 
of assistant, while ordinary people, for whatever reason, cannot visit it only for the 




3.4. The Backdrops and Meanings of the Savage Reservations 
Now we can come back to the first mystery and consider a substantial reason why 
the World State has left several regions uncivilized as “Savage Reservations” instead of 
completing its policy of civilizing the world. In fact, compared with George Orwell’s 
Nineteen Eighty-Four (1949), Huxley’s Brave New World gives a fragmentary 
explanation to the process of founding the World State (see BNW, Chapter 3; Orwell 
NEF, Chapter 9). Viewed ideologically, this point may be a weakness, but it actually 
guarantees the strength of Huxley’s work as a literary text, affording us a wider freedom 
of interpretation. 
Politically, one possible reason lies in the necessity for the Government to 
maintain its citizens’ identity as civilized people. As has often been indicated (and 
suggested in Huxley’s writing too24), “modern and primitive societies” tend to “derive a 
sense of their identities negatively.” By the “universal practice of designating in one’s 
mind a familiar space which is ‘ours’ and an unfamiliar space beyond ‘ours’ which is 
‘theirs,’” fifth-century Athenians, for example, could feel they had an identity as 
“nonbarbarian” (Said, Orientalism [1978], 54). As far as the West is concerned,25 it is 
“the conquest of America that heralds and establishes our present identity.” In 1492, 
when Columbus encountered America, “our genealogy beg[an],” and since then “men 
have discovered the totality of which they are a part, whereas hitherto they formed a 
part without a whole” (Tzvetan Todorov, The Conquest of America: The Question of the 
Other [1982], 5). Was this negative method of forming and maintaining identity not 
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adopted by the World Government in Brave New World? The hypothesis may be 
advanced here that, until a certain point in the Nine Years’ War (the period when a 
framework of the present World State was being created), the Controllers—such as the 
leaders of the British Empire and America—intended to complete their imperial policies 
to unify all regions into one civilization. However, the completion of imperialism or the 
unification of civilization would lead to a crisis in their identity, because the extinction 
of them is none other than the extinction of ourselves. This fact, the paradox of 
imperialism, is what the Controllers were really afraid of. This is why the Controllers, 
switching their policies, decided to leave several regions uncivilized as “Savage 
Reservations” where savages could live in their own way, and this is also why the 
Controllers have purposefully and regularly dispatched “inspectors” to the Reservations 
in order to prevent these savages from being annihilated by any chance.26 
Why, then, are only a limited number of people permitted to enter the 
Reservations? In my view, this would owe to the Government’s fear that such contact 
could spoil the effect of conditioning (and hypnopædia) in the citizens’ minds. 
Originally, civilization-dwellers are not completely civilized; this is persistently 
suggested in their “unfordly” (anti-social/uncivilized) behaviour, which does not accord 
with their conditioning.27 However, if nobody is allowed to enter the Reservations, it 
will become highly doubtful whether they really exist, and this may lead to an ‘identity 
crisis.’ As a compromise, permission for seeing the Reservations is given to only the 
elite (and their friends), who are socially expected to be such exemplary citizens that 
they have a low risk of being deconditioned (see 84, 128-29). In fact, this apparently 
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incomplete measure consequently succeeds in contributing to strengthening and 
spreading among civilized people the misrepresented images of Others—such as the 
mysterious, the exotic, the primitive and the inferior. This reminds us of Said’s 
disclosure of how Orientalism was being formed and confirmed by the West, including 
the intellectual elite, who were most earnest in irresponsibly repeating the 
misrepresentation of the Orient with no careful thought for what the real Orient is like.28 
It is also worth psychologically considering the meanings of the Savage 
Reservations’ existence and of civilized people’s wish to visit them. In fact, “Our 
Freud” is ranked alongside “Our Ford” as the theoretical founder of this World State 
(see 33). What remains in the Reservation is actually what existed in civilized society in 
the Pre-World State Era; uncivilized society—“the negative prefix un- is the indicator of 
repression” (Freud Uncanny, 151)—is thus a dump in which the Controllers confined 
the old customs, or a shelter in which the latter reached from the former.29 This is 
symbolically shown by Bernard’s and Lenina’s reactions to what they see in the 
Reservation, especially their ambiguous feelings (hatred and nostalgia) before “the 
spectacle of two young women giving the breast to their babies”: 
“What a wonderfully intimate relationship,” he said, deliberately 
outrageous. “And what an intensity of feeling it must generate! I often think 
one may have missed something in not having had a mother. And perhaps 
you’ve missed something in not being a mother, Lenina. Imagine yourself 
sitting there with a little baby of your own. . . .” (96) 
This is the uncanny encounter with the past self, especially for Bernard, who is not 
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conditioned well.30 What cannot be lost even by conditioning—something perhaps basic 
to humans and animals—may be a fundamental reason for inviting civilized people to a 
Reservation, and it may reveal some aspect of the Controllers’ wishes to maintain such a 
place like a living museum.31 
 Huxley’s vision is unique in the anthropological context of his time. As stated 
later, mainly from a perspective of social evolution, professional and amateur 
anthropologists assumed that the Indians would either vanish sooner or later or else 
would be unable to live without the help of whites (see e.g., Strong 343, 347; Prins 508, 
511, 519). Overturning these common views, Huxley freely envisaged that Indians 
would survive into the twenty-sixth century as a counterpart to civilized people, and that 
it is civilized people who would depend on their counterpart in terms of their identity. 
 
3.5. Vestige (3): Christian Elements in the Snake Dance 
Inside the Reservation, there also remain vestiges of imperialism. One of them 
can be seen in the Indians’ snake dance, which shocks Bernard and Lenina. Regarding 
the sources of the snake dance in Brave New World, David Leon Higdon gives the 
minutest examination. The appearance and style of the snake dance, in his view, can be 
attributed to The Moki Snake Dance (1898), a pamphlet for tourists written by the 
anthropologist Walter Hough, The Snake Dance of the Moquis of Arizona (1884), 
written by the soldier-adventurer John Gregory Bourke, and three essays written by the 
anthropologist Jesse Walter Fewkes, “Tusayan Snake Ceremonies” (1897), “Tusayan 
Migration Traditions” and “Notes on Tusayan, Snake, and Flute Ceremonies,” (1900).32 
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Among them, the most influential would be Fewkes’s writings, especially several 
illustrations and photographs that they contain, which were published in Volumes 16, 
19-1 and 19-2 of the Annual Report of the Bureau of (American) Ethnology to the 
Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution. 
Although this is not analysed by Higdon, before the snake dance begins, Bernard 
and Lenina are passed by two Indians who are probably preparing for the ceremony and 
whose “dark brown bodies painted with white lines” remind Lenina of “asphalt tennis 
courts” (93). This image of Indians may be based on a photograph of an Indian whose 
body is painted with white lines like tennis courts, “Kakapti at Entrance to Walpi 
Antelope Kiva” (by F. H. Maude and G. W. James), which Fewkes cites as appearing in 
Volume 19-2, Plate LIV.33 Following the instructions of an Indian guide, Bernard and 
Lenina climb the ladder and, walking through the doorway and a room, find themselves 
on a terrace below which, “shut in by the tall houses, was the village square, crowded 
with Indians” (97). This composition appears to echo a reproduced illustration “Snake 
Dance at Mishongnovi” (Plate XLV in the same report), in which M. Wright Gill 
portrays Indians crowded in a square against the background of buildings and an 
audience who overlook them from the buildings, like Bernard and Lenina. Although 
Higdon comments that this illustration gave Huxley an “essential” hint about how a 
snake dance was performed by Indians (142), it also must have shown him how their 
snake dance was observed by sightseers. The text therefore seems to try to describe the 
snake dance as accurately as possible, but in fact it also includes an original scene which 
has not so far received due attention. 
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Up to the part of the performance involving sprinkling snakes with corn meal and 
water, the description of the snake dance basically follows the details of the real 
ceremonies (see e.g., Fewkes Vol. 16, 294-95), but after this, surprisingly enough, it 
presents the following unique scene, where Christian images suddenly appear: 
And slowly, raised by invisible hands from below, there emerged from the 
one a painted image of an eagle, from the other that of a man, naked, and 
nailed to a cross. [. . .] Naked but for a white cotton breech-cloth, a boy of 
about eighteen stepped out of the crowd and stood before him [the old 
man], his hands crossed over his chest, his head bowed. The old man made 
the sign of the cross over him and turned away. Slowly, the boy began to 
walk round the writhing heap of snakes. He had completed the first circuit 
and was half-way through the second when, from among the dancers, a tall 
man wearing the mask of a coyote and holding in his hand a whip of plaited 
leather, advanced towards him. [. . .] The coyote-man raised his whip, there 
was a long moment of expectancy, then a swift movement, the whistle of 
the lash and its loud flat-sounding impact on the fresh. [. . .] Then all at 
once the boy staggered and, still without a sound, pitched forward on to his 
face. Bending over him, the old man touched his back with a long white 
feather, held it up for a moment, crimson, for the people to see then shook it 
thrice over the snakes. [. . .] A minute later the square was empty, only the 
boy remained, prone where he had fallen, quite still. Three old women 
came out of one of the houses, and with some difficulty lifted him and 
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carried him in. The eagle and the man on the cross kept guard for a little 
while over the empty pueblo; then, as though they had seen enough, sank 
slowly down through their hatchways, out of sight, into the nether world. 
(98-99) 
There is no need to dwell upon the fact that Jesus, alongside the image of a cross, 
appears in the Indians’ traditional performance. Why did Huxley hit upon such a strange 
vision of Christian elements mixing with Indian culture? 
Of course, this prediction is not necessarily groundless, considering what is 
remarked about Indian snake dances by the anthropologists of the time—such as 
Fewkes’s fear that “the Snake dance will cease to be a religious ceremony” or will be 
“finally abandoned” under the influence of many visitors and traders (Vol. 19-2, 978; 
Vol. 16, 295, 311; Vol. 19-2, 978; see also Lawrence’s comments above). In 1913, 
Theodore Roosevelt, an ex-President who had an aspect of an amateur anthropologist, 
visited the Hopi village of Walpi, and forecast that in the near future their “snake-dance 
and antelope-dance will [would] disappear” because the people would give up their 
“religious” beliefs (82; see also Dilworth 62-68). Meanwhile, Fewkes and Lawrence 
refer to Indians’ tolerance towards Christian images of Jesus, Mary and the Cross (see 
Lawrence, “Indians and Entertainment,” MM, 52; Fewkes Vol. 16, 299).34 
In my view, Huxley’s vision of an Indian snake dance mixed with Christianity 
was based upon his insight into the development of imperialism in the near future. The 
partly Christianized ritual is the vestige of a civilizing policy in the Pre-World State Era. 
Although since the seventeenth century European missionaries had travelled to convert 
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Indians to Christianity, the US government evangelized them more strongly by placing 
them in the Indian Territory. In the latter part of the nineteenth and the early part of the 
twentieth centuries, boarding schools played a leading role in Christianizing Indian 
children. Huxley, bearing this situation in mind, imagined that this tendency would 
sooner or later bring Christian elements into an Indian dance. 
By daringly envisaging the survival of Christianity in the snake dance in the 
twenty-sixth century (when Christianity was abandoned long previously in civilized 
society), the text suggests the violent impact of civilizing policy during the Pre-World 
State Era as well as the powerful vitality of Indian culture which is still alive. 
 
3.6. Vestige (4): The Complete Works of William Shakespeare 
Before the aftertaste of the snake dance disappears, Bernard and Lenina are 
suddenly greeted by a young savage called John. In fact, his mother is Linda, a Beta-
Minus who was the Director’s co-worker and lover but was left in the Reservation by 
him about twenty years ago. (This means that the savage is the son of the Director.) 
Because she gave birth to John, Linda could not return to civilization and had to live 
thereafter in primitive society with him. As a civilized person, she speaks English and 
begins to teach it to her son. At twelve years old, John fatefully encounters Shakespeare: 
It was a thick book and looked very old. [. . .] He picked it up, looked at the 
title-page: the book was called The Complete Works of William 
Shakespeare. 
Linda was lying on the bed, sipping that horrible stinking mescal out of 
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a cup. “Popé [Linda’s lover] brought it,” she said. [. . .] “It was lying in one 
of the chests of the Antelope Kiva. It’s supposed to have been there for 
hundreds of years. I expect it’s true, because I looked at it, and it seemed to 
be full of nonsense. Uncivilized. Still, it’ll be good enough for you to 
practise your reading on.” (113) 
The question that has not been considered by critics is why the book of Shakespeare 
exists there. In my view, however, it is necessary to address this question to understand 
the hidden history of the Reservation. 
In civilized society, “almost nobody” knows Shakespeare because it is 
“prohibited” (192). Being made to believe in the progress of mankind (“History is 
bunk” [29], “progress is lovely” [86]), the citizens “haven’t any use for old things” like 
Shakespeare (192) and, if they read it, “they couldn’t understand it” (193). In view of 
the fact that even in England, Shakespeare’s native land, almost nobody knows him, it 
must be a miracle of miracles that his book survived far away in New Mexico.35 The 
existence of Shakespeare’s book in the kiva’s chest in the twenty-sixth-century 
Reservation suggests the existence of someone who left it there “hundreds of years” 
ago, but when and who could do this? Since it would be impossible to bring the book 
from civilized society after A.F. 150 (A.D. 2058, the year when “all books published 
before” were subjected to “suppression”), it must have been brought to the Reservation 
before then. However, we can hardly imagine that the “civilized” visitors left it in the 
kiva because it seems to have been difficult for “any white man [. . .] to enter their 
[Antelope] kiva” (Fewkes Vol. 16, 290). Thus, logically, the most reasonable inference 
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would be that some Indian(s) obtained it from whites to read by themselves, and left it 
in that place before A.F. 150. 
Here again, we come to see the author’s bizarre vision. Certainly, in the last 
decades of the nineteenth century, the US government began to recognize the necessity 
of assimilating Indians by cultural means in order to ‘civilize’ them, and one of the most 
effective methods was considered to be the education of their children (see Trennert 2), 
including teaching them the ‘civilized’ language, English. However, English education 
for Indians was regarded merely as a means to an end, i.e., to enable them to support 
themselves, by most politicians, educators and other people deeply interested in them 
(see the first official guideline, Reel 5).36 In short, political and academic authority 
never expected Indians to gain such high ability in English that they would be able to 
read Shakespeare, simply because of their prejudice about the inherent intelligence of 
Indians (see Lomawaima 427). 
Unlike those professionals familiar with American Indians, Huxley saw no reason 
why the Indians would not be able to understand such a difficult text as Shakespeare, 
and thought that the influence of ‘civilization’ was so considerable that one of its 
symbols would intrude into even their very sacred space.37 After the Nine Years’ War, 
the Controllers have never followed the civilization policies of the US government, and 
thus no Indians with English proficiency have appeared. Consequently, the book was 
put away in the kiva and has not been read by anyone for several centuries until it is by 




3.7. A Contrapuntal Reading of Brave New World 
I have thus far focused my analysis on four mysterious points (what I call “the 
vestiges of imperialism”) which are related to the Savage Reservation, and while using 
these as a lead, I have reconstructed the unknown part of the history before and after the 
founding of the World State. My arguments are summarized in a timeline below (Table 
1). 
The essential strategy of postcolonial criticism is a “contrapuntal reading,” which 
was first proposed by its key scholar, Edward W. Said, but which has been widely 
adopted and developed not only by postcolonial theorists, such as Gayatri Chakravorty 
Spivak and Homi K. Bhabha, but also by many others engaged in textual studies in 
general. In this reading, one analyses a literary text, compares it with some seemingly 
unrelated phenomena of politics and culture in the same period, and attempts to disclose 
the role of a literary text in relation to imperialism, bringing to light a hidden reciprocal 
relationship between imperial society and colonized society. This method is supported 
by Said’s belief in the “worldliness” of the text—the political nature of the text, which 
necessarily exists in and reacts to the world (see e.g., The World, the Text, and the Critic 
[1983], 34-35).38 The most famous example of a contrapuntal reading is Said’s analysis 
of Jane Austen’s Mansfield Park (1814), in which he synchronizes a story of an upper-
middle-class family with the situation of a British colony where the family has a 
plantation (see Culture and Imperialism, 95-116). Although the questioned history here 
is the present for Austen—and the past for Said—can we not apply this in the future 
too? In fact, partly with this idea in mind, I have attempted a contrapuntal reading of the 
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futuristic story of Brave New World, contrasting the written future of civilized society—
such as London—with the unwritten future of Indian society, which was previously 
under the rule of the West and is now managed in a strange manner by civilized society. 
The potential of the text to be read like this suggests that Huxley, the very author who 
inserted such signs or vestiges of imperialism there, might have expected readers to 
perform such a reconstruction as I have done. At the very least, we can say that Huxley 
himself worked on the novel while bearing some of the above blueprint in mind—then, 
could we not call this a “contrapuntal imagination”? 
While subscribing to some extent to a typical representation of Others (e.g., the 
primitive and the aggressive), Huxley was also resisting such an Orientalist image of 
Indians in his own way, by adding to his text images of Indians inconsistent with those 
shared by professional and amateur anthropologists of his time. The unique images, 
especially 1) Indians who will never vanish, 2) Western people who will have to depend 
on Indians, 3) the snake dance which will survive with Christianity in it, and 4) an 
Indian who will be able to read Shakespeare, are the essence of the very future that 
Huxley, not an anthropologist but a novelist, tried to (to use his own words) “imagine” 
by himself. What made these original visions possible is that, unlike the conventional 
image of Huxley as being indifferent to imperialism, Huxley in fact grasped the realities 
of imperialism, such as the destructiveness of ‘civilization’ policies and the 
contradictory psychology of ‘civilized’ people, more carefully and accurately (in a 
sense) than most of his contemporaries. 
As seen in Said’s discussion, a contrapuntal reading is closely relevant to how to 
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think of history, identity and the role of intellectuals. Let us consider these issues 
through historical and theoretical approaches to the hero of Brave New World, who is 
white, intellectual but savage.  
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Table 1. Timeline of the World State in Brave New World 
 ‘Civilized’ Societies 
(Centring on London) 
American Indian Societies 






0 (1908) Model-T Ford is produced. 
23 (1931) Huxley writes Brave New World. 
1887 The Dawes Severalty Act 
1901 The official guideline for the Indian schools is 
first published. 
1928 The Meriam Report  
Fictional History 




Numerous sovereign nations exist as before. 
 
<The Continued Domination by the USA> 
The policy for ‘civilizing’ American Indians and the 
reservation system are maintained almost in the same 
way as before. Because of education at boarding 
schools, the number of ‘civilized’ Indians who speak 
English and believe in Christianity increases. As a 
result, in New Mexico, images of Jesus and a cross 
are blended into their snake dance, and an Indian 
proficient in English obtains The Complete Works of 
Shakespeare and leaves it in a chest in a kiva. 
Fictional History 




The Nine Years’ War causes devastating damage to 
various regions and the great Economic Collapse. As 
a measure to save the world from destruction, the 
leaders who are later to become the Controllers begin 
to recognize the need for World Control. In the 
interests of industry, they compel people to greatly 
increase their consumption, and massacre Simple 
Lifers and culture fans, who make conscientious 
objections to their policy. Realizing that force is no 
good, the Controllers begin to encourage scientists to 
develop the infinitely more certain methods of 
ectogenesis, conditioning and hypnopædia. A 
campaign against the Past is conducted, which 
includes the closing of museums, the blowing up of 
historical monuments and the suppression of all 
books published before A.F. 150. Science also begins 
to be controlled. The introduction of Ford’s first T-
Model is chosen as the opening date of the new era. 
< The Transfer of Sovereignty> 
Sovereignty over Indian societies is conceded to the 
Controllers. They designate certain lands, including 
New Mexico, as “Savage Reservations,” and decide 
not to develop them or civilize the residents, in order 
to maintain the citizens’ identity as civilized people. 
Fictional History 




184 (2092) Soma is produced commercially. 








632 (2540) The two thousand million citizens enjoy 
their “happy” life. With the approval of the Controller 
for Western Europe, John and Linda enter London. 
<The Domination by the World State> 
The Government occasionally dispatches inspectors 
to the New Mexican Reservation, and permits a 
limited number of civilized people to visit it. 
c.607 (2515) While travelling in the Reservation, 
Linda strays from and is left by her boyfriend 
Thomas and later gives birth to John. 
c.619 (2527) The Complete Works of Shakespeare is 
discovered in a kiva in the Reservation.   
632 (2540) Bernard and Lenina visit the Reservation 
and encounter John and Linda. 
The shaded text is a history that has been restored by my reading of the vestiges of imperialism.  
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4. The Savage with a Complex Identity39 
4.1. Ishi, a Real ‘Savage’ in Two Worlds 
John is a savage who lives in two worlds, Indian society and London, but it has 
not been clarified whether this unique hero is purely the product of the author’s 
imagination or if he is modelled on a real person. Judging from the biographical facts, 
the character of John seems to owe much to D. H. Lawrence. Despite living in a 
‘civilized’ society, Lawrence was never satisfied with ‘civilization’ and tried to find an 
ideal in an American Indian society, and thus he might be called a ‘savage’ who lived in 
two worlds. Since the period in which Huxley wrote Brave New World (from May to 
August of 1931) overlaps with the time he edited The Letters of D. H. Lawrence (1932), 
it would not be surprising if Lawrence cast a shadow over the characterization of John.40 
On the other hand, as a prototype for John, Margaret F. Sloan focuses on Frank 
Hamilton Cushing, an American anthropologist who “experienced a dual life, one 
among the native peoples and one in the polished and popular world of the day” (“F. H. 
Cushing: A Source for Huxley’s Brave Old World” [2003], 136). However, even if these 
actual people contributed to Huxley’s characterization of John, such an influence 
probably helped only with creating the general image of this hero, not with describing 
the concrete experiences in his life, especially in civilized society. After all, they entered 
Indian society from ‘civilization,’ unlike John, who does the opposite. 
As a model for John, I will turn the spotlight on an American Indian known as 
“Ishi in Two Worlds.” Although having led a stone-age life in California, he suddenly 
entered white society in 1911, causing a sensation in San Francisco, and lived at the 
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Anthropology Museum of the University of California until 1916.41 When he mentioned 
“all sorts of Smithsonian reports,” Huxley may well also have been thinking of the 
Bulletin, published by the Smithsonian Institution. In fact, Volume 78 of the Bulletin 
(1925) is the Handbook of the Indians of California by Alfred Louis Kroeber, which 
mentions the “discovery” of Ishi, “the last wild Indian of the United States” (343-346). 
Huxley was somewhat familiar with studies by the anthropologist Franz Boas (see 
“Casino and Bourse” [1935], AHCEIII, 419) and may have known about the works of 
his student, Kroeber. While staying in London for a few months in 1930 and 1931 (see 
Bedford 250, 755), Huxley would have been able to refer to literary sources on Ishi, 
available in the British Museum, the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain 
and Ireland (RAI), etc. When he visited California in May 1926, he may also have 
casually heard about Ishi from citizens who could remember this famous Indian.42 This 
section shows the interesting relationship between these fictional and real ‘savages’ by 
comparing their experiences in ‘civilized’ society, and argues that the character and 
story of the former could have been influenced by the image and life of the latter. 
On 28 August 1911, an American Indian was discovered in a slaughterhouse near 
Oroville in California and driven by the sheriff to the county jail, where a thousand 
people crowded in to view him. He was called “the last wild Indian” or “aboriginal 
Indian” because in those days all the other Indians in North America lived under 
‘civilized’ conditions in the Indian reservations. Having lived almost fifty years 
untouched by ‘civilization’ as the last surviving member of the Yahi (a group of the 
Yana Indians), he finally entered the white people’s world because of his terrible 
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hunger.43 This event was immediately reported in local papers, the Oroville Register and 
San Francisco Call, and piqued the curiosity of the citizens of San Francisco. The news 
also attracted academic interest from two anthropologists at the University of 
California, Kroeber and Thomas Talbot Waterman. On 4 September, with government 
permission, Waterman took the Indian to San Francisco and housed him in the museum 
at the University of California. The Indian spent his remaining years there as what one 
might call a living exhibition. Kroeber, who is said to have been his closest friend, 
named him “Ishi, an anglicization of his word for man” (A. L. Kroeber H, 343). It 
should be added that the Indian was first called “John,” which Kroeber rejected because 
it was “lacking in individuality” (Mary Ashe Miller, “Indian Enigma Is Study for 
Scientists” [1911], 97). The general public’s image of Ishi can be seen in a newspaper 
reporter’s description of him: “Of a verity, if any man in the world can be said to have 
qualified as the abysmal brute the caveman of the type that lived 50,000 years ago, the 
primordial savage of the stone age, with a mind unspoiled by civilization, Ishi is the 
man” (Grant Wallace, “Ishi, the Last Aboriginal Savage in America, Finds Enchantment 
in a Vaudeville Show” [1911], 108). 
This event of Ishi’s entering ‘civilized’ society is similar to the story of Huxley’s 
John. Like Ishi, John visits civilization of his own will, being motivated by despair at 
the primitive life and his hope about civilized society. His visit is also made possible by 
an Alpha-Plus psychologist, Bernard, who intends to keep his social position by taking 
advantage of “this young savage” (120), and by the World Controller Mond, formerly a 
“pretty good physicist” who actually liked “real science” or “pure science” (198-200) 
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and even now displays “sufficient scientific interest” in the Savage (123). These are 
similarities with the anthropologists who cherished an academic interest in Ishi and took 
him to the white people’s world, with official approval. After arriving in civilized 
society, John, the “real savage” (133), becomes the focus of London’s attention. Having 
been deprived of his personal name, he is called simply “savage,” a common noun (or 
“Mr Savage”), and sometimes is treated like a gorilla or ape.44 This corresponds to the 
case of Ishi, the ‘wild man,’ who is also addressed by ‘civilized’ people using the 
general noun “Ishi” (or “Mr Ishi”) and sometimes is identified as a “brute” animal. Just 
because they lived as people had lived “hundreds of years” ago or “50,000 years ago,” 
‘civilized’ people one-sidedly labelled them as such. 
How do the two ‘savages’ live in the city and evaluate ‘civilization’? Although 
Ishi’s house was in the museum, he often strolled around the neighbourhood and was 
taken by white people on visits to all parts of the city. Anthropologists and reporters 
observed his reaction to it. In “The Yana Indians” (1918), Waterman remembers what 
Ishi felt about ‘civilized’ society: 
To a primitive man, what ought to prove most astonishing in a modern city? 
I would have said at once, the height of the buildings. For Ishi, the 
overwhelming thing about San Francisco was the number of people. That, 
he never got over. Until he came into civilization, the largest number of 
people he had ever seen together at any one time was five! […] The big 
buildings he was interested in. He found them edifying, but he was not 
greatly impressed. […] He mentally compared a towering twelve-story 
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building […] with the cliffs and crags of his native mountains. (66) 
Ishi reacted with horror to a city crowd, fearing that an individual could become lost in 
the faceless throng. On the other hand, against the ‘civilized’ guide’s expectations, Ishi 
did not show “astonishment” at a “big building,” a construction typical of ‘civilized’ 
society, because he thought things in his natural native world, especially the mountains, 
were much higher and more impressive. One day in October 1911, a newspaper reporter 
invited Ishi to visit one of the theatres featuring a vaudeville show. However, according 
to his attendant Kroeber, Ishi “did not appreciate” the “performance itself” or “the 
humor of any of the acts” (“It’s All Too Much for Ishi, Says the Scientist” [1911], 111). 
As for the ‘civilized’ people living in such ‘civilization,’ Ishi did not judge them as good 
or bad, but according to his closest doctor, Saxton T. Pope, he regarded them only “as 
sophisticated children—smart, but not wise” (Hunting with the Bow and Arrow [1925], 
13). While staying at home, Ishi met a large number of white guests and demonstrated 
his craftsmanship: “Ishi moreover was remarkably clever with his hands” and “made 
bows of perfect finish” (Waterman 67). 
Compare John’s life in civilization. Although he has his own room, he can act 
freely and is taken by civilized people on visits to all parts of the civilized society. 
John’s reactions are also observed by Bernard and reported to Mond as follows: 
“. . . the said Savage,” so ran Bernard’s instructions, “to be shown 
civilized life in all its aspects. . . .” 
He was being shown a bird’s-eye view of it at present, a bird’s-eye view 
from the platform of the Charing-T Tower. The Station Master and the 
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Resident Meteorologist were acting as guides. But it was Bernard who did 
most of the talking. […] 
The Bombay Green Rocket dropped out of the sky. […] 
“Twelve hundred and fifty kilometres an hour,” said the Station Master 
impressively. “What do you think of that, Mr Savage?” 
John thought it very nice. “Still,” he said, “Ariel could put a girdle 
round the earth in forty minutes.” 
“The Savage,” wrote Bernard in his report to Mustapha Mond, “shows 
surprisingly little astonishment at, or awe of, civilized inventions.” (137) 
Contrary to the civilized people’s expectations, this savage does not show 
“astonishment” at a rocket, a device typical of the future civilized society, and instead 
comments that Ariel in The Tempest is much quicker and more impressive.45 This 
reaction is very similar to Ishi’s reaction to a high-rise building. Neither of them 
appreciates an invention of ‘civilized’ society, a symbol of modern ‘civilization,’ by 
comparing it with something familiar to them. 
After that, John is taken to “a small factory of lighting-sets for helicopters, a 
branch of the Electrical Equipment Corporation,” and is greatly shocked by the figure of 
“a single Bokanovsky Group” working in “[e]ach process” (138). In the civilized 
society, members of the lower castes such as Gammas, Deltas and Epsilons are 
produced by “Bokanovsky’s Process,” a sort of “mass production” which makes at most 
“ninety-six [identical] human beings” from one egg (3-5). Seeing such people who 
cannot be recognized individually gives John a creepy feeling: “the Savage had 
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suddenly broken away from his companions and was violently retching, behind a clump 
of laurels” (139). 
Hearing that his mother Linda is in a critical condition, John rushes to the Park 
Lane Hospital for the Dying, where “an interminable stream of identical eight-year-old 
male twins” is directed by a nurse to Linda’s bed in order to be “death-conditioned” 
(177-8). The children’s “repeated face—for there was only one between the lot of them” 
is nothing less than “a nightmare” for John. After attending his mother’s deathbed, John 
leaves the Hospital and begins to walk unconsciously, but suddenly finds himself being 
in “the crowd.” “Repeated indefinitely, as though by a train of mirrors, two faces” of the 
crowd make his blood run cold (183): 
He woke once more to external reality, looked round him, knew what he 
saw—knew it, with a sinking sense of horror and disgust, for the recurrent 
delirium of his days and nights, the nightmare of swarming 
indistinguishable sameness. Twins, twins . . . Like maggots they had 
swarmed defilingly over the mystery of Linda’s death. Maggots again, but 
larger, full grown, they now crawled across his grief and his repentance. He 
halted and, with bewildered and horrified eyes, stared round him at the 
khaki mob, in the midst of which, overtopping it by a full head, he stood. 
(183-84) 
For John, the crowd, “the nightmare of swarming indistinguishable sameness,” is vile, 
like “maggots” gnawing at his mother’s memory. The “less than human monsters” 
(187)—labourers working in a factory, children receiving lessons and people walking in 
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the city—are the grotesque future (something like human clones) of the “crowd” that 
Ishi feared in the twentieth century because he could not recognize their individuality. 
Paying close attention to detail, other resemblances can be discovered. Just as Ishi 
did not admire a vaudeville performance, John does not appreciate at all the film he sees 
with Lenina, Bernard’s friend. Like Ishi, John finds “infantility” in civilization and 
likens civilized people to “babies” who do not “understand what manhood and freedom 
are” (138, 187). In Surrey, John is “absorbed in the whittling of his bow” (218), 
something that Ishi also enjoyed. 
The similarity of both ‘savages’ can also be seen in their last days in ‘civilized’ 
society. Surprisingly, in spite of his past ‘wild’ life, Ishi does not seem to have been 
attached to where he was born or where he later lived. According to Kroeber, although 
Ishi was told that he was free “to return to his old home or to settle on any Indian 
reservations,” he chose ‘civilized’ society (H, 343). Ishi was also “appointed Museum 
Helper; so that for the last years of his life he was self-supporting” (Waterman 68). His 
health was checked by Pope and other doctors (although Ishi himself seems to have 
preferred the tribe’s traditional medicine), but a plentiful diet in ‘civilized’ society did 
not necessarily have a good influence on him. Because of “over-feeding” Ishi 
sometimes injured his health, and on another occasion he asked Pope to “get him fresh 
spring water—‘sweet water’” because ‘civilized’ society’s “water did not taste good to 
him” (“The Medical History of Ishi” [1920], 179-81, 206). On 25 March in 1916, Ishi 
died of tuberculosis, a disease of ‘civilization,’ “as the result of an oversusceptibility to 
tuberculosis to which he never developed the slightest immunity” (Waterman 68). 
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John, too, does not intend to return to Indian society. However, this does not 
necessarily mean that he feels more at home in civilized society than in the Reservation. 
He is disgusted with the dehumanization of civilization, and his discussion on this point 
with Mond does not bring agreement any closer. When Bernard and Helmholtz call on 
John, he explains his condition in the following way: 
Then, with a click, the bathroom door opened and, very pale, the Savage 
emerged. 
“I say,” Helmholtz exclaimed solicitously, “you do look ill, John!” 
“Did you eat something that didn’t agree with you?” asked Bernard. 
The Savage nodded. “I ate civilization.” 
“What?” 
“It poisoned me; I was defiled. And then,” he added, in a lower tone, “I 
ate my own wickedness.” 
“Yes, but what exactly . . .? I mean, just now you were . . .” 
“Now I am purified,” said the Savage. “I drank some mustard and warm 
water.” 
The others stared at him in astonishment. “Do you mean to say that you 
were doing it on purpose?” asked Bernard. 
“That’s how the Indians always purify themselves.” He sat down and, 
sighing, passed his hand across his forehead. “I shall rest for a few 
minutes,” he said. “I’m rather tired.” (213-14) 
Because “civilization” has “poisoned” and “defiled” him, John has to “purify” himself 
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by the traditional medicine of “the Indians.” In order “to escape further contamination 
by the filth of civilized life” and “to be purified and made good,” John leaves for Surrey 
heath, instead of returning to the Reservation, and begins to lead a self-supporting life 
free from “[l]oathsome civilized stuff” (217-18), but finally commits suicide in despair 
over being unable to elude the “crowd” (226), the tentacles of evil civilization. The 
story of John eating “civilization” and being necessarily “purified” reminds us of the 
facts that Ishi worsened his health by “overfeeding” on ‘civilized’ food, and that he 
craved “sweet water” that had not been contaminated by ‘civilized’ society. Above all, 
the plot of the story, where in spite of his choice to live in civilized society John the 
“Savage” does not adapt himself to civilization (or cannot acquire immunity to it) and 
dies of a disease of civilization as if betrayed by civilization, is highly suggestive of the 
last days of Ishi, the ‘wild man.’46 
Although these ‘savages’ who lived in two worlds have the above similarities, 
there are also differences between them. Most clearly, in regard to parentage, Ishi was 
an American Indian but John is not. Unlike Ishi, a survivor of the Yana, John was born 
to civilized parents, and he grew up only accidentally in Indian society. 
Another difference in their characters lies in the amount of knowledge each of 
them has. After Ishi entered ‘civilized’ society, his ignorance was thoroughly stressed by 
‘civilized’ people. By way of example, the San Francisco Call (17 December 1911) 
published Kroeber’s article entitled “The Only Man in America Who Knows No 




He is the one man to whom the very name of Christmas carries no 
significance whatever. He is Ishi, a California Indian, the least civilized 
man in the world, who is being cared for by Dr. Kroeber at the Affiliated 
colleges. […] He knows no Christ, no Christmas tree; the turkey dinner he 
will eat on the holiday will seem to him merely some special dispensation 
of his woodland gods.—Editor. (112) 
As well as savagery (uncivilizedness) and primitivism, ignorance is recognized as a 
characteristic of Ishi.47 Although all of the above prejudices were not held in common 
by his friend and anthropologist Kroeber, he also comments in this article that Ishi “has 
been all his lifetime surrounded by civilization, yet never a part of it; in fact, absolutely 
unaware of its meaning” (“OMAWKNC,” 113), and in another, he compares Ishi to “a 
puppy” because “[n]ine-tenths of that which goes on around him he does not 
understand” (“IATMI,” 111-2). The ignorance of Ishi was also reflected in his attitude 
towards English. When entering ‘civilized’ society, he “knew no English and but a few 
words of Spanish,” and until his death he “never learned to speak English correctly or 
fluently” (H, 343; Waterman 68).48 
On the other hand, although John is also called “savage,” he is not ignorant. 
Rather, he is more intellectual than most civilized people. He has a sufficient education 
and sensitivity to love and recite the almost forgotten works of Shakespeare, and in spite 
of his unfamiliarity with the life of civilized people, he has a critical spirit and the 
logical ability to attack the irrationality of their civilization. Regarding language 
capacity, it is possible for John to speak “peculiar” but “faultless” English (100) and to 
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read closely the difficult text of Shakespeare, a skill shared by few others in the 
civilized society. 
As demonstrated above, Ishi and John have so many points of similarity that this 
fact cannot be regarded merely as a coincidence, although these two ‘savages’ also show 
some interesting differences. It is difficult to affirm how much of the characterization of 
John depended on information about Ishi and how much of it can be attributed to the 
author’s own imagination. However, there is a possibility that Huxley at least glanced 
over, even if he did not read closely, books or theses which referred to Ishi, and that he 





Fig. 3. San Francisco Sunday Call, Vol. 110, No. 130 (8 October 1911), P. 4. This page contains 
Grant Wallace’s article: “Ishi, the Last Aboriginal Savage in America, Finds Enchantment in a 
Vaudeville Show.”  
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Fig. 4. San Francisco Sunday Call, Vol. 110, No. 130 (8 October 1911), P. 5. This page contains A. 
L. Kroeber’s article: “It’s All Too Much for Ishi, Says the Scientist.”  
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4.2. Empathy with an Indefinable Individual 
If Huxley knew about Ishi and chose him as a model for John, two questions arise 
as to why he was so drawn to Ishi, and what kind of attitude towards Others can be 
derived from his choice and fictionalization of Ishi. 
As for the first question, would Huxley not have had a natural interest in—and 
empathized with—the destiny of Ishi, a person who, because of the diversity of his 
identity, could not be defined and had to live as an outsider to the community? In Ishi, 
there coexisted heterogeneous aspects, such as a ‘civilized’ person/a ‘savage’ and a 
white/an Indian. In spite of his former life as a ‘savage’ Indian, Ishi suddenly began to 
live with ‘civilized’ whites and refused to return to where he had lived before or to an 
Indian reservation, although he was not completely assimilated into white society and 
maintained his tribe’s traditional values until his death. Due to his complex identity, Ishi 
continued to be an incomprehensible person to those around him, whether whites or 
Indians.50 As we have so far seen, Huxley also realized that a human being, originally, is 
difficult to define because of a manifold and fluid identity, and that some people—
particularly the minority who lived especially freely from the ideology of a simple 
identity (such as gender norms)—are often put into an isolated position, just as he was 
during wartime (see Chapters I and II of this dissertation).  Considering this, it is not 
surprising that Huxley felt some attraction to and empathy with Ishi, and was inspired 
by him to create a character with a complex identity. John also has heterogeneous 
aspects as a civilized person/a savage and a white/an Indian, and thus cannot be fully 
understood by anyone, even by his friends, which forces him to live as a lonely outsider 
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to both the Indian and civilized societies.51 
The answer to the second question depends on how we conceive the process of 
Huxley’s fictionalization of Ishi, especially his making Ishi similar to himself by 
attributing to him ‘civilized’ (English) parentage and knowledge. Assuming that he felt 
some empathy with Ishi, it would be most natural to consider that Huxley, precisely 
because of this empathy, reflected his own life and characteristics in his fictionalization 
of Ishi, perhaps without being entirely conscious of it. In this sense, John is a compound 
of both Ishi and Huxley. This autobiographical tendency would not be surprising, 
considering that before and after Brave New World Huxley repeatedly portrayed himself 
in the main characters of his novels. Indeed, some aspects of John’s life, such as his 
relationship with his parents (his love for his [lost] mother and his hatred of his “bad, 
unkind” father [101]), are clearly a reflection of the author’s own. 
If we imagine the process of his fictionalization of Ishi into John as above, i.e., if 
we imagine that Huxley consciously or unconsciously adopted Ishi as a model for John 
due to his empathy with him and made this model similar to himself by reflecting his 
own features in the characterization of the savage hero, the conventional view of Huxley 
as standing on the ruler’s side of imperialism will inevitably become less convincing. 
 
4.3. The Ambiguous Savage: Deconstruction of the Other 
How should we theoretically think about the effect of Huxley’s characterization 
of the Savage in an ambiguous manner? John was born and raised in a Savage 
Reservation, a vestige of imperialism, and he enters civilized society after having been 
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influenced by Christianity and Shakespeare, other vestiges of imperialism; this rare 
background makes him more complex than his model Ishi by incorporating into him 
another set of ambiguities, namely two aspects of the ruler and the ruled of imperialism. 
Unfortunately, little focus has been given to this ambiguity, although I believe it is the 
essential element to comprehending the significance of the hero and perhaps this text. 
In a sense, John is a colonized person who has appeared several centuries too late. 
According to what this savage in “Indian” dress says to Bernard and Lenina, he has 
lived with Indians, learning their culture, loving an Indian girl (see 105, 111, 113, 116-
17). Meanwhile, he has spontaneously attempted to civilize himself through reading 
Shakespeare and believing in Christianity (see 113-14, 119), just as Indians were by 
imperial policies made to be ‘civilized’ during the Pre-World State Era. Despite his 
endeavours, he fails to live as a civilized individual in civilized society, being regarded 
entirely as a “real savage.” His difficulty in becoming a civilized citizen is reflected in 
his use of language. His English sounds “faultless but peculiar” (100; see also 121)—
typically for a non-native speaker who learns a language by reading—and his too 
frequent quoting from Shakespeare shows his unfamiliarity with practical English. 
When he is really excited, he can “adequately express” his anger “only in Zuñi,” his 
mother tongue (150-51, 221).52 In the climax of the story, where he engages in a bitter 
argument with Mond, John comes to find himself unable to speak anymore: “there were 
no words. Not even in Shakespeare” (203).53 After all, he escapes into the countryside 
to return to a primitive life-style, but finally puts an end to his life. Where imperialism 
was abandoned long ago, the Savage, in this way, replays the tragic fate of those ruled 
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by imperialism for the first time in five hundred years. 
In another sense, John has an aspect of the colonizer from the British Empire, 
which no longer exists as such. John, whose “plaited hair was straw-coloured, his eyes a 
pale blue, and his skin a white skin, bronzed” (100), is the son of the civilized from 
London, who has grown up distanced from the savages around him (see 112, 117-18), 
and whose form of elitism appears when he likens himself to Jesus, God’s chosen 
person—“I did something that none of the others [Indians] did” (119)—and when he 
believes in his cultural superiority to them—“‘But I can read,’ he said to himself, ‘and 
they can’t. They don’t even know what reading is’” (112). When he reads or thinks of 
Shakespeare, he unconsciously identifies himself with civilized characters such as 
Miranda (120), Romeo (160) and Ferdinand (166), while refusing Othello, a “black 
man” who is associated with a deconditioned “negro” in the feely, Three Weeks in a 
Helicopter (see 149, 168). When for their unfordly behaviour Bernard and Helmholtz 
are exiled to the Falkland Islands (199-202), John asks Mond to join them instead of 
returning to his homeland (see 214), as if to suggest he has little or no attachment to it. 
The role of the ruler of imperialism is thus replayed by John in his identity.54 
Theoretically, this multiple ambiguity of the hero is thought-provoking. While 
Ishi was from a tribe of American Indians, had its values of ‘primitive’ culture and 
contacted white culture, John is white but has been influenced by both primitive and 
white cultures, going on to live with over-developed and globalized culture; thus, the 
latter is put into a more complex cultural situation, being given two positions, of the 
ruler and the ruled, which were not shared by Ishi. In this respect, Huxley may be 
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criticized for his softening or weakening of Otherness (such as aspects of Indian and the 
ruled); this is so especially for some essentialist critics of postcolonialism who would 
place stress on race or the nation state. However, John’s complex identity can be 
somewhat positively evaluated when we realize it has the potential to question the very 
concept of “the Other” itself, deconstructing binary oppositions such as the civilized/the 
savage, the modern/the primitive, the ruler/the ruled and the West/the East. Such a 
deconstructive attempt is made by Huxley here and there in this text.55 In fact, Edward 
W. Said, while proposing a contrapuntal reading with a particular emphasis on the 
viewpoint of Others, is very wary of the identity politics of nativism based on 
essentialism: “Nativism, alas, reinforces the distinction [between ruler and ruled] even 
when revaluating the weaker or subservient partner”; “to accept nativism is to accept the 
consequences of imperialism, the racial, religious, and political divisions imposed by 
imperialism itself” (CI, 275-76).56 
Furthermore, John may have a further radical potential, namely to be a defiant 
intellectual leader, in that he is an exile, always feeling outside of a community because 
of his complex identity, and resisting the hegemony of the World State (i.e., the 
ideology of universalism or globalization), based on a hybrid philosophy that he has 
formed under the influence of traditional Zuñi and English cultures. In this sense, John 
may agree with Said’s image of an intellectual with a spirit of resistance towards 
authority or hegemony—the image that is based on his own hybrid or complex 
backdrop of life: “the intellectual [is characterized] as exile and marginal, as amateur, 
and as the author of a language that tries to speak the truth to power”; “Exile for the 
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intellectual in this metaphysical sense is restlessness, movement, constantly being 
unsettled, and unsettling others. You cannot go back to some earlier and perhaps more 
stable condition of being at home; and, alas, you can never fully arrive, be at one with 
your new home or situation” (Representations of the Intellectual: The Reith Lectures 
[1994], xvi, 53).57 It could be argued, therefore, that Huxley brought forth Ishi’s hybrid 
and exiled natures more emphatically when he characterized the Savage. 
 
4.4. A Reconsideration of ‘Humanitarian’ Anthropology 
Given the above understanding, it makes sense that there was something Huxley 
wanted to intimate about anthropology, in which he was interested and on which he 
relied for his descriptions of New Mexico and the Savage. Our reading of the Savage 
Reservation has revealed not only the author’s conformity but also his resistance to the 
representation of Others provided by the anthropology of his time—but what kind of 
suggestion can we derive from his story of the Savage in relation to other issues of 
anthropology, particularly the relationships of anthropologists (the observer) with the 
colonized (the observed)? 
From the beginning, anthropology seems to have developed with a kind of 
ambiguity, namely involving imperial and ‘humanitarian’ aspects. Anthropology, whilst 
being accompanied with European imperial contexts, has concerned itself with the 
movement of ‘humanitarianism,’ i.e., the idea and practice of building equal friendships 
regardless of race or culture.58 This ambivalence can be found in American 
anthropology of Indians as well.59 The first contribution of anthropology to the domin-
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ation of American Indians was seen in the second half of the nineteenth century, mainly 
attributed to Lewis Henry Morgan, a pioneering anthropologist known for his theory of 
social evolutionism. In this period, during which the government shifted its policy away 
from removal towards directed assimilation, ethnography was employed as a means to 
ease the task of ‘civilizing’ Indians. On the other hand, it was Franz Boas who, instead 
of measuring Indian cultures comparatively against the standard of Western 
‘civilization,’ tried to evaluate them as they were, and by doing so, introduced cultural 
relativism into Western thought. However, Boasian or ‘humanitarian’ anthropologists 
were still not free from the prejudice held by the preceding ‘imperialist’ anthropologists, 
namely the social evolutionistic belief that Indian cultures would vanish in the not-too-
distant future. 
A theoretical problem of anthropology has been the asymmetric relationship 
between the observer and the observed. This is a mirror of the power relationship of 
Europeans and Americans, who can become the observers, to the colonized, who have 
to be the observed. Said focuses on “the unequal relationship of force between the 
outside Western ethnographer-observer and a primitive, or at least different but certainly 
weaker and less developed, non-Western society.” Although Western anthropologists are 
so deeply involved in “a political actuality based on force” that they cannot be 
“detached outside observers,” they conceive “a scientific and humane desire to 
understand the Other hermeneutically and sympathetically” (“RC,” 217). 
While considering these issues in anthropology, let us compare Ishi’s relationship 
with anthropologists with John’s relationship with civilized scientists. As for the 
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Californian anthropologists, the most reliable standard for judging is Ishi’s own 
evaluation of this relationship. Waterman, an anthropologist who visited Ishi on his 
deathbed, claimed that Ishi ended his days with a great deal of satisfaction at his 
friendship with ‘civilized’ people: 
A final word about Ishi himself would be in place, but I find it difficult to 
say the right thing. It was patent that he liked everybody, and everybody 
liked him. He never wished to go back to the wilds, naturally enough, for 
there was nothing to go back to. He had, however, to be reassured 
repeatedly that we had no intention of sending him back. As a matter of fact 
I think the closing years were far the happiest of his life. (68) 
This kind of idealization of Ishi’s relationship with whites was more or less shared by 
Kroeber and Pope, and seems to have been carried on to this day. In Ishi in Two Worlds 
(1961), the first full-scale, best-selling biography of Ishi, Theodora Kroeber (Alfred’s 
wife) sums up their relationship in the epilogue: “He had walked quietly out of the 
Neolithic world into their [the whites’] world, and once he was settled in the museum, 
Ishi and the anthropologists took each other pretty much for granted, as one’s family is 
taken for granted, and one’s close friend” (238). When their relationship is defined like 
this, it sounds like an ideal comradeship between different races, or a symbolic 
reconciliation between the perpetrator and the victim of American history. In short, it 
was a friendship worthy of being called ‘humanitarian.’ 
But do we have to share this optimistic appraisal? It should be noted that all of the 
above comments were made by American white people. As Orin Starn suggests, the 
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whites’ idealization of their relationship with Ishi can be traced back to their self-
contented desire to overcome their qualms of conscience regarding their oppression of 
American Indians: “Here was a vision of America healing itself from the wounds of 
genocide and slavery through the powers of goodwill, tolerance, and mutual respect and 
understanding” (93). 
In order to relativize the above views, it is indispensable to refer to those of 
Native Americans too. Although Ishi left no account himself, other Natives commented 
on Ishi’s relationship with anthropologists. For example, Starn interviewed Art Angle, a 
Maidu Indian who denied the conventional image of Ishi as a “helpless, almost childlike 
victim in need of rescuing by Alfred Kroeber and other kind-hearted whites,” and 
instead believed that he was “a man of power, a healer, and always very much in control 
himself.” Angel’s view of Ishi has the personal endorsement of his cousin who “claimed 
to have come across Ishi” in his childhood (Starn 93). Angel also critically looked at 
anthropologists who made Ishi “a captive in the museum”: “Ishi would [not] have 
stayed in San Francisco if he had had any real choice”; “Kroeber had never viewed the 
wild man of Oroville as anything more than a specimen” (94). In his pertinent essay, 
Gerald Vizenor, a Native American writer, also remarks that concerning his treatment of 
Ishi “Kroeber was not sentimental enough, and anthropology was not ethical enough at 
the time” (“Mister Ishi: Analogies of Exile, Deliverance, and Liberty” [2003], 366). 
This criticism of anthropologists cannot be dismissed as mere surmise. Because 
of their academic interest in Ishi, Californian anthropologists ‘brought’ him to the 
museum. According to a reporter for San Francisco Call, they regarded Ishi mainly “as 
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such an amazingly interesting human document” or “a unique specimen of the genus 
homo,” and Kroeber, in an interview by this reporter, expressed his joy at the encounter 
with Ishi as if he had miraculously discovered a species of animals which had been 
thought to be extinct: “It is almost unbelievable […]. Here is a man, the last remnant of 
a once proud and warlike tribe, who, through terror of the white man, has successfully 
hidden himself away from human sight for 40 years. Surrounded on all sides by white 
men and civilized Indians of other tribes, he has lived like a hunted beast” (Wallace 
108). 
Even if Ishi’s relationship with anthropologists was successfully maintained in the 
museum, it seems to have collapsed at the end of his life. Whilst Ishi was suffering from 
tuberculosis, Kroeber was staying overseas for his research and did not look after him. 
His absence made it possible for his colleagues to ignore Ishi’s last wish to be cremated 
without dissection.60 Kroeber’s friendship with Ishi might seem more doubtful from a 
letter which he wrote seven months after Ishi’s death to Aleš Hrdlička, anthropologist at 
the Smithsonian’s National Museum (27 October 1916): “There is no one here who can 
put it [Ishi’s brain] to scientific use. If you wish it, I shall be glad to deposit it in the 
National Museum collection” (qtd. in Starn 159).61 Considering these facts, it would 
appear difficult for us to recognize the anthropologists’ relationship with Ishi only as 
‘humanitarian.’62 
In Brave New World, the above relationship between anthropologists and the 
subject of their research, i.e., between the ‘civilized’ observers and the ‘primitive’ 
observed, is reconstructed by the introduction of the viewpoint of the latter. By inviting 
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John to London from a selfish motive, Bernard achieves greater social “[s]uccess” than 
expected; thanks to John, he wins fame as “his accredited guardian” and becomes “a 
person of outstanding importance” (135-36). So as to please the Controller, Bernard also 
shows John civilized life in all its aspects, and with the intention of gaining public 
favour, he frequently takes John to parties where leading figures appear (see 150-51). 
How does John feel about this? A hint is seen in the following scene, where John 
becomes angry at Bernard’s selfishness and refuses to attend a party he has announced 
on invitation cards to “meet the Arch-Community-Songster of Canterbury and Mr 
Savage” (153): 
Bernard had to shout through the locked door; the Savage would not 
open. 
“But everybody’s there, waiting for you.” 
“Let them wait,” came back the muffled voice through the door. 
“But you know quite well, John” […] “I asked them on purpose to meet 
you.” 
“You ought to have asked me first whether I wanted to meet them.” 
“But you always came before, John.” 
“That’s precisely why I don’t want to come again.” 
“Just to please me,” Bernard bellowingly wheedled. “Won’t you come 
to please me?” 
“No.” (150) 
Despite having obediently complied with Bernard’s requests on earlier occasions, John, 
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for the first time, expresses how he feels about such an imposition and resists it. 
Bernard’s emphasis on the phrase “[j]ust to please me” reveals not only his true feelings 
about John but also the hypocrisy of his friendship. Bernard has regarded John mainly 
as a means of raising his own position in society. However, after the quarrel, Bernard is 
reconciled with John by reverting to the modest behaviour he showed when they first 
met, and as a result they become “friends” worthy of the name (see 155-56, 214). It is 
difficult to see this kind of process in the relationship of Ishi and the anthropologists. 
The ‘wild man’ hardly asserted himself and could not speak English well, whereas his 
‘civilized’ friends did not exactly remember his final word but optimistically believed in 
his gratitude to their society. Their relationship seems to have been far from a two-way 
friendship established after a collision of opinions and subsequent reconciliation. 
Significantly, the World Controller is an ex-scientist who is not only familiar with 
the old life of “the savages of Samoa, in certain islands off the coast of New Guinea” 
(33) but also, out of “scientific interest,” orders Bernard to observe John and refuses 
John’s request to leave London so as to continue his “experiment” on the savage (214). 
His name, Mustapha Mond, which can be read as ‘must have a monde’ (i.e., ‘I must 
have the world’), is itself symbolically suggestive of the close relationship between 
anthropology and imperialism.63 In the end, John eludes the vigilance of Mond and goes 
to Surrey. This kind of event did not occur in the case of Ishi, who remained in 
‘civilized’ society, although opinions have been divided as to whether he chose or was 
made to do so. John’s escape from the captive condition under the scientist’s 
surveillance may represent the true feelings of another ‘savage’ in California. 
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In Surrey, John is chased by civilized people, one of whom is a photographer 
called Darwin Bonaparte. As Carey Snyder suggests, his “name fuses the persona of 
naturalist with that of conqueror” (211), and he is associated with the image of an 
anthropologist who in a sense has played roles similar to those of a naturalist and a 
conqueror.64 Just as John’s character is distorted in Bonaparte’s feely, The Savage of 
Surrey, Ishi was one-sidedly represented by anthropologists as a ‘wild man’ in 
California and his story was avidly consumed by the public. However, in stark contrast 
to Ishi, who, according to his friends, did not avoid being reported on by the media and 
died as a person popular with the masses, John shakes off such attention and kills 
himself. Here again, we may see another example of the true feelings of the observed, 
namely the will to refuse to become either the subject of ‘civilized’ scientists’ research 
or a commodity consumed by the ‘civilized’ masses. 
The above scenes contain not only a satire on the anthropologists’ optimistic 
belief that their relationship with Ishi was entirely ‘humanitarian,’ but also a suggestion 
that in their research anthropologists should make an effort to relativize the asymmetric 
relationship between the observers and the observed that reflects the power structure of 
the world. 
According to Said, the practical measures for “the realignment” of anthropology 
are “the new and less formalistic understanding that we are acquiring of narrative 
procedures” and “a far more developed awareness of the need for ideas about alternative 
and emergent counterdominant practices” (“RC,” 221). Considering “the context 
provided by the history of imperialism,” anthropologists need to understand the 
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“articulation” of colonized people, through their “counternarrative” (such as Fanon’s or 
Césaire’s), which carefully shows the “contest between white and nonwhite” (223-24). 
As the counternarrative argues for the abandonment of “fixed ideas of settled identity 
and culturally authorized definition,” anthropologists have to “think of cultures as 
permeable and, on the whole, defensive boundaries between polities,” and “to see 
Others not as ontologically given but as historically constituted” (225).65 
A similar vision of alternative anthropology is suggested in John’s life with 
civilized scientists. For instance, the Savage’s resistance to civilized people’s control 
and his criticism of the state of civilization can be construed to hint at the importance of 
Western anthropologists’ acceptance of the “articulation” of the observed-colonized, 
including their objections against Western imperialism. The necessity for flexibility in 
the ideas of “culture” and “Others,” on the other hand, is implied by Bernard’s 
friendship with John. Bernard can hear from John about his life and culture only in a 
scene shortly after their encounter (see 106-119) in which he recognizes John, not as a 
subject of his observation who has a settled identity or definition (such as a “savage” or 
an “Indian”), but as a flesh-and-blood person like himself who cannot be easily 
identified or defined.66 
 
5. Conclusion 
In searching for the hidden potential of Brave New World as well as Huxley’s 
attitude towards imperialism, we have thus far analysed the text historically and 
theoretically, by focusing on the descriptions of the Savage Reservation and the Savage, 
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which the author provided under the influence of anthropological discourses of those 
days. In his portrayal of the twenty-sixth-century society of Indians, while depending on 
the anthropological representation of American Indians to some extent, Huxley was also 
trying to resist this, by allowing his “contrapuntal imagination” to envisage unique 
images of Indians and their cultures as those which will never vanish even in the far 
future. His vision was also based on his insight into the violent and paradoxical nature 
of imperialism, including ‘civilization’ policies. By giving several vestiges of 
imperialism as a clue, Huxley enables readers to reconstruct a hidden side of future 
history, namely the West’s rule over Others. 
What is key to appreciating the radical significance of this text is to explore the 
potential of the Savage, who has formed a complex identity through the influence of 
these vestiges of imperialism. Because of his hybrid cultural values and exiled way of 
life, this hero has powers latent within him to deconstruct the attributes underlying 
imperialism, such as race, nation, culture and ruler/ruled, and to be an intellectual leader 
who may resist authority by representing ‘subalterns.’67 On the other hand, Huxley 
certainly set some limits to this potential of the Savage, by frustrating his 
counternarrative (relying on old Indian and European cultures) against the World State 
and by killing this character before he plays a significant role as the voice of Indians 
who were ruled by the West and who are now segregated by the State. This hopeless 
ending may leave us today with a pessimistic message that, with any sort of traditional 
cultures, we cannot possibly compete with globalization. As I minutely examined, 
Huxley could have characterized the Savage, inspired by and possibly in empathy with 
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Ishi, a real ‘savage’ who refused to be defined by others because of his ambiguous life 
and identity. Although contemporary anthropologists used Ishi to support a kind of 
Orientalism, idealizing their friendship with him, Huxley might have satirized this 
through his story of the Savage’s life with civilized scientists, fumbling after another 
form of anthropology. 
I would also suggest, more positively, a potential value hidden in Brave New 
World. Said pins his hopes upon what he calls “the voyage in,” a paradoxical attempt in 
which the colonized do not oppose but resist empire by transforming the discourse of 
empire itself, while also subverting essentialist notions of culture and identity because 
of the hybridity of the attempt (CI, 260-61). This daring strategy of “writing back” to 
canonical texts has been adopted by postmodernist writers, including Aimé Césaire, a 
Francophone Caribbean writer who adapted a classic of Shakespeare from a 
postcolonial viewpoint, restoring Caliban’s counternarrative towards Prospero in Une 
Tempête (1969).68 It could thus be argued that Brave New World has the possibility of 
being reborn by the “voyage in” as such a postmodernist text, by either making the 
Savage represent more effectively the inhabitants of the Reservation or giving the 
‘subalterns’ the right to speak, and by adding their challenges to the present and former 
rule of the World State, which can be traced back to Western imperialist powers. 
Although, as stated before, there seems to be a large gap between Huxley’s 
indifference to Others in his early writings and his interest in Others in his later 
writings, my reading of Brave New World suggests the possibility that a feeling of 
tolerance towards non-Western Others emerged within him while he was preparing and 
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writing Brave New World, especially when he imagined the coming history of a non-
Western region as well as the destiny of a savage with a complex identity who has 
grown up there. After all, for Huxley, who had written mainly about an intellectual 
circle modelled after actual people around him, it was, in a certain sense, his first 
encounter with Others, and this might have been precisely the secret trigger behind his 
ideological development or conversion. 
In the mid-1930s, Huxley was engaged with a pacifist campaign seeking world 
peace, and wrote Eyeless in Gaza, where an intellectual like himself awakens to the 
“unity” of human beings, guided by an “anthropologist” who advocates and practises 
loving and treating the colonized equally with Europeans. In Time Must Have a Stop 
(1944), Huxley criticized a genealogy of violence justified by the worship of time, 
including the colonial rule of the West over the non-Western world. In parallel with 
these novels, Huxley increased his intellectual interest in Oriental thought to such a 
degree that he published The Perennial Philosophy (1945) in order to introduce Western 
readers to the doctrines of Eastern religions, especially Hinduism and Buddhism. 
Although this might sound like another example of Orientalism, Huxley, rather than 
idealizing Others, tried to grope for a meeting point of the West and the East, dreaming 
of a hybrid cultural community, which he fictionalized in his last novel, Island (1962). 
In the next and last chapter, we will approach the above development of his later views 
of world, history and identity with a Marxist focus on his relationship with the masses, 
whom he appears to have mocked in his works up to Brave New World. 
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1 My evidence on this point is based on my online search in the MLA International Bibliography (as of 9 
July 2015). 
2 See note 76 of Chapter I; note 55 of Chapter II. For Huxley’s view of Jews, see Claudia Rosenhan, 
“Aldous Huxley and Anti-Semitism” (2003). “His anti-Semitic utterances are,” according to Rosenhan, 
“mostly abstracted from any actual attacks on Jews, are theoretical rather than prescriptive and thus lack 
the measurable impact that can lead to the unequivocal conclusion that Huxley is an anti-Semite” (232). 
3 Huxley can be criticized for tacitly accepting British imperialism. Robert S. Baker remarks that 
“Huxley’s contempt for the British colonials is a leading theme in the Indian essays” which are “written 
from a self-consciously European perspective” (Baker I, AHCEII, xvi). While reading about Huxley’s trip 
to the Far East and Jesting Pilate, Charles M. Holmes states: “He himself might have been a Fascist, or a 
‘full-blooded’ imperialist. Perhaps political talk, even political action, is a waste of time” (“SOW,” 189). 
In contrast, A. A. Mutalik-Desai views positively Huxley’s trip to India: “It was his first stepping out of 
his own class or set in Britain. It provided him with a look at how the other world, a vast chunk of 
humanity, lives, suffers, struggles without hope or resolution in sight” (35). Rosa Borgonovi has recently 
supported this view, arguing: “Huxley’s travel books [Jesting Pilate and Beyond the Mexique Bay (1934)], 
in fact, offer a realistic picture of the world, based on a supranational observation which permits him to 
give a description of European and non-European cultures that goes beyond stereotypes” (65). 
4 When the author’s intention is concerned, it would appear that Brave New World has a special issue, 
differently from ordinary fiction. It is the question of whether Huxley tried to make a eutopia or dystopia. 
Although this is often regarded as a canonical text of the latter genre and Huxley himself called it a 
“negative” utopia (compared to his Island [see “Monitor,” John Lehmann’s interview in 1958 with 
Huxley]), David Bradshaw’s historicist and detailed analysis of the backdrops of Brave New World 
reveals that the world Huxley envisaged had an aspect of something like eutopia (as well as dystopia) to 
him at the time, when he was actually attracted to Wellsian ideas, feeling a necessity for the large-scale 
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planning of stability like the World Controllers (see “Huxley’s Slump: Planning, Eugenics, and the 
‘Ultimate Need’ of Stability” [1995]). Though this is the question that arises in considering Thomas 
More’s Utopia as well, it would be unreasonable to categorize the text dualistically in either case; at best, 
the answer might be that the text has the ambiguity of both positive and negative utopias. Rather, what I 
want to do in the present chapter is to read Brave New World as just a literary text that is set in the future, 
and then to consider the author’s thinking or feelings about individual issues, such as imperialism. 
5 For a detailed background of the popularity of anthropology in Britain, see Jeremy MacClancy, 
“Anthropology: ‘The Latest Form of Evening Entertainment’” (2003). 
6 I take up Mass-Observation again in Chapter IV, Section 2.1. 
7 See Max Saunders’s unpublished paper, “Aldous Huxley: Today and Tomorrow” (2013). 
8 Huxley adopted a similar viewpoint in writing about what he called “Alien Englands,” such as the 
Durham coalfield, where he encountered the realities of mass unemployment (see Chapter IV). When 
working on Brave New World, Huxley also enjoyed reading Julian Huxley’s Africa View (1931) (see his 
letter to Julian, 17 May 1931, Sexton 256). 
9 For a detailed analysis of this point, see Meckier, “Brave New World and the Anthropologists: 
Primitivism in A.F. 632” (1978). Meckier discloses the impact of the writings of Malinowski, Mead and 
Franz Boas upon Huxley’s idea of civilized society and people in Brave New World, and goes on to argue 
that Huxley, through this satire, demonstrates that even if “the theories of Ford, Freud, Wells and Pavlov 
are combined, the result would be Brave New World,” namely that even “such a federation of influential 
theories” could not bring “a significant improvement upon primitivism” (AHMSNI, 233-34). 
10 Although this is a delicate issue, in the present chapter, as well as in other parts of this dissertation, I 
use “American Indians” or “Indians” instead of “Native Americans” outside of a few exceptions, 
following Huxley’s use of the former in the text. As is often indicated, what “(American) Indians” means 
is not strictly the same as what “Native Americans” means, and the latter can be problematic in that it 
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may conceal the history of the European colonization of the Americas—although the former has also 
received criticisms from other angles. 
11 Exceptions are the later mentioned studies by Peter Edgerly Firchow and David Leon Higdon. 
12 The anthropology mentioned here is anthropology of American Indians. In America, in the late 
nineteenth century, anthropology held a position as an “academic discipline,” thanks to the great 
achievements of John Wesley Powell (director of the Bureau of American Ethnology at the Smithsonian 
Institution) and Franz Boas (professor of anthropology at Columbia University). Boas is often ranked 
with Malinowski as the father of modern anthropology, and his “appointment at Columbia [in 1896] is 
heralded as marking the true beginning of anthropology as a university discipline.” Compared with 
contemporary Europeans, American anthropologists enjoyed the advantage of having “proximate access 
to indigenous peoples only recently affected by the West, who became its principal object of 
investigation, a ‘living laboratory,’ so-called.” For this outline, see Peter Whiteley, “Ethnography” (2004), 
436. 
13 See also the left side of the Timeline of the World State (Table 1), attached at the end of Section 3.7. 
14 H. G. Wells repeatedly advocated the idea of the World State in his writing, such as Anticipations (non-
fiction, 1905), The World Set Free (novel, 1914) and The Shape of Things to Come (novel, 1933), and was 
engaged in political activity to work towards the promotion of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. Yet his proposal of the World State has an aspect of the World “Empire,” which is established 
mainly by Westerners (especially English-speaking peoples), and where inhabitants of all the regions are 
civilized or Westernized, accepting Western cultural manners, including English as the only official 
language, as suggested in the second volume of his Experiment in Autobiography (1934): “The British 
Empire, I said, had to be the precursor of a world-state or nothing”; “I was still clinging to the dear belief 
that the English-speaking community might play the part of leader and mediator towards a world 
commonweal” (762; see also Patrick Parrinder, Shadows of the Future: H. G. Wells, Science Fiction and 
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Prophecy [1995], Chapter 5). According to his own comments, Huxley was conscious of the “Wellsian 
Utopia” at least in the early stage of his composing Brave New World (letter to Kethevan Roberts, 18 May 
1931, Smith 348; see also Plimpton 165), and it has been suggested by critics that he had the intention of 
satirizing optimism regarding technology and equality, which repeatedly appeared in Wells’s later 
writings, such as The Sleeper Awakes (1910) and Men Who Like Gods (1923) (see Firchow EU, 57-66; for 
Huxley’s ambivalent attitude towards Wells, see Bradshaw, “Open Conspirators: Huxley and H. G. Wells 
1927-35” [1994]). However, I am more interested in the possibility of reading Brave New World as a 
satire on the imperial aspect of the Wellsian Utopia. 
15 With regard to imperialism, a racial discrimination system like slavery seems to exist in the future 
civilized society, if we turn our attention to the “black” or “negro” people who are mentioned as members 
of the lower castes, that is, Deltas and Epsilons (see 6, 55, 87, 138, 146-47). However, the lower castes do 
not consist of only “negro” people (see 6), and the descriptions do not necessarily mean the survival of 
the former institution of black slavery, even though we may get a glimpse of the State’s (or the author’s) 
racism here (see also Holmes “SOW,” 190-91). 
16 After the Indian Removal Act was passed in 1830, about one hundred thousand American Indians were 
evicted from their homelands to the east of the Mississippi River to Indian Territory in the west. After the 
Civil War, the US government attempted to remove western tribes to reservations, which led to bitter 
wars. Ultimately, by the late nineteenth century, more than a hundred Indian tribes, exhausted from battle 
and struggling to live, had no choice but to move to reservations. However, the confinement of American 
Indians to reservations began to be suspected of not necessarily being effective for ‘civilizing’ them, and 
the government changed its policy from removal to assimilation. As a typical example, under the Dawes 
Act of 1887, reservation lands, which had been owned collectively by tribes, were forcibly redistributed 
in small portions into families and individuals. For the education of Indian children, the non-reservation 
boarding schools began to be regarded as superior to the reservation schools. However, the Meriam 
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Report of 1928 revealed the poverty in reservations and the injustice of the Indian policy, which 
subsequently led to the Indian New Deal from the mid-1930s, a movement for the improvement of 
Indians’ rights. For the above outline, see Arlen Hirschfelder, Native Americans (2000), 8-15. 
17 Huxley could also have known about the severe situation of American Indians at the time, through his 
conversation with D. H. Lawrence, who, as stated later, spent some time in the 1920s in Taos and who 
was engaged with a campaign against the Bursum Bill, supporting Indians’ rights to their land (see Arthur 
J. Bachrach, D. H. Lawrence in New Mexico: “The Time Is Different There” [2006], 14-18). 
18 In this way, the misrepresentation of American Indians was reproduced, popularized and reinforced as a 
kind of Orientalism. 
19 For the title list of the works Lawrence wrote during his stay in Taos, see Bachrach 107-10. 
20 According to Miller, “Lawrence’s more lengthy experiences in America, particularly in New Mexico 
where he had hoped to be inspired by the Native Americans to find a new direction for western culture, 
had a much deeper and lasting impact on his worldview than Huxley’s brief experience in America had on 
him” (146). Meanwhile, another of Lawrence’s works on American Indians, the short novel St Mawr 
(1925), is mentioned in Snyder’s essay, below. 
21 Lawrence also analyses why tourists were so drawn to the Hopi’s snake dance: since it was “uncouth in 
its touch of horror,” it attracted “the crowd” who were seeking “the thrill” (MM, 63-64). This may also 
explain the civilized persons’ seemingly inconsistent reaction to the savages’ snake dance in Brave New 
World, which is “funny” for the pilot but “awful” for Lenina. The fact is that their snake dance is so 
“awful” and gives civilized people such a “thrill” that they are attracted to it, feeling it is very “funny.” 
22 While Bernard and Lenina are being guided by an Indian, they are surprised by a nasty smell coming 
from his body and the Indian society, and say their catch-phrases: “cleanliness is next to fordliness,” 
“civilization is sterilization” (94). Because of an unbearable smell of “long-work, long-unwashed clothes” 
and the “crowded” Indians with “dark skins shining with heat,” “Lenina put her handkerchief to her nose” 
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(97). The shock of the Indians’ smell was mentioned by Lawrence, too: “they never wash flesh or rag. So 
never in my life have I smelt such an unbearable sulphur-human smell as comes from them when they 
cluster: a smell that takes the breath from the nostrils” (P, 95). 
23 Carey Snyder discusses equally the works of Lawrence and Huxley, and argues that they were “a 
parallel project of satirizing” what she calls “ethnographic tourism,” which means “tourism that takes 
travellers to sites such as the tropics, reservations, and ethnographic exhibits, mimicking modern 
ethnology’s goal of observing traditional customs and ceremonies” (193). Although both writers’ works 
may include “satirizing” of the Indian tourism of their day, it is not very accurate to identify the twentieth-
century Indian reservation tourism with the twenty-sixth-century visits to the Reservation. Whereas 
Lawrence in his essays reports contemporary tourism, Huxley in his novel envisages the vestige of it. 
24 As Chapter I demonstrated, as early as in his debut work of fiction, Huxley questioned the distinction 
between the self and the other, and described an intellectual who tries to define himself as a pacifist by 
projecting aggression within himself onto the other. 
25 I use the word “West” with reference to both Europe and America, following Edward W. Said. 
26 It may be argued that, by making Savage Reservations outside, the Controllers have also tried to keep 
“COMMUNITY, IDENTITY, STABILITY” within civilized society. In a BBC radio lecture, “Causes of 
War” (1934), Huxley mentions the view that, for peace, we always need to make the enemy outside. 
27 For instance, Bernard and Helmholtz Watson are too individualistic, Lenina loves her boyfriend for a 
long period of time, and the Director is sometimes overcome with the memory of his former girlfriend. 
Moreover, Linda, a civilized woman who gave birth to John, has formed, though awkwardly, a mother-
child relationship to a certain extent (see 105, 110). In this sense, her body, as well as her mind, has not 
been “conditioned” enough as a civilized person (who would have never have a baby or such a 
relationship). 
28 In Brave New World, civilized people show a strong interest in the Reservations, and later the Savage, 
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partly because they have usually filled the savage space, which they have not seen but heard of, with their 
fertile imagination. According to Said, the establishment of identity depends on “a very unrigorous idea 
of what is ‘out there,’ beyond one’s own territory,” and “[a]ll kinds of suppositions, associations and 
fictions appear to crowd the unfamiliar space outside one’s own” (O, 54). 
29 Roughly speaking, it may be possible to identify civilized society as the conscious and the Reservation 
as the unconscious. As remarked in the conclusion of Chapter I, the visit of the Savage from the 
Reservation, where violence still exists, to civilized society, which is basically peaceful, can be viewed as 
the uncanny return of repressed aggression—on a personal level—and belligerence—on a political level. 
30 Here, we might recall our discussion in Chapter II about Point Counter Point, where Huxley reveals the 
opposition of male-scientific discourse vs. female-personal discourse regarding motherhood. While the 
scientist Bernard applauds the mother-child relationship, Lenina displays some hesitation or dislike. 
31 Interestingly, the Controllers connive at these primitive or savage elements to a certain extent in 
civilized society as well. For example, Londoners like an unfordly feely, Three Weeks in a Helicopter, 
something like a film in which a deconditioned hero lives “in a wildly anti-social tête-à-tête” with a girl 
(146-47). When John, a never-conditioned savage, comes to London, they enjoy “a fascinating horror” 
towards him, especially his unfordly behaviour of flagellation, which enables them to imagine “pain” they 
have never experienced (227). 
32 Higdon also mentions as possible sources Erna Fergusson’s Dancing Gods (1931) and Edward S. 
Curtis’s The North America Indian (1907-1930) (Higdon “AHHSD,” 145-46). 
33  
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Fig. 5. Kakapti at Entrance to Walpi Antelope Kiva: A photograph taken by F. H. Maude and G. W. James 
(cited as Plate LIV in J. W.  Fewkes, “Notes on Tusayan, Snake, and Flute Ceremonies,” the Smithsonian 
Annual Report Vol. 19-2 [1900]). 
34 In a religious sense, does the snake dance have something in common with Christianity? Fewkes 
explains that, although the “original meaning” of the snake dance lies in “clan worship,” its “main 
purposes” at the end of the nineteenth century are “the making of rain and the growth of corn” (Vol. 19, 
1009; Vol. 16, 307). In the Indians’ religious view, a “sacrifice” is regarded as important (see Vol. 16, 
297), and their snake dance includes a performance of whipping. Of course, the idea of requiring a 
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sacrifice for the prosperity of a group is similar to the Christian belief that Jesus was sacrificed for “our” 
sins. Moreover, the whipping in the snake dance apparently resembles the ascetic practices (including 
self-flagellation) of “Penitentes,” a Catholic sect in the Southwest. In Brave New World, the religious 
similarity between Indians and Penitentes is directly shown by the naked boy, who plays the two roles of 
a whipped sacrifice and Jesus. In the 1946 foreword, Huxley recognizes “Penitente ferocity” in the 
Indians’ religious view and explains that John’s behaviour is controlled by “native Penitente-ism” (xlii). 
According to Firchow, Huxley was dissatisfied with the idea shared by Indians and Penitentes that “death 
was merely another aspect of fertility” (EU, 74-75). Although in Brave New World the snake dance is 
conducted “[f]or the sake of the pueblo—to make the rain come and the corn grow” as in Fewkes’s report, 
another purpose is added: “to please Pookong and Jesus” (100-01; see also 111, 141). Interestingly, Jesus 
is placed on the same level as the traditional god of the Indians. According to P. E. Goddard’s Indians of 
the Southwest (1921), which Huxley could also have read, in the snake dance of the Hopi, “two wooden 
images” are brought into the kiva: “The larger represents Pookong, the elder of the war god twins; the 
smaller may be intended for his brother, or for some other divinity” (113). However, in Brave New World, 
this “smaller” god is replaced by Jesus (see Firchow EU, 74), and the painted images of Jesus and an 
eagle (a symbol of Pookong [see BNW, 141]) are equally shown in the snake dance. Considering the fact 
that both the Indians’ religion and Christianity emphasize the concept of a “sacrifice,” it is not necessarily 
impossible for Christian and Indian elements to coexist in the snake dance in Brave New World. 
35 In fact, the “Antelope Kiva,” where the book was lying, is an underground chamber mentioned by 
Fewkes as being used for the snake ceremony. In the early part of the twentieth century, the kivas 
functioned mainly as “sacred rooms set apart for ceremonial purposes” (Goddard 76). 
36 In reality, no American Indian who read Shakespeare seems to have been mentioned in the 
anthropologists’ and other people’s accounts of those times. As is well known, since 1925, the British 
writer Charles Kay Ogden advocated Basic English, the movement of proposing only basic vocabulary of 
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English as an international auxiliary language for non-native speakers. Considering this, Huxley’s 
imagination of the appearance of an Indian reader of Shakespeare looks daring. 
37 As well as the snake dance (a traditional ritual), the kiva, a room closed to outsiders, can be seen as the 
most ‘Indian’ space. 
38 “The point is that texts have ways of existing that even in their most rarefied form are always enmeshed 
in circumstance, time, place, and society—in short, they are in the world, and hence worldly” (Said WTC, 
35)  
39 I have published some of the following sections regarding Ishi and John; see Hisashi Ozawa, “John and 
Ishi, ‘Savage’ Visitors to ‘Civilization’: A Reconsideration of Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World, 
Imperialism and Anthropology” (2014). For this dissertation, I made revisions to this article, most of 
which are minor, excepting my discussion of John’s ambiguous identity and its potential to deconstruct 
the concept of the Other (Section 4.3). 
40 For the influence of Lawrence on Brave New World, see K. T. Miller’s essay above, as well as Brad 
Buchanan, “Oedipus in Dystopia: Freud and Lawrence in Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World” (2002). 
41 Apart from Ishi, there were other American Indians who showed some similarities with John. Although 
since the sixteenth century Indians had written about their interactions with whites, it was only in the 
nineteenth century that three Indians recorded “their reactions to visiting England.” At the beginning of 
the twentieth century, E. Pauline Johnson used “Native terms to describe London and to compare 
Canadian Indian and British concepts of government, lifestyle, and worship” (A. LaVonne Ruoff, 
“Reversing the Gaze: Early Native American Images of Europeans and Euro-Americans” [2001], 208-11). 
These accounts may also have partly influenced the characterization of John or the motif of Brave New 
World, but Ishi was certainly a more recent and more famous Indian for Huxley, and thus the likelihood 
that he based John on Ishi must be greater. 
42 It has often been indicated that his travels in America, especially his encounter with subcultures in 
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California, left Huxley with a bad impression and supported part of his negative descriptions of the 
civilized society in Brave New World (see e.g., Bradshaw I, BNW, xix-xx). If London(ers) in Brave New 
World can be partly identified with the real California(ns), is it to be doubted that the fictional savage who 
visits London, and the Londoners’ reaction to him, also depend partly on the real ‘savage’ who visited a 
city in California and the Californians’ reaction to him? 
43 Although the discussion below focuses on Ishi’s life in ‘civilized’ society, his previous life may also be 
of interest. According to the generally accepted view, the Yana Indians, including the Yahi (Ishi’s group), 
had been in northern California for three to four thousand years and numbered two to three thousand 
before the conquest by white people. The Anglo-Saxons’ gold rush from 1848, followed by forced 
migration, bringing diseases and mass murder, dealt a crushing blow to California Indians, including the 
Yahi. Ishi was probably born in 1862, and lived with his mother and a small number of other survivors—
their way of life is ethnologically regarded as the most ‘primitive’ of any on the continent—but after the 
death of the others, Ishi was without human companionship for almost three years before he entered white 
society (see Theodora Kroeber, Ishi in Two Worlds [1961], Chapters 1 and 3 to 6). However, the above 
description has been criticized for its stereotype of “white beastliness and Indian saintliness” and doubted 
because of the possibility that “Ishi was the child of a mixed union,” not only of the Yana (see Orin Starn, 
Ishi’s Brain: In Search of America’s Last “Wild” Indian [2004], 98-107). Ishi’s ‘primitive’ life is not 
similar to John’s, and in my view the descriptions of John’s concrete experiences before his visit to 
civilization are mainly based on Huxley’s imagination, although the Indian life of these ‘savages’ has a 
point in common—both of them are represented in a distorted way by ‘civilized’ scientists as being 
‘primitive’ (see also Starn 25). 
44 From Chapter 11, John begins to be called “savage” more often than John, and finally he calls himself 
“Mr Savage” when answering the phone (173). Subsequently, John is later reported by the media as the 
“MYSTERY SAVAGE,” “Benighted fool” (221), and is also compared to a “gorilla” by a photographer 
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(223) or to an “ape” by the sightseers (225). 
45 In fact, the cited line is spoken by Puck in A Midsummer Night’s Dream (II, ii), which suggests that 
John (or the author) unconsciously feels a kind of similarity between himself and Ariel, both of whom 
have a submissive, colonized aspect. 
46 There are other minor similarities between John and Ishi. Neither of them is good at forming close 
relationships with women, except their mothers (see Pope “MHI,” 19, 186). Ishi’s dislike of alcohol, 
especially whiskey, which he believed made men “crazy” (186), reminds us of John’s strong hatred 
towards soma, which in the future society functions like “alcohol” (BNW, 46). Ishi’s doctor was Pope, and 
a similar name is also given to a character called Popé in Brave New World who acts as an amateur doctor 
by providing John and his mother with mental support, in the form of Shakespeare’s works and a 
romantic attachment respectively (see also Sloan 141-42). 
47 Conversely, knowledge often suggests power. Academic knowledge is accused of its complicity with 
politics in contributing to discourses of Orientalism (see e.g., Said O, 73-92). In anthropology, too, 
academics can be at times problematic in their sense of privilege of observing Others and propagating the 
image of Others (see Section 4.4). 
48 However, part of the above ignorance was definitely fabricated, and Pope attempted to relativize it in 
the following way: Ishi’s “temperament was philosophical, analytical, reserved, and cheerful. […] While 
we knew many things, we had no knowledge of nature, no reserve” (“MHI,” 187). 
49 All the academic books and essays cited in this section are presumed to have been accessible to Huxley. 
I checked copies of these sources that are now held by the British Library or the British Museum and 
investigated the seal marks of the copies to know which institutions originally owned them. According to 
the marks, copies of Kroeber’s Handbook were purchased by the British Museum (one copy shows 1926 
as the year of purchase), Pope’s Hunting with the Bow and Arrow was also purchased by the British 
Museum, and the thirteenth volume of University of California Publications, which includes the essays 
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by Pope and Waterman, was purchased by the Royal Anthropological Institute (the marks of the latter two 
show no year of acquisition). Huxley might also have visited the Bodleian Library. Meanwhile, the 
possibility cannot be denied either that non-academic information as provided by the newspaper articles 
cited in this section was obtained by the author during his trip in America or later. It is uncertain whether 
there was a direct connection between Huxley and A. L. Kroeber, but there was one between Julian 
Huxley and Kroeber. In 1946, Kroeber was awarded the Huxley Memorial Medal (1945) by the Royal 
Anthropological Institute and first met Julian, who was engaged with the Institute. Their relationship 
continued until Kroeber’s later years (see T. Kroeber, Alfred Kroeber: A Personal Configuration [1970], 
194-95, 198, 230-31, 238-41, 282). Incidentally, the well-known science fiction writer Ursula Le Guin, 
who wrote an introduction to Brave New World in the Folio Society edition (2013), is the child of 
Theodora and A. L. Kroeber (see also Clifford 175-89). 
50 There have been many on-going controversies about how to interpret Ishi’s life before and after his 
entering white society, which also suggests that he is a person who cannot be fully understood by other 
people. The difficulty in defining Ishi is reflected particularly in the fact that his real name has remained 
unknown to this day. He never disclosed it to whites or Indians in ‘civilized’ society. Although in a narrow 
sense this silence can be interpreted as passive resistance against ‘civilized’ people by their victim, it 
might mean more broadly an adamant refusal to accept any definition by others. He was finally named 
“Ishi ” by a white man, but even this means merely “man” in the Yana language and does not connote any 
personality. Regarding his name, the most symbolic explanation is offered in the butcher Adolph 
Kessler’s interview in 1973: “‘What is he?’ dozens of visitors to the jail house had inquired of the sheriff. 
[…] Webber [the sheriff] began to call his captive ‘Is he’ and then just ‘Ishi’ for short” (Starn 40). 
Therefore “Ishi” is a name that by itself doubts (or rejects) a performance of naming. 
51 Just as people who saw Ishi asked “What is he?” John is, symbolically enough, asked similar questions 
by Bernard, who is surprised to see him: “Who on earth . . .?”; “Who? How? When? From where?” (100-
194 
 
                                                                                                                                          
01). Huxley emphasizes his view of a human being as an indefinable existence by sending John, a human 
person with a complex identity, to the civilized society of the World State, which has produced machine-
like citizens with a single, unchangeable identity by employing all sorts of conditioning and hypnopædia: 
“The mind that judges and desires” is “made up of these [the State’s] suggestions” (23); “characters 
remain constant throughout a whole lifetime” (47). Certainly, in the future civilized society, there are only 
a few citizens with human features, such as Bernard and Helmholtz, indefinable characters who have and 
realize their own complex identity and who build a relatively good relationship with John probably 
because of this. For instance, Bernard, whose “physique was hardly better than that of the average 
Gamma” (55), has a different image of himself: “what it would be like if I could, if I were free—not 
enslaved by my conditioning” (78). Helmholtz also regards himself as manifold and incomprehensible 
when he asks Bernard: “Did you ever feel […] as though you had something inside you that was only 
waiting for you to give it a chance to come out?” and when he mentions his “queer feeling” that “I’ve got 
something important to say and the power to say it” (59). However, according to the State’s criteria, they 
are only defective products that could not be conditioned well, and thus must be deported from society as 
illegal human persons who have “got too self-consciously individual to fit into the community-life” (200). 
All these settings and the plot are based on the author’s belief that the complexity of identity is the 
essential condition for humanizing humans. 
52 Sloan analyses Zuñi phrases which Huxley, in the text, cited from Cushing’s Zuñi Folk Tales (1931) 
(see 145). 
53 This is not just a typical aspect of non-native speakers but one of the colonized who learn English 
outside England. In The World, the Text, and the Critic, Said divulges power structures embedded in 
language and texts, while citing James Joyce’s description of Stephen’s attitude towards English in 
Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man (1916): “The language in which we are speaking is his before it is 
mine. How different are the words home, Christ, ale, master, on his lips and on mine! I cannot speak or 
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write these words without unrest of spirit. His language, so familiar and so foreign, will always be for me 
an acquired speech” (qtd. in Said WTC, 48). In fact, the discipline of English literature was established in 
India in the mid-nineteenth century for ‘civilizing’ the colonized, and was then imported into England in 
the early twentieth century (see Gauri Viswanathan, Masks of Conquest: Literature Study and British 
Rude in India (1988); for the institutionalization of English literature in Scotland in the eighteenth 
century, see Robert Crawford’s Devolving English Literature [1992]). The function of culture as 
“hegemony” can be traced back to Mathew Arnold (see Said WTC, 9-11). In Brave New World, a savage 
in the future brings English literature (Shakespeare) to England again, but unlike the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, this fails to be established there. Although he was the great-nephew of Matthew 
Arnold, and one of the earliest graduates of English, Oxford (he got the best degree there in 1916), it 
would appear that Huxley in the novel set forth “culture” as rather changeable or unreliable than 
hegemonic or confirmed. 
54 Ironically, in the Pre-World State Era, John would have succeeded as a civilized, submissive colonized 
or as a civilized, competent colonizer, because of his cultural accomplishments, such as his faith in 
Christianity and knowledge of Shakespeare. However, another fate awaits him in the twenty-sixth 
century, at a time when no imperial policies exist in non-Western regions and when former symbols of 
civilization like Shakespeare and Christianity are reversed as something primitive or savage in this new 
civilization. 
55 Evidently, Huxley attempts to subvert or deconstruct a set of keywords “civilization” and “savage.” He 
envisages a future world where Shakespeare’s book is undoubtedly regarded by a new civilization as 
“uncivilized,” and civilized people make a habit of making some collective performances which are very 
similar to those performed by uncivilized people in the Savage Reservation (see 97)—indeed, Huxley 
described civilized people’s life, as mentioned earlier, by echoing the then reports on ‘primitives’ by 
anthropologists. Before and after Brave New World, Huxley often questioned the same sort of binary 
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opposition by remarking, for example: “being civilized [. . .] is keeping up the appearances of culture, 
prosperity, and good manners”; “freed from the necessity of keeping up the appearance of being civilized, 
the majority of human beings would rapidly become barbarous” (Jesting Pilate, AHCEII, 468); “The 
difficulty of measuring and comparing civilizations consists in the fact that we have no rulers and no 
scales in terms of which to make our measurements” (“The Fallacy of World Brotherhood” [1928], 
AHCEII, 102); “We say that the Quiché Indians are primitive. But what exactly do we mean by the word? 
[. . .] Primitiveness of mind is not necessarily associated with congenital inferiority of mind” (“Primitive 
Minds” [1933], AHCEIII, 360). 
56 Said continues: “To leave the historical world for the metaphysics of essences like negritude, Irishness, 
Islam, or Catholicism is to abandon history for essentializations that have the power to turn human beings 
against each other” (CI, 276). A similar view is presented in cultural studies; for example, Paul Gilroy in 
The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness (1993) questions the racial purity which has 
often been seen in black politics, believing: “The [hybrid cultural] history of the black Atlantic yields a 
course of lessons as to the instability and mutability of identities which are always unfinished, always 
being remade” (xi). 
57 Throughout Edward Said: The Paradox of Identity (1999), Bill Ashcroft and Pal Ahluwalia place 
emphasis on Said’s own identity, which also appears inconsistent and paradoxical in various ways (e.g., 
being an exile from Palestine, sustained concern about his homeland while being a New York citizen with 
a Westernized persona), and which is what personally endorsed and supported his activity as a public 
intellectual as well as his postcolonial theory. Not fully, but to some degree, Said’s definition of an 
intellectual may be applied to Huxley, in whom Said was so little interested that he made no reference to 
Huxley in Orientalism, and only once in Culture and Imperialism (see 353). Despite his coming from a 
notable family of Western ‘civilization,’ Huxley was irresistibly attracted to Eastern cultures, by which in 
later years he cast a critical eye upon Western imperialism and a cultural and political tendency towards 
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globalization. His engagement with pacifism in the mid-1930s exposed him to severe censure for his 
‘unpatriotic’ behaviour, probably encouraging him to emigrate to America, which, however, did not give 
him citizenship for the natural reason that, based on his political beliefs, he refused all cooperation with 
the US Army in the case of an emergency (see Bedford 531-35). In 1959, Huxley declined an offer of 
knighthood by the British government as well (see Dunaway HH, 345). 
58 For instance, in Britain an anthropology recognizable as such arose as a result of the anti-slavery 
movement, and its supporters entertained “liberal, humanitarian, and utilitarian ideals” and “the utopian 
belief that the sustained efforts of education and science would result in a better society” (MacClancy 76). 
59 For the following outline of American anthropology, see George Pierre Castile, “Federal Indian Policy 
and Anthropology” (2004), 269-70; Whiteley 448-49. 
60 This betrayal should not be attributed only to Kroeber, who actually urged the importance of observing 
Ishi’s dying wish in a letter to his colleague. However, this letter unfortunately arrived after the autopsy 
had been performed and the brain had been preserved. 
61 Ishi’s brain, having been stored in the Smithsonian Institution, was finally buried together with the 
ashes in his native land in 2000. 
62 The above criticism on Kroeber and his friends would be argued against by the anthropologist George 
M. Foster (see his “Assuming Responsibility for Ishi: An Alternative Interpretation” [2003]). 
63 The Controller has often been compared with Alfred Mond, the founder of Imperial Chemical 
Industries (see e.g., James Sexton, “Brave New World and the Rationalization of Industry” [1986], 429-
36). 
64 As can be easily seen in Smithsonian publications, photographers were often indispensable for 
anthropologists’ field surveys. 
65 Examples of results of such realigned anthropology can be seen in recent studies of Ishi, such as Ishi in 
Three Centuries (2003, ed. Karl Kroeber and Clifton Kroeber; a collection of essays from various 
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contributors from Californian anthropologists to Native Americans), Starn’s Ishi’s Brain (2004) and James 
Clifford’s Returns: Becoming Indigenous in the Twenty-First Century (2013), which devotes the second 
part to “Ishi’s Story.” These writings avoid a rash conclusion that overemphasizes either the side of whites 
or Indians. They appear to aim at something like an “impossible union” of human history which is made 
possible not by “the provincialism of one strand of history” but by “an apprehension of other histories” 
(see Said CI, 339-40). 
66 My argument in the latter part of this chapter is based on the premise that Huxley had some information 
about Ishi, but even if he had not, the significance of Huxley’s work in regard to imperialism and 
anthropology would not be lost. On the contrary, if Huxley, without knowing anything about Ishi, had so 
correctly—in a sense—described how a ‘primitive’ person who grew up with American Indians felt and 
was treated in ‘civilized’ society, this description would imply that he had great imagination and 
sensitivity with respect to the destiny of Others. The fact also remains that Huxley had a keen awareness 
of the imperial aspect of anthropology, by which he could narrate John’s life with civilized scientists as a 
critical reflection of the ambiguity typically seen in the contemporary relationships between 
anthropologists and the colonized. 
67 For privileged intellectuals’ risk of (mis) representing or silencing oppressed individuals (such as ‘Third 
World’ women), see e.g., Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s famous and controversial work, “Can the 
Subalterns Speak?” (1988). 
68 In decolonizing cultural contexts, according to Said, “resistance” should be considered “an alternative 
way of conceiving human history”: “Certainly, [. . .] writing back to the metropolitan cultures, disrupting 
the European narratives of the Orient and Africa, replacing them with either a more playful or a more 
powerful new narrative style is a major component in the process. [. . .] The conscious effort to enter into 
the discourse of Europe and the West, to mix with it, transform it, to make it acknowledge marginalized or 
suppressed or forgotten histories is of particular interest in [Salman] Rushdie’s work, and in an earlier 
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generation of resistance writing” (CI, 259-61). 
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Chapter IV Mass 
—Later Writing— 
Utopia and Marxism 
 
1. Introduction 
The final chapter focuses on Aldous Huxley’s relationship with the masses and 
his view of them. The previous chapters have already provided some clues to this 
question, albeit in fragments. In the “Farcical History of Richard Greenow” (1920), 
Dick cannot repress his visceral hatred for a crowd on a street and in a train, as well as 
for lower class activists involved in a pacifist campaign with him.1 Another of the 
author’s indirect confessions may be made through Walter in Point Counter Point 
(1928), who cannot “personally like the oppressed” despite his politically “advanced” 
stance. In this story, Rampion eloquently denies the validity of socialist ideas and 
movements, and even Illidge, a communist from the working class, has to finally 
question his belief of “revolution” after he murders Webley, whom he thought embodied 
the “plutocracy” (506, 511, 515). For most readers, however, the most memorable is 
probably the grotesque image of a crowd of lower castes like “maggots” in Brave New 
World (1932). These examples, more or less, might convince us of Huxley’s dislike of 
the masses or his contempt for them. Indeed, Huxley, especially because of his most 
famous novel, has been convicted by Marxists and other leftist critics as a reactionary 
engaged in, or standing up, for “bourgeois society,” “the authentic bourgeois spirit,” 
“the European leisured class” or “aristocratic critique[s].”2 However, it must not be 
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overlooked that the aversions towards working classes in “Richard Greenow” and Point 
Counter Point are followed by the characters’ guilt as well as their desire to have 
empathy for them. In Brave New World, an uncomfortable feeling in a class-based 
society is also held by Bernard, who has an unstable identity because of his Alpha 
intelligence and Gamma physique, and who cannot “feel himself too secure in his 
superiority,” unlike many others of the same class who take “their position for granted,” 
moving “through the caste system as a fish through water” (55-56). 
To reconsider Huxley and the masses, I reflect on his later work, examining the 
particular historical contexts of his time and Marxist theories of today. Although it is 
well known that after the 1930s Huxley increased his interest in religious thought and 
drugs, how can this be viewed in his relationship with the masses? A keyword in our 
discussion will be “utopia,”3 a theme that is problematic but significant for both the later 
Huxley and Marxism. 
 
2. The Road to Eutopia: Huxley’s Encounters and Relationships with the Masses 
2.1. Huxley’s Experiences “Abroad in England” 
In Typhoeus or the Future of Socialism (1929, published in the To-day and To-
morrow series), Arthur Shadwell states: “Socialism was raised by the war [1914-1918] 
from a vague programme to a practical political question, and its future was thereby 
made a matter of primary interest” (9). The Fabian Society, established in 1884, 
provided a place for the energetic activity of intellectuals, including Sidney and Beatrice 
Webb, George Bernard Shaw and H. G. Wells. In 1915, Huxley himself became a Full 
202 
 
Member of the Balliol Fabian Group to make “sincere but less than fanatic” 
commitments to socialism (Bradshaw I, HH, viii-ix)—this experience was later 
fictionalized in “Richard Greenow” (see Limbo, 29-30). In a letter to Sybille Bedford 
(28 May 1968), the leading figure of the Group, Rajani Palme Dutt, remembered that 
Huxley “supported socialism for the same reason as Oscar Wilde had done,” instead of 
being “an economic type of Socialist” (qtd. in Bradshaw I, HH, ix). In 1924, with 
Fabian ideas as a background, the Labour Party, having advocated “the common 
ownership of the means of production,” formed the first Labour Party government, 
together with the Liberal Party, which emphasized funding support for public housing, 
reforms for spreading education, and improving pension and unemployment insurance. 
What kind of attitude did Huxley show towards these situations in his early 
essays? In “Varieties of Intelligence” in Proper Studies (1927), Huxley admits that in 
many cases “an individual’s thoughts and actions are undoubtedly conditioned by the 
class to which he belongs and the economic conditions in which he lives,” and that 
anyone “knows the difficulties which individuals of different classes experience in 
communicating with one another” (AHCEII, 192). However, Huxley carefully reminds 
readers that it is impossible to “interpret all social phenomena in terms of class warfare 
and the play of economic forces,” and that “[d]ifference in class no longer implies, as it 
once did, a radical difference in world-view,” especially now, when “education” is 
“made universally compulsory” (192). Of his essays in the 1920s, the longest discussion 
of Marxism is “Revolutions” in Do What You Will (1929). Huxley predicts a future in 
which “the doctrines of socialism lose most of their charm, and the communist 
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revolution becomes rather pointless” (133; see also 136). The image of the “Proletariat,” 
which Karl Marx characterized as being “exploited and victimized” as “slaves” by 
nineteenth-century industrialists, is now “ceasing to exist in America, and, to a less 
extent, industrialized Europe,” because “[i]n the depth of the human soul [including of a 
bourgeois] lies something which we rationalize as a demand for justice” (131-32). 
Marxists, or “historical materialists, who deal not with real human beings but with 
abstract ‘Economic Men,’” cannot realize this point (132), believing “equalization of 
income” as “happy consummation” in which “the real sources of present discontent” 
will be removed (133, 135). In Huxley’s opinion, “the real trouble with the present 
social and industrial system is [. . .] that it makes life fundamentally unlivable for all” 
because “mechaniz[ation]” “degrade[s]” the individual “from manhood towards the 
mere embodiment of a social function” (135-36). Of course, he recognizes the impact of 
Marx on the modern age (see e.g., “Print and the Man” [1928], AHCEII, 120), agreeing 
with some of its criticism of capitalism, but he was never satisfied with Marxism.  
Unlike Huxley’s optimistic prediction, things were changing for the worse. 
Although in 1929 the second MacDonald cabinet was formed by just the Labour Party, 
October of the same year saw the beginning of the Great Depression. Unemployment 
grew tremendously, delivering an especially impactful blow to the staple trades—coal, 
cotton, shipbuilding, and iron and steel—particularly in Scotland, Wales, Northern 
Ireland and Northern England (see J. Stevenson 270-71). For a breakthrough in the 
crisis, MacDonald was responsible for a National Government from 1931 to 1935, 
which, however, not only led to a splitting up of the Labour Party but also a weakening 
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of it, which had to wait until 1945 to take the helm again. It was during this depressed 
period that Huxley had a series of important experiences, namely encounters with the 
world and inhabitants “Abroad in England.”4 Though having toured the industrial 
Midlands of England in 1928, Huxley from 1930 to 1931 repeatedly—and rather 
surprisingly, considering what he had been before—explored “Alien Englands,” such as 
Durham colliery villages, St Katherine and Royal Albert docks in London, a Sheffield 
ironworks, the old and new industrial towns in Middlesbrough and Billingham 
respectively (Imperial Chemical Industries’ factory in the latter), and a car factory in 
Birmingham (see his articles “Abroad in England,” “Sight-Seeing in Alien England,” 
“The Victory of Art over Humanity” and “Greater and Lesser London” [1931]). In 
February 1931, during MacDonald’s second cabinet, Huxley even attended a 
parliamentary debate on financial matters (see “GLL”). He also delivered a speech titled 
“The Worth of a Gift” in support of the Cecil Houses Women’s Public Lodging House 
Fund in 1934, and visited drug and bicycle factories in Nottingham (see “How to 
Improve the World” [1936]) as well as a camp for unemployed people in the New Forest 
(see “The Man without a Job” and “Pioneers of Britain’s ‘New Deal’” [1936]). 
In these tours, Huxley observed the state of labourers “stereoscopic[ally]” by 
using both the “standpoint of the bird’s-eye of sociological generalities” and “that of the 
wanderer among alien particulars” (“AE,” AHCEIII, 268; “SSAE,” AHCEIII, 277). The 
former looks at the negative aspects of what has supported, and will support, the British 
Empire—e.g., the highest class barriers, which have been accentuated by the English 
education system (“AE,” AHCEIII, 264-65); a slump in singing and the rising suicide 
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rate as a quid pro quo for industrial progress (268-69); aesthetically well-organized 
factories where the machine makes work monotonous or less creative (“SAAE,” 
AHCEIII, 277, 281; “VAH,” AHCEIII, 282-83); over-production that creates 
unemployment, which leaves poor people in the vacuum of leisure with boredom 
(“AE,” AHCEIII, 270-71; “VAH,” AHCEIII, 282-83; “MJ,” AHCEIV, 141-46). In a 
sense, these were all tragedies that were brought on by virtues such as “civilization,” 
“progress” and “humanitarian[ism]” (see “AE,” AHCEIII, 269; “SSAE,” AHCEIII, 
274)—the paradox which Huxley vividly satirized in Brave New World. One may also 
find ideas similar to Marxism such as the theory of commodity fetishism.5 
On the other hand, Huxley’s viewpoint of a wandering stranger allows him to 
think of those social issues as his own personal ones, too. He honestly confesses his 
difficulty in establishing contact with working-class people, despite the fact that he 
“like[s]” their “pleasant” and “intelligent” characters (“AE,” AHCEIII, 265). Before 
workers in a factory or mine, he “feel[s] ashamed” for his own “freedom,” “want[ing] to 
apologise to them for being a man whose labours are [. . .] much more profitable” 
(“SSAE,” AHCEIII, 278). Finally, he imagines himself in their places: “If I had been 
born and lived my life in this street of rags behind the Docks, should I be playing Bach, 
I wondered, should I even have heard of Schubert? [. . .] The conquest of poverty 
demands an extraordinary strength and vitality, a consuming passion for higher things. 
Most probably, I told myself, I should have succumbed” (“GLL,” AHCEIII, 301). These 
comments deviate considerably from his previous elitism. 
Each time he witnesses such wretched circumstances, Huxley feels the need for 
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“the most careful and systematic national planning” (“AE,” AHCEIII, 212) and shows, 
though cautiously, interest in large-scale plans—whether from the political right or the 
left—such as the one proposed by Oswald Mosley in England and the Russian one in 
progress: “If her Five-Year Plan succeeds [. . .] Russia will be in a position to convert 
the whole world to her way of thinking. [. . .] [A] Time may come when communism 
will pay and pay better, for the majority of men and women, than capitalism” (“AE,” 
AHCEIII, 272-73). More importantly, his experiences “Abroad in England” seem to 
have given him a crucial insight into national reforms that would yield ideal 
communities. He appreciates the Cecil House organizers’ way of treating the homeless 
“as persons [like themselves], never as mere cases or things” (“WG,” AHCEIII, 418). In 
an Unemployment Centre—the Grith Fyrd camp for providing people with chances for 
working, learning and being entertained—Huxley draws significant lessons from their 
“co-operative, and in the fullest sense of the word, communistic” life—lessons that can 
“be applied to great many industries” or “the life of all civilised men”(“MJ,” AHCEIV, 
145; “PBND,” AHCEIV, 150, 152-53). “Self-government,” in Huxley’s view, is the 
essence of the camp, which allows each group (the optimum size is around 20) “co-
operation,” “the sense of solidarity” (and thus, “the highest social ethics”) and “human 
efficiency” based on “liberty” (“PBND,” AHCEIV, 150-53).6 
These essays can be located in broader contexts of those days, such as domestic 
anthropology. The idea of two nations in England, as symbolized by Huxley’s 
paradoxical phrases “Abroad in England” and “Alien Englands,” already appeared as 
early as 1855 in Benjamin Disraeli’s novel, Sybil, or the Two Nations (1855). The most 
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significant movement of the inter-war period was probably Mass-Observation, which 
started in 1937, as mentioned in Chapter III.7 Certainly, Huxley’s works about “Alien 
Englands” appear to be an early example of domestic anthropology, and in 1933 he 
went on to write the essay “Anthropology at Home,” insisting that “reformers” must be 
“anthropologists” to solve contemporary issues such as “slums” (AHCEIII, 369).8 While 
M-O put a particular focus on the working classes (who were equated with the 
primitive), Huxley was critical of the conventional treatment of the destitute as “a 
different and inferior species” or “African savages” (see “WG,” AHCEIII, 415), instead 
showing his awareness of the significance of applying an “anthropological approach” to 
both the poor and the rich (see “Casino and Bourse” [1935], AHCEIII, 421). This point 
will be well understood, given my argument in Chapter III that in Brave New World 
Huxley attempts to subvert or deconstruct the categories of the civilized, the primitive 
and the savage. In a sense, Huxley’s idea of ‘Anthropology at Home’ was something 
fairer than those proposed and performed by other intellectuals of his time. 
 
2.2. Huxley’s Approach to Politics in the 1930s 
How did Huxley’s encounter with “Alien Englands” influence his thinking and 
career? The main topic of the present chapter—Huxley and the masses—has never been 
discussed more earnestly than in relation to his most popular work of fiction, Brave New 
World. By using Marx and Lenin for the names of characters,9 Huxley appears to 
satirize Marxism, together with Freudism and Fordism, and the tale has been regarded 
as an anti-Marxist text that reflects the author’s contempt for the masses. For example, 
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in The Intellectuals and the Masses: Pride and Prejudice among the Literary 
Intelligentsia, 1880-1939 (1992), John Carey analyses representations of the masses in 
the writings of early twentieth-century intellectuals, and finds in Brave New World 
Huxley’s “cultural élitism, antagonism to the mass and mystic breakthrough to ‘ultimate 
reality’” as one body (86). According to Carey, Brave New World was written not only 
due to the author’s fear that “mass unemployment” would bring about something 
“awful” like “communism,” but also as a reflection of his desire to justify the status 
quo, rejecting “mass happiness” as “inherently inferior” (87-88). Thus, Huxley shares 
some notions or beliefs with Nietzsche, including “the ethic that was used to underwrite 
[. . .] the systems of exploitation that produced the European leisured class to which 
Huxley and Nietzsche belonged” (88).10 
However, Brave New World can be read in a different way in view of the four 
pieces of non-fiction written by the author in the same period—from “Abroad in 
England” to “Greater and Lesser London.” Indeed, David Bradshaw argues that in the 
early 1930s Huxley’s contempt for the masses began to coexist with, and later even be 
surpassed by, his compassion for the masses. This ambiguity or development of 
Huxley’s mentality was reflected, for example, in his interest in drastic planning for 
stability (including “the state uses of eugenics, the legitimate use of force in society, and 
the desirability of hierarchical government”), accompanied by his joining several 
organizations,11 as well as writing Brave New World (see Bradshaw, “Huxley’s Slump: 
Planning, Eugenics, and the ‘Ultimate Need’ of Stability” [1995], 168).12 
In my opinion too, it looks a little unreasonable to trace the text back, as Carey 
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does, to Huxley’s elitist craving to protect vested interests occupied by the leisured 
class. First, as Chapter III demonstrated, Huxley’s attitude towards culture is more 
ambiguous, and not necessarily hegemonic or authoritarian. Second, is it not more 
probable and natural to see that Huxley satirizes or ridicules, rather than approving or 
appreciating, the (existing) class system? For instance, the conventional class system, 
which is mainly based on a family line, is suggested as groundless compared with the 
future caste system which is absolutely rationally managed by categorizing the citizens 
according to their mental and physical abilities. In another sense, by presenting such an 
extreme form of a hierarchical society, the text may hint at the futility of grading human 
beings who are objectively “physico-chemically equal,” for example, before death (63; 
see 65).13  
A more reformist Huxley appears in his next novel, Eyeless in Gaza, which is not 
a so-called utopian text (about an imaginary or ideal community) but which, in a broad 
sense, falls under this category in that it is a story about a protagonist who finally 
reaches a utopian vision. In his childhood, Anthony Beavis, apparently modelled on the 
author, has a fear or dislike of the poor, especially their smell (Chapter 9). Although he 
becomes a member of the Fabian Society at Oxford (Chapter 10), he lives as a 
“sociologist,” an intellectual apart from others. However, through experiencing 
revelatory or fateful incidents—such as seeing a dog fall from the sky, which reminds 
him of his friend Brian, for whose death he was responsible, and his encounter with the 
“anthropologist” James Miller, who leads him to a pacifist movement—Anthony begins 
to have a “longing to know and love” a real person (see 128). In the end, this transforms 
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him into a new person who believes in the following “[e]mpirical facts”: “One: We are 
all capable of love for other human beings. Two. We impose limitations on that love 
[such as “classes and nations”]. Three. We can transcend all these limitations—if we 
choose to” (185; see 493). The story also suggests how to face and improve real politics. 
The “dilemma” explored in Brave New World—namely the choice between 
totalitarianism (because of large-scale plans) and societal breakdown (because of the 
lack of such plans)—is discussed again, but this time the author writes: “there is a hope 
of passing between the horns.” It is to always “begin by considering concrete people” 
instead of “States [. . .] and such-like abstractions,” in order to avoid the risk of those 
plans, such as the repression of individuals (364-65). By this novel, especially his belief 
of “moral evolution,” in which all people can improve themselves and thus society too, 
Huxley is counted by Stephen Ingle as one of “[e]thical socialists” (103-05).14  
The “love for other human beings” mentioned above is the essence of what Miller 
calls “anthropology,” which is to “study men,” “think of them as men” and “always 
treat them as men”;15 this opposes “entomolog[y],” in which “you propose to treat him 
[a human being] as a bug” (468-72). The former contributes to the “good, whatever 
makes for unity with other lives and other things,” while the latter encourages the “evil” 
or “the accentuation of division” (see 499). In fact, as early as November 1934, Huxley 
had already used a similar expression in his speech for the Cecil Houses Women’s 
Public Lodging House Fund: “We do evil when we treat others as though they were not 
persons, like ourselves, but as though they were things. [. . .] And it [the evil] can be 
eliminated. Cecil Houses are there as a proof that it can. No person in a Cecil House is 
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ever treated as a thing” (“WG,” AHCEIII, 418). Huxley might have read some writings 
of the founder of the Houses, Ada Elizabeth Chesterton, who was the widow of Cecil 
Chesterton (the younger brother of G. K. Chesterton).16 In a sense, she was certainly a 
practical “anthropologist” who based her philanthropic work on her own journalism, 
and who brought light to the hidden lives of poor women after disguising herself as one 
of them. What she realized as a result of her investigation is that “the misery and 
starvation of the outcast” are not caused by “her own fault” but by “poverty” and “the 
shortage of housing,” and that “[h]umanity” of the outcast is as “decent” as others (In 
the Darkest London [1926], 34). Whilst reporting many types of women, including 
“thieves, prostitutes, blackmailers,” she consistently treats them on terms of equality 
with women of the aboveground by paying attention to the individuality of the subjects 
of her research, instead of lumping them together (see Women of the London 
Underworld [1931], 9). Although Miller has been thought to be modelled after the 
author’s male friends, such as the therapist F. M. Alexander (see EG, 13) and the 
philosopher Gerald Heard—none of whom was actually an anthropologist—another 
source for this character is possibly an almost forgotten female acquaintance of Huxley, 
Ada Chesterton.17 
What gave Huxley the major inspiration for Eyeless in Gaza must be his actually 
joining a pacifist movement, The Peace Pledge Union (PPU).18 Although it has often 
been indicated that Huxley was ideologically influenced by other intellectuals related to 
this campaign, such as Gerald Heard (a religious philosopher and one of Huxley’s 
lifelong friends), Dick Sheppard (an Anglican clergyman and the Canon of St Paul’s 
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Cathedral) and Richard Gregg (an American social philosopher whose Power of Non-
Violence [1935] was a Bible for the PPU),19 and although Huxley’s joining the PPU can 
be said to be the result of his encounters with the masses “Abroad in England,” his 
activity for the PPU itself must have been another of his encounters with the masses. 
The origin of the PPU was a single letter signed by Sheppard which was published in 
newspapers on 16 October 1934, inviting men to send a postcard to him to publicly 
declare: “We renounce war, and never again, directly or indirectly, will we support or 
sanction another.” Immediately, 135,000 men responded and became members. 
Sheppard’s Peace Movement was sponsored by intellectuals, including Huxley, “the 
foremost thinker of the PPU,” and in May 1936 it was named the Peace Pledge Union.20 
In contrast to his previous work, Huxley had to see the masses as the audience of his 
speeches and pamphlets, and found “more adherents [of the PPU] among the poor than 
among the rich” (Ends and Means [1937], AHCEIV, 270).21 This attitude was indeed an 
important aspect of the PPU’s campaign, reflected in its miscellaneous pamphlets, 
where plain catchphrases and illustrations were effectively used to gain popularity not 
limited by class and gender.22 In Eyeless in Gaza, Huxley articulates his reflection on 
his activity in Anthony’s notebook (see Chapters 13 and 28), in which, for example, he 
confesses to his “failure[s],” such as a feeling that his audience was “a collective noun, 
an abstraction” or the “imbecile or odious” masses (135-36). However, Anthony or 
Huxley finally overcomes them, resolving to act for “his friends,” who unite with him 
beyond class differences for the same purpose (see 493, 496). 
One of the changes brought about by these points can be found in Huxley’s views 
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on social improvement. As we have already seen, Huxley once advocated top-down 
planning directed by the elite. Now, though still believing that “politicians” must be 
“intelligent,” he gives the highest priority to ordinary people’s “liberty” and “well-
being” in politics, “education” and “physiological and mental” life (see 365). His idea is 
developed more theoretically and concretely in Ends and Means (1937). Finding the 
“goal” of social reforms in “freedom, justice, and peaceful co-operation between non-
attached, yet active and responsible individuals” (AHCEIV, 191), Huxley goes on to 
argue that the “road to a better society” is none other than “the road of decentralization 
and responsible self-government” (191; see also Chapter 7). The volume also provides 
his consideration of general principles for making social plans (Chapter 5), as well as 
his discussion of the issues that appear when the plans are put into practice, including 
how to achieve both public and private benefits (Chapters 8 and 10). These arguments 
were supported by his recognition of the significance of self-government, which Huxley 
obtained firstly by his visit to the unemployment camp and secondly through working 
for the PPU, the essence of whose campaign was also “self-organisation,” by which 
members could freely and positively work through “local Groups” in their towns or 
villages (Hetherington 9). 
Although I have not hitherto discussed how Huxley updated his view of Marxism 
and Russia after his tours of “Alien Englands,” this is a matter worth considering in 
some detail. “Like many of his contemporaries,” Bradshaw and James Sexton comment, 
“Huxley wrote fulsomely in praise of the Soviet Union in the early 1930s” (note 17 to 
NMTE, 88). Certainly, Huxley, probably as a result of his tours of “Alien Englands,” 
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took an interest in Russian-style propaganda or dictatorship (see “A Soviet School 
Book” [1931], AHCEIII, 308-10; “Forewarned Is Not Forearmed” [1931], AHCEIII, 
310-11), beginning to feel that “the rest of the world” should adopt “something on the 
lines of the Five Year Plan” (letter to Leonard Huxley, 31 August 24, Smith 352; see 
also “AE,” AHCEIII, 272-73). However, this does not necessarily mean that he was 
always optimistic or positive towards Russia or Marxism.23 Theoretically, Huxley still 
repeats the same argument (as before in his “Revolutions” in Do What You Will), 
criticizing Marxism for its disproportionate emphasis on the economic aspects of human 
and history; he also shows his pessimism about Russia, the embodiment of Marxism: 
“whether they [the Bolsheviks] will go on being successful for long seems to me rather 
dubious. Man is more complex than the formulators of Soviet ideology care to admit 
(“In Whose Name?” [1931], AHCEIII, 314-15).24 To speak more concretely, for Huxley, 
a possibly problematic aspect of the Russian plan is the suppression of individualism or 
personal liberty in the interests of society, such as the abolition of private property. 
Rather he prefers, for example, “a limited right to private property”—as the French 
socialist Pierre-Joseph Proudhon proposed—in order to “enjoy the advantages of 
Liberalism and at the same time as the advantages of Socialism” (“The Problem of 
Property” [1932], AHCEIII, 347-38; see also his letter to Mitchison, below).25 His anti-
Russian stance is more systematically developed in Ends and Means. Huxley, pointing 
out Marx’s failure in underrating nationalism (Chapter 7), relentlessly comments that 
Russia, due to defects in its plan, is almost the same as, or even worse than, capitalist 
countries in terms of suppression of individuals and militarism (Chapters 5 and 8 to 12). 
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His anti-communist or anti-Russian ideas have a personal aspect, too. While attending 
the International Authors Congress for the Defence of Culture in Paris (June 1935), 
Huxley, who “had hoped for serious, technical discussion,” was very disappointed “by 
the French Communist writers for their own glorification and by the Russians as a piece 
of Soviet propaganda,” and even got angry about their hypocrisy, namely “the cynical 
indifference of the Communist organizers to the wretched little delegates from the 
Balkans etc” (letter to Victoria Ocampo, June 1935, Smith 397).26 
In his fiction, Huxley could more plainly but effectively express his strong 
mistrust of communists and Russia. When the main characters of Eyeless in Gaza, 
Anthony and Helen—both intellectuals who have lived in a self-indulgent way—search 
for a raison d’être to begin a new life, communism emerges as an attractive choice. 
Although Anthony follows Mark to join a revolutionary movement in Mexico and 
Helen approaches Ekki (a communist refugee), Mark’s attempt fails, revealing itself as 
just empty bravery, and Ekki is abducted and killed by the secret police or because of 
some factional dispute among the communists.27 A simple and emotional doubt about 
communists occurs to Helen when seeing Ekki with two other German communists: 
“She felt ashamed of herself, but at the same time couldn’t help thinking that life, if you 
were like Ekki, must be strangely narrow and limited, unimaginably without colour. 
[. . .] Whereas hers—hers was a vague bright Turner, a Monet, a savage Gauguin” (483, 
see also 491).28 The theoretical basis of this novel’s assaults against Russian 
communism is the author’s belief that “means determine ends.” As argued by Miller and 
Anthony after his awakening, violence such as “liquidating” achieves only the similarly 
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violent result, i.e., “a post-revolutionary society, not communistic but (like the Russian) 
hierarchical, ruled by an oligarchy using secret police methods” (335; see also 261-63, 
491-92). 
Not having visited Russia himself, Huxley formed the above view, depending 
somewhat on the reports of other people.29 For example, one of those around him who 
travelled to Russia was his brother Julian, who stayed with him and his family in 1932 
in Sanary, France. In the late spring of the previous year, Julian visited Russia with his 
wife Juliette to “bring British scientists and medical men in contact with their Russian 
colleagues,” and on the whole, he was “favourably impressed by the development of 
Russia” (J. Huxley MI, 191, 200).30 Evidently, his attitude towards Russia was much 
less ambivalent than his younger brother’s. 
Naomi Mitchison also may have contributed to Huxley’s view of Russia. 
Mitchison, a member of the Labour Party, stayed in Russia between June and August 
1932 with her husband, a Labour MP, as well as other people of the Fabian Society. The 
aim of her journey was to investigate archaeology and abortion. Huxley’s reply to her 
(c. September 1932, Smith 361-63) suggests that Mitchison sent him her accounts of 
Russia, which no longer exist, like most of the other letters to him, due to the 1961 fire 
in his house in California. However, by using extant materials, we can surmise a rough 
idea of what she wrote to Huxley. Her Russian diary31 conveys the first impression that 
she got of the country: “I did like [Soviet Russia] so much. I felt it was in a way what I 
had wanted, what I have waited for” (her diary, qtd. in Lloyd 30). During her stay, she 
found lovable people who lived happily in the system of communism (see Mitchison 
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YMWA, 188-89; her diary, qtd. in Calder 115). On the whole, she was satisfied by 
Russian archaeology and the status of women,32 although shocked by witnessing an 
abortion, which was legalized in 1920 but which she saw performed without anaesthesia 
(see her diary, qtd. in Calder 113; Benton 84).33 At the same time, a more ambivalent 
aspect of her feelings towards Russia or communism appears in her diary, for example, 
in a passage in which, appreciating theoretically the rejection of possessions, she still 
has private doubts about life in Russia without a good bath, shampoo or clean linen (see 
her diary, qtd. in Calder 114). Her enthusiasm about “socialist thinking and planning” 
was not supported by a concrete vision of what it would be like “after the revolution” 
but by something “moral” that was formed “romantically” and “deeply influenced by 
William Morris.”34 Huxley—who originally did not like an economics-oriented view of 
humanity, calling Russian collective enthusiasm “the new romanticism” (MN, AHCEIII, 
251-54)—agreed with Mitchison’s accounts of Russia, although he did so more calmly, 
saying: “I perfectly believe that a lot of people are happy in Russia—because [. . .] 
happiness is a by-product of something else and they’ve got a Cause” (Smith 361-62). 
Unlike Mitchison’s optimism about the future, Huxley showed acute anxiety about the 
period after the Five-Year Plan would be finished, while also questioning her about the 
economic facet of Russia: “without some private property, what is to become of 
individual liberty? Private property is the only guarantee possessed by individuals 
against the tyranny of the State” (362). 
Though a minor person in Huxley studies, Cynthia Mosley (the MP and first wife 
of Oswald) may be a worthwhile figure to consider.35 As early as 24 August 1931, 
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Huxley wrote to his father: “The accounts of travelling in Russia which I received the 
other day from a Soviet enthusiast, Lady Cynthia Moseley [Mosley], were distinctly 
depressing. My own courage would quail before the dirt she described” (Smith 352; 
Cynthia’s letter to Huxley is also no longer in existence).36 In September 1930, when 
Oswald’s publicly known affairs made her feel insecure, Cynthia travelled to Russia, 
accompanied by her sister, Zita James. On their way, they visited Turkey, where they 
met the exile Leon Trotsky, to whom Cynthia enthusiastically conveyed “her sympathies 
towards Soviet Russia” as “an ardent Socialist” and as “a great admirer of yours [his]” 
(see Trotsky’s diary and her letter to him, qtd. in Nicholas Mosley 159-60). However, 
her expectations seem to have been too high about Russia, where she found only “that 
queer intangible new spirit, everyone equal, no classes,” as well as “all the nonsense 
talked about only wearing old clothes so as not to be conspicuous, typhoid, the frightful 
food shortages, no soap—bunk from beginning to end,” and wondering why Stalin had 
got rid of many intellectuals (see Cynthia’s letter to Tom [Oswald] and Zita’s diary, qtd. 
in Mosley 164). 
I suggest that Huxley’s characterization of Helen in Eyeless in Gaza, especially 
with regard to communism, might have been inspired by these intellectual and political 
women who wrote to him about their own experiences in Russia and their views of it. A 
portrait of Cynthia Mosley, who visited Russia partly to gain her independence from her 
husband, excited by a charismatic revolutionist, but who finally found herself “stuck” 
because of the realities of Russia as well as her husband (see Mosley 165), seems to fit 
with the story of Helen after separating from Anthony. Other detailed aspects of 
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Helen—such as her reading about and experiencing abortion (see EG, 359-60, Chapter 
39), later devoting herself to communism, but having a sense of discomfort when seeing 
actual revolutionists while in theory recognizing the importance of their arguments—
might have been supplemented by Naomi Mitchison. 
Although he did not lose interest in the Russian plan, Huxley always kept his eyes 
on the limits of this first state founded on Marxist socialism. What made him do this 
was, above all, the imaginative power typical of a writer, which was reinforced not only 
by the “dirt” revealed by writings about Russia or people who travelled there but also by 
the relationships with the masses that he firstly incidentally and later intentionally built 
up through his visits to their workplaces and unemployment facilities, as well as 
through his activity for the PPU. Particularly in the mid-1930s, Huxley was aggressive 
towards Russia, not because he rejected the ideals of communism or socialism—in a 
phrase, mass happiness37—but because, in a certain sense, he had a genuine 
commitment to them. Although there were many intellectuals who, recognizing the 
effectiveness of the Russian plan, doubted that the same system would work in Britain 
(see Overy 288-89), Huxley, who as early as 1931 doubted that the effects of the plan 
would continue for a long time, even in Russia, drew a line between himself and many 
of the left wing—not to mention the right wing, who originally hated socialism or 
communism. The historical fact that Huxley never visited Russia due to being busy with 
writing suggests that Russia was, for him, not attractive enough to interrupt his work; 
otherwise he would have done so because he had a taste for travelling and he was 
particularly active in those days. With the benefit of hindsight, however, his choice was 
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wise because he could spend his time and energy producing his masterpiece, Brave New 
World, and because his critique of Russia, presented in his writings up to Ends and 
Means, was no less accurate than those of many of the actual visitors, and perhaps better 
than some of them.38 
 
2.3. Huxley’s Retreat from Politics in the 1940s and 1950s 
In 1937, while writing Ends and Means, Huxley went to America with his family 
and Gerald Heard to lecture on peace, and unexpectedly spent a quarter of a century 
there, mainly in southern California. There were several reasons behind this surprising 
decision, including a financial one. At that time, Hollywood film studios hired many 
literary authors for screenwriting and other roles, and Huxley was singled out, together 
with other European exiles such as Zoltan Korda and Christopher Isherwood. Huxley 
contributed to Pride and Prejudice (1940, a collaboration), Madame Curie (1943, a 
collaboration; not credited), Jane Eyre (1944, a collaboration with John Houseman) and 
A Woman’s Vengeance (1947, based on his short story, “Gioconda Smile”).39 Opinions 
differ about whether his engagement with Hollywood was successful,40 but it must have 
been a big event in his life, not only as another example of his encounters with the 
masses but also as his first participation in mass culture, which he had mocked. In his 
essays, Huxley rarely referred to concrete social issues, including those related to 
Marxism and Russia, and even when he did so, his arguments do not seem to have gone 
beyond what he had written before.41 Since his discussion of the issues more often 
appears in his fiction, this section traces the subject in his novels. 
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A conspicuous feature of his novels, from After Many a Summer (1939) to The 
Genius and the Goddess (1955), seems to be a retreat from politics. In his first 
American novel, After Many a Summer, the story centres on Jo Stoyte, a Hollywood 
multimillionaire who is obsessed by a fear of death. His old friend, Proper, puts his idea 
of something like Jeffersonian democracy into practice42 and lives as self-sufficiently as 
possible. This mouthpiece for the author, who is described by Stoyte as a “communist 
agitator” (147), gives one of his cabins to a poor family of transients whom Stoyte 
exploits, although Propter is also well aware of the self-responsibility of those 
economically disadvantaged people, and does not seems to have strong affection for 
them (Part 1, Chapter 8). The scene that is symbolic of the author’s denial of politics (or 
“social justice”) appears in a conversation between Propter and Pete, a young scientist 
(like Illidge in Point Counter Point) who joined the Republicans as a volunteer of the 
International Brigade for the Spanish Civil War (1936-39) (see Part 1, Chapters 6 and 
9). Whereas Pete idealizes his and his friends’ activity for great causes—“fighting for 
liberty and democracy” (127)—by using such words as “friendship” and “self-
sacrifice,” Propter argues that these values are also shared by those who are fighting for 
the opposite, Fascist side, and that Pete and his friends instead should do “something 
appropriate”: “Not war, anyhow. Nor violent revolution. Nor yet politics, to any 
considerable extent” (129-31). In Propter’s view, even if it appears evasive, the 
“realistic” strategy for a breakthrough in the crisis is to start by recognizing the 
existence of “good” beyond a “human level, the level of time and craving” (see 133-38). 
The story may reflect the author’s state of mind. The Spanish Civil War had an 
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aspect of being a “dress rehearsal” for the Second World War as it drew in other nations; 
the Republicans (Popular Front) were supported by the Soviet Union, while Fascist 
rebels (led by General Francisco Franco) won with the help of Germany and Italy. As 
early as autumn 1936, Huxley revealed the PPU policy statement on this issue in a 
pamphlet called Pacifism and Civil War, appealing for non-violence: “the pacifist must 
concentrate above all on prevention”; “The pacifist will [have to] fight this battle for a 
better society by non-violent methods, by argument; [. . .] and, if necessary, by non-co-
operation” (Pacifism and Philosophy, 36; see also EM, AHCEIV, 217). After all, about 
500 renounced their peace pledge (Hetherington 11), and the war, as Huxley had feared, 
turned into a quagmire. In November 1937, the Left Review published a special booklet, 
Authors Take Sides on the Spanish War, in which Nancy Cunard openly asked famous 
British authors the following questions: “Are you for, or against, the legal Government 
and the People of Republican Spain? Are you for, or against, Franco and Fascism?”43 
Although Huxley’s reply is categorized by Cunard into the Republic camp, it sounds 
closer to the neutral one: “My sympathies are, of course, with the Government side, 
especially the Anarchists; [. . .]. As for ‘taking sides’—the choice, it seems to me, is no 
longer between two users of violence, two systems of dictatorship. [. . .] The choice now 
is between militarism and pacifism. To me, the necessity of pacifism seems absolutely 
clear.”44 His comments probably did not please his ex-lover, who would have expected 
more enthusiastic support for the Republic, like her own: “It is unthinkable for any 
honest intellectual to be pro-Fascist as it is degenerate to be for Franco, the assassins of 
the Spanish and Arab people. [. . .] His place is within the people against Fascism; his 
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duty, to protest against the present degeneration of the democracies.” While writing the 
discussion between Propter and Peter, Huxley must have considered many of his 
contemporaries who, like Cunard, justified fighting for either side by using beautiful 
and brave words; Propter’s counterargument to Peter can thus be read as Huxley’s to 
those figures. However, there still appears to be a contrast between Eyeless in Gaza—
the approach to real politics—and After Many a Summer—the retreat from real 
politics.45 
One may get an impression that Huxley’s opinion of the Spanish Civil War is 
inhumanely dogmatic, voiced from (to use Cunard’s words in the pamphlet) “the Ivory 
Tower, the paradoxical, the ironic detachment.” Yet his seemingly unsympathetic 
attitude may have been supported by a humane feeling, too. Although not a close friend 
of his, the poet Julian Bell, the son of Clive and Vanessa Bell, was killed in July 1937, 
while serving as an ambulance driver for the Republican side in Spain. Moved by the 
news of his death, Huxley wrote a letter to Clive Bell: “There is no consolation; but at 
the risk of intruding I felt that I would like to tell you how deeply we both sympathize 
with Vanessa and yourself. It’s a horrible business and confirms me in my conviction 
that there’s no alternative to pacifism” (7 August 1937, Sexton 345). Although Julian 
Bell was basically a pacifist known as the editor of We Did Not Fight: 1914-18 
Experiences of War Resisters (1935, a memoir of conscientious objectors from the Great 
War), the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War led him to feel the limits of political 
liberalism without any forces and to conclude: “to be anti-war means to submit to 
fascism, to anti-fascist means to be prepared for war” (Bell, “War and Peace: A Letter to 
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E. M. Forster,” JB, 373). In fact, Bell, who had been a good reader of Huxley,46 came to 
criticize the absolute pacifist Huxley as “slightly mad” because he believed: “there’s no 
longer any real hope of peace, national or international, but only a choice between 
fighting and surrender” (letter to Jane Simone Bussy, 22 October 1936, Bell JB, 165; 
see also “WP,” JB 361). What made Bell ignore his parents’ oppositions and head for 
Spain was causes, again, such as “military virtues” and friendship (see Bell “WP,” JB, 
380-87; see also Stansky 229, 248). Propter’s debate with Pete is, in a sense, Huxley’s 
posthumous debate with Bell, in which Huxley, while listening to the claim of a 
vigorous young man, persistently tries to impress upon him the significance of non-
violence. Therefore Huxley’s dogmatic pacifism in After Many a Summer was not the 
result of an intellectual’s selfish escape into “the Ivory Tower” but of his anger at the 
war, which took the precious life of a man of great promise, and perhaps his anger at 
himself, who could not prevent it despite his campaign for peace.47 
As time passed, Huxley’s distance from practical politics, as well as his 
disappointment at the situation of the world, seems to have become more conspicuous. 
During the Second World War, Huxley wrote the next novel, Time Must Have a Stop 
(1944). The protagonist, Sebastian Barnack, is a poet mainly modelled on Huxley, 
though this character belongs to the generation of the author’s son. Sebastian is 
originally a sensitive boy who is, for example, moved by imagining mass unhappiness 
in the world (see 2-3) and who, having been born into the upper-middle class, feels “the 
shame and discomfort” on seeing “the poor” (156). At the same time, he leads a selfish 
life, prompted by his beauty and cleverness, bringing others into difficulty. In the end, 
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however, he decides to live according to the teaching of Bruno Rontini, a second hand 
bookseller who has been inconspicuously but consistently engaged with spreading his 
mystic and pacifist ideas by selling relevant books and teaching such ideas to his pupils. 
With the help of Bruno, Sebastian—now thirty-two years of age—perceives not only 
“the Ground,” which is “transcendent and immanent” and in which human beings can 
“love, know and, from virtually, to become actually identified with the Ground” itself, 
but also that “to achieve this unitive knowledge, to realize this supreme identity, is the 
final end and purpose of human existence” (248). Since the worship of time demands 
“human sacrifice”—as shown by the religions and politics that have justified violence 
by idealizing “either past time, in the form of a rigid tradition, or future time, in the 
form of Progress towards Utopia”—we should pay attention to “eternity,” where the 
Ground exists (250-51). 
Although in these points Time Must Have a Stop is similar to another 
Bildungsroman Eyeless in Gaza, the former is much more pessimistic in terms of the 
effect of practical politics or the feasibility of social improvement. Bruno is equivalent 
to Miller in thinking that the first task is to improve ourselves (71), but unlike Miller, he 
is acutely aware of how difficult it is for everyone to do this, suggesting that it is almost 
impossible to improve this world in the end (see 87, 89, 92).48 Huxley’s previous self-
portrait, Anthony, joins the pacifist campaign, prepared to die, by resisting the 
temptation of “going back to doing what nature meant you to do—to looking on from 
your private box and making comments” (see EG, 496). On the other hand, his new 
self-portrait, Sebastian, is now advised by his guru to concentrate upon the 
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improvement of himself, instead of wishing that “he could undertake some heroic 
course of action” or of “try[ing] to act somebody else’s part” like Joan of Arc or 
Florence Nightingale (242). Here, we cannot help imagining that the author tried to 
justify himself, who no longer belonged to a political movement.49 His deep interest in 
religion, as reflected in this novel, was also the subject of the book published in the 
following year, The Perennial Philosophy (1945), in which he cites numerous examples 
of what religious leaders have argued, and encourages readers to recognize the 
significance of going out of the self and becoming one with other beings through 
something like the eternal ground. 
It seems that Huxley’s despair reached a peak in his next novel, Ape and Essence 
(1948), which definitely mirrored his own psychology at the beginning of the Cold War. 
Although he had already pointed out the danger of abusing science and technology in 
Science, Liberty and Peace (1946), Huxley more dramatically fictionalized this fear in 
the tale, which begins with two Americans who talk about the desperate situation of the 
world as symbolized by the assassin of Gandhi, and who incidentally discover a rejected 
script by Tallis, a minor writer who just died a few months previously. The script, 
entitled Ape and Essence, is set in America in A.D. 2108, which is devastated by nuclear 
war and where New Zealand explorers, including the main character Dr Alfred Poole, a 
botanist, encounter the inhabitants who have degenerated like apes due to the effects of 
radioactivity. The people of this “entirely new race” do not worship God but rather the 
Devil, who they believe has hammered two absurd notions of “Progress and 
Nationalism” into the human mind, directing them consistently “to courses of action 
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that are demonstrably fatal,” such as environmental destruction, the First World War, the 
Communist Revolution, Fascism and the Nazi holocaust (92-99). Tallis’s script or 
Huxley’s story ends with the escape of Poole and his new lover Loola from the 
dystopia, heading for another community beyond the desert.50 In contrast to Brave New 
World, Huxley gives signs of hope for his main characters, but in another sense this 
ending—namely, two characters escape from this society instead of improving it—
suggests the author’s escapist attitude towards contemporary realities. The attempt to 
replace world issues with a private problem of lovers may be shared by his next novel, 
The Genius and the Goddess (1955), which mainly describes an assistant who lives with 
a Nobel Prize physicist and who has an affair with his wife, who has a healing power 
like a goddess. Inspired by Humphry Osmond, Huxley took mescaline from 1952, and 
recorded his psychedelic experience in The Doors of Perception (1954) and Heaven and 
Hell (1956), although his interest in the world of drugs has been repeatedly mentioned 
as a token of his “escapism.”51 
While his engagement with the mass culture in Hollywood was reflected in some 
styles or structures of his novels such as After Many a Summer and Ape and Essence, it 
seems to have had little influence on the core of Huxley, including his relationship with 
the masses—judging from his writing discussed above. It would not be unfair to note 
that the beginning of his period in America was soon followed by his setbacks in the 
pacifist campaign and later by his disappointment in practical politics in general, which 
became deeper and deeper, finally turning his face away from realities on the whole. In 
the 1920s, the elitist Huxley felt a gap in his relationship with the masses, while in the 
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1950s, the escapist Huxley finally appears to have lost the relationship itself. As a result, 
the significant questions are: did Huxley end his life without productive changes in his 
attitudes towards the masses, and are there any theoretical bases in common between 
Huxley and Marxism? 
 
2.4. Huxley’s First and Last Eutopia 
Huxley’s first attempt to write something like a positive utopia or eutopia can be 
found in a letter to Harold Raymond, dated as early as October 1940 (see Smith 460). 
Here, Huxley confesses that he has “abandoned the utopian plan for the time being—it 
didn’t work out satisfactory, for some reason,” and that he has turned instead to a 
biography of Father Joseph, who Huxley thinks was responsible for the contemporary 
dystopian world; the book appeared in the following year with the title of Grey 
Eminence.52 Although his desire to write an eutopian novel remained somewhere in the 
back of his mind, he postponed this project for as long as twenty years—while 
producing fictional works of the seemingly opposite type—until he finally embarked 
upon his last and only eutopian novel, Island (1962).53 Thus, this tale must have 
reflected those twenty years of his life, as well as of the world situation—from genocide 
during the Second World War, the appearances of Mao Zedong’s China and other 
communist countries, McCarthyism, independence movements in various regions of the 
world, the threat of atomic and hydrogen bombs, and the destruction of the environment 
on a global scale. 
At first sight, Huxley’s eutopia, Pala in the Indian Ocean, appears to be anti-
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Marxist. The people of this island are certainly said to want neither “the Communists” 
nor “the Capitalists,” rejecting “the wholesale industrialization that both parties are so 
anxious to impose on” them (109).54 However, there is some affinity between Pala and 
Marxism.55 Theoretically, the basis of Palanese systems was devised by two reformers’ 
skilful combination of “Buddhist ethics and primitive village communism” (see 89). 
Palanese people are thus not “capitalists or state socialists” but “co-operators” who have 
been working for “[human] decency, reason and liberty” (see 145-47). To solve 
economic issues, Pala has figured out several ways of avoiding “being over-populated” 
and “the temptation to over-consume,” and of adopting an “economic system” that 
“doesn’t permit anybody to become more than four or five times as rich as the average” 
(145-46). Unlike other “undeveloped countries,” Palanese people have “always chosen 
to adapt our [their] economy and technology to human beings,” only importing what is 
not inconsistent with their “wish to be happy” and their “ambition to become fully 
human” (140-41). They have welcomed, for example, some electric equipment but not 
“motor scooters” (141, 145, see also 130). 
Huxley’s suspicion of economic liberalism and globalization is represented by the 
fact that he makes the faction of their supporters take the role of the villain in the story. 
For years, petroleum companies overseas have been trying to acquire oil resources in 
Pala (see 26, 45). Colonel Dipa, the military dictator of Rendang-Lobo—a neighbouring 
country that has industrialized itself by sacrificing the poor in slums (see 80-81)—plants 
the lure of “modern consumerism” in Murugan, the young Raja of Pala, by giving him 
“Sears, Roebuck and Co., Spring and Summer Catalog” (133). Just as “[Franklin D.] 
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Roosevelt is said to have advocated free distribution of S-R catalogues in Communist 
countries, to convert the inhabitants” to “Consumerism” (Huxley’s letter to Ian Parsons, 
16 January 1962, Smith 928), Dipa plays the role of a serpent before Murugan in the 
Eden, directing his eyes to “the Tree of Consumer Goods” (I, 134). Murugan is now 
seriously planning to “get this place modernized” by using “oil royalties,” and this idea 
is also endorsed by his mother the Rani, who cunningly hopes to allot some of the 
proceeds to “the Crusade for the Spirit,” her own fanatic movement for “World 
Reconstruction” (44-46).56 
In a different way from Brave New World, Huxley imagines Pala as a pure eutopia 
for the masses which is “so perfectly designed to make every man, woman and child on 
this enchanting island as perfectly free and happy as it’s possible to be” (I, 58; see also 
185, 202). Unlike his previous work, the author tries to describe each character of 
ordinary people as an individual who has human appeal. The word “masses” may thus 
not necessarily be suitable for these characters, each of whom has a personal name, in 
contrast to the masses in his essays about “Alien Englands.” The visitor to this island, 
Will Farnaby—a solitary journalist who is an “ex-imperialist” from an “[u]pper class” 
(20) and who is suggestive of the author—comes to hope to live there as long as 
possible, profoundly attracted not so much to the system of Pala as to the individuals 
living there: “the more I see of you people the better I like you. I want to find out more 
about you. And in the process, [. . .] I might find out some interesting things about 
myself” (111; see also 191). Especially with the guidance of Susila, a “dark little” 
woman (see 98), Will eventually grows into a full-blown human being. This clearly 
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opposes the author’s previous elitist view of human improvement, in which he tacitly 
assumed that it would be imposed by intellectuals, Europeans and men, upon ‘inferior’ 
groups of people, such as the masses, non-Europeans and women. 
It is no longer difficult to associate Huxley’s empathic attitude with his 
encounters with the masses from the early 1930s. Certainly, Pala is composed of the 
elements necessary for ideal society—which probably came to Huxley during and after 
his visits to “Alien Englands”—such as the guarantee of worthwhile work (not 
drudgery), the abolition of disparities in income, the treatment of everyone as a human 
being and, last but not least, a communistic but self-governing system that develops 
human potentialities.57 The absolute pacifism was also a reflection of the author’s own 
experiences of a pacifist movement, in which he realized that war is none other than 
massive exploitation of the workers by their nations’ rulers (see EM, AHCEIV, 188). 
Needless to say, this text, the final point of Huxley’s intellectual development, 
relates to all the texts that have been mentioned so far in this chapter. Regarding politics 
and economics, Huxley again owes much to Proudhon and Jefferson,58 while a religious 
facet of this eutopia seems to be influenced by his interest in Oriental religious 
philosophy, especially the ideas of Vedanta, Jiddu Krishnamurti and Taoism, which are 
often cited in studies about Huxley’s later career.59 However, it is also worth 
considering D. T. Suzuki, a Japanese Buddhist scholar who contributed to the spread of 
Zen in the Western world but whose ideas have not received, in Huxley studies, as much 
deliberation as the ideas of Indian and Chinese philosophers.60 
In fact, Huxley referred to Suzuki more than ten times in his letters from 1940 to 
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1961, particularly from 1949 to 1957, which reveal that he read at least six works 
written by Suzuki: Studies in the Lankavatara Sutra (1930), Essays in Zen Buddhism 
(1927-34), The Manual of Zen Buddhism (1935), The Essence of Buddhism (1947), The 
Zen Doctrine of No-Mind (1949) and Mysticism, Christian and Buddhism (1957).61 
Their personal relationship seems to have begun in May 1949, when Huxley received a 
letter from “Dr D. T. Suzuki, the well-known Japanese scholar who is the leading 
authority in the field of Mahayana Buddhism,” in which Suzuki told about “a friend 
who wd like to translate The Perennial Philosophy” (Huxley’s letter to Harold 
Raymond, 8 May 1949, Smith 597). This friend was actually Shosaku Fukazawa and his 
Japanese translation was successfully published in 1951 under the title of Kuon no 
Shinri (久遠の真理), which means “the eternal truth.”62 Suzuki himself wrote the 
preface to this book, confessing the feeling that there was a strange turn of fate because 
more than sixty years before he had read T. H. Huxley to learn English and now his 
grandchild, Aldous Huxley, was interested in Eastern ideas, paying close attention to 
Suzuki’s work (SDZ35, 47-48). Suzuki’s preface ends with the mention of a two-way 
exchange between the East and the West, as well as a strange combination of religion 
and science, both of which are embodied or symbolized by this newly translated book 
and the original author: “Because Mr. Aldous Huxley appeared in the same family [as T. 
H. Huxley and Julian Huxley], I firmly believe that even scientists are necessarily 
drawn into Eastern ideas because of something at the bottom of their heart. It would 
also be the trend of times that we in the East are given an opportunity to reflect on 
ourselves by the writing of a person in the West” (50). According to Suzuki’s diaries 
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and Huxley’s letters, they met together at least five times: 20 February 1950, 12 
December 1951, 24 January 1952, 2 September 1954 and 18 May 1957.63 Huxley 
appreciated not only Suzuki’s knowledge but also his character, and his admiration for 
Suzuki was more enthusiastic than the other way round.64 
Especially with regard to Island, Suzuki is important because he was a Buddhist 
scholar, as well as a ‘socialist’ and pacifist. In a word, like Huxley, Suzuki was an 
intellectual who dreamed of a new world where the Eastern religion could coexist with 
Western political values. As early as the beginning of the twentieth century, in a letter 
(14 January 1901), Suzuki expressed his sympathy with democratic socialism, which 
was “not based on economics but religion” (SDZ36, 206).65 Furthermore, after the 
Second World War, he also applauded the renunciation of war, stipulated in the new 
Constitution of Japan, believing it represented a contribution to world peace.66 
Traditionally, Buddhism and socialism have not been considered compatible. Marx 
himself was critical of religion in general even though he was culturally affected by 
Christianity. Under the influence of Arthur Schopenhauer, Marx was not free from the 
stereotyped view of Buddhism as an example of pessimism or escapism (see Lenoir 
118). Overturning this, Suzuki joined Buddhist, socialist and pacifist ethics into one 
philosophy. It is not so surprising that Huxley’s idea of a Buddhist, communist and 
pacifist eutopia was partly inspired by his conversation with “dear old” Suzuki, whom 
he consistently respected in the 1950s. Above all, Huxley’s encounter with Suzuki may 
remind one of the fateful encounter between the two reformers of modern Pala, that is, 
the British doctor Andrew MacPhail and its Raja, a Mahayana Buddhist: “what a 
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strangely assorted pair! But a pair, very soon, of firm friends” (128). In his 
characterization of them, Huxley might have viewed himself as Andrew, and the “little 
old Japanese” Suzuki as the Old Raja of another Asian island.67 
Therefore, Island is actually not only a social, political text but also has an 
autobiographical aspect in that it reflects his later life, particularly his relationships with 
the masses and the intellectuals who have sympathy with the masses. This point cannot 
be fully understood until we realize the utmost important fact that, in his final novel, the 
author has returned to the issue that he presented in his first piece of fiction, “Farcical 
History of Richard Greenow.” In some aspects, Island is a rewrite of “Richard 
Greenow.” 
As Chapter I discussed, Dick, a lonely intellectual with a split personality, dislikes 
the masses (see 77-80), and one day he is seized with a strong hatred and fear when he 
sees a crowd of people in city streets: 
“There were three hours to wait [for a train] in Glasgow; he spent them in 
wandering about the streets. In the interminable summer twilight the 
inhabitants of Glasgow came forth into the open to amuse themselves; the 
sight almost made him sick. Was it possible that there should be human 
beings so numerous and so uniformly hideous? Small, deformed, sallow, 
they seemed malignantly ugly, as if on purpose. The words they spoke were 
incomprehensible. He shuddered; it was an alien place—it was hell” 
(Limbo, 54). 
In the end, Dick cannot fill the gap between himself and others, and dies with his 
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unrewarded hope to have something like a sense of togetherness (see 109). Dick is 
modelled after the young Huxley himself, but is also a reflection of human beings, 
especially of contemporaries who have faced the Great War as a result of the 
unsuccessful repression of their inherently violent dispositions.68 
Forty years after this debut work of fiction, Huxley devised a similar character 
called Will, who also has a “schizoid” tendency (65) and no “compassion” for others, 
finding “pointlessness” in his life and the world (100, 103, see also 190). Dick’s 
traumatic scene above is reconstructed in Will’s recollection of his horrible feeling on 
seeing a crowd of people: 
“[. . .] The first time it happened I was waiting for a bus to take me home 
from Fleet Street. Thousands upon thousands of people, all on the move, 
and each of them unique, each of them the centre of the universe. Then the 
sun came out from behind a cloud. Everything was extraordinarily bright 
and clear; and suddenly, with an almost audible click, they were all 
maggots.” 
“Maggots?” 
“You know, those little pale worms with black heads that one sees on 
rotten meat. Nothing had changed, of course; people’s faces were the same, 
their clothes were the same. And yet they were all maggots. Not even real 
maggots—just the ghosts of maggots, just the illusion of maggots. And I 
was the illusion of a spectator of maggots. I lived in that maggot-world for 
months. [. . .]” (99-100; see also 101) 
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However, this time Huxley prepares a destiny for Will that contrasts that of Dick. While 
living in Pala, Will experiences significant events—from learning the history of Pala to 
talking with the inhabitants to attending the deathbed of Lakshmi, Robert’s wife—all of 
which lead him to reflect on his past, understand the meanings of his life and the world, 
and “passionately” wish to join these “good” people (191). As a result of Susila’s 
counselling, his meditation and taking Moksha (a psychedelic drug), Will can see the 
real states of himself and of the world, where all creatures and things are one before 
“the divine unity” and for which he cannot find any other words to express than “love.” 
Will has “finally recognized” other people’s “existence,” no longer having visions of 
maggot ghosts, and even thanked himself for being now among other people and 
creatures (279-83). Here again, the story of Will, who has had little respect for others 
and been attracted to death like a hyena, is a metaphor of the history of human beings, 
who have left society intolerant towards each other, as exemplified by poverty and war 
(see 274-75). However, unlike “Richard Greenow,” the author now directs the readers’ 
“attention” to another message, namely that human beings can overcome terrible 
realities, as Will can do: [in Robert’s words] “We don’t despair [. . .] because things 
don’t necessarily have to be as bad as in fact they’ve always been” (117).69 
The above interpretation also suggests that the controversial facet of Huxley’s 
later career, i.e., his acute interest in religions and drugs, had a positive effect on his 
relationship with the masses. These two approaches were not so much for his escape 
from others but for his attempt to remove the distinction between himself and others. At 
first, Huxley tried to do so by following great figures of religions, through something 
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like emancipation, that is, freeing himself from the self (or personality) and attaining 
oneness with the divine and other beings, as he recommended in The Perennial 
Philosophy (see e.g., Chapter 3). Although studying or meditating on this was 
egalitarian in the sense that it did not depend on a person’s wealth or poverty, it was 
certainly not easy to achieve emancipation for many people, including Huxley. In due 
course, his eyes were directed towards drugs as another measure that could expand the 
human mind and that, unlike the first one, was not a technique limited to experienced 
sages. In fact, as a result of repeated experiments with LSD and psilocybin70—which he 
often made with other people of various backgrounds—Huxley confessed in a letter: “I 
have known that sense of affectionate solidarity with the people around me and with the 
universe at large—also the sense of the world’s fundamental all-rightness, in spite of 
pain, death and bereavement” (“Notes on LSD and Mescaline,” qtd. in Borgonovi 73). 
Although this method has been attacked by many, it worked positively for Huxley. The 
effect can be seen, for example, in his warm descriptions of ordinary people in Island 
and many of his arguments in a series of lectures in 1959 at the University of California, 
Santa Barbara, in which he stresses the importance of universal education, criticizes 
power politics that has been responsible for the poverty of two-thirds of human beings, 
and advocates a sustainable society with no threat of technology or over-
industrialization for the sake of the Earth’s future inhabitants (see The Human Situation 
[1977, posthumously published], especially Chapters 1 to 3 and 6).71 
When it comes to Huxley’s impact on mass culture, the eutopian elements of 
Island have not received due attention, compared with the ambiguously utopian images 
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of the future in Brave New World (e.g., a regimented society, a test-tube baby, 
conditioning and hypnopaedia) and the eschatological components of the post-nuclear-
war world in Ape and Essence.72 As regards the counterculture centred in America from 
the 1960s, it is worthwhile to note what Huxley observed and made famous through his 
efforts to realize an eutopian unity with others—a Buddhist worldview, ecological 
arguments, the expansion of consciousness by use of psychedelics, etc.73 In recent 
Marxist theories, beyond Theodor W. Adorno’s theory of the “Culture Industry,” more 
attention has been directed to the political significance of popular cultures particularly 
as a reflection of contemporary people’s eutopian hopes for ties with others and for the 
improvement of unfair and unequal situations (see e.g., Fredric Jameson, “Reification 
and Utopia in Mass Culture” [1979]).74 Indeed, counterculture was political and 
eutopian in that it tried to reconsider and transcend the realities that earlier generations 
have established. This cultural phenomenon appeared internationally in various ways, 
from an individual experience of alternate experiences using drugs to student 
movements that sought both self-government and world peace—e.g., the campaign 
against the Vietnam War. One may see that Huxley’s spirit, bolstered by a compassion 
for the masses that he attained in the 1930s, was transmitted, even if it was incomplete 
and distorted, to this youth culture and to popular culture of our time. 
 
3. A Marxist Analysis of Huxley’s Idea of Utopia 
3.1. Marxism, Utopia and Totality 
In contrast to the historical approach above, let us move on to a theoretical review 
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of Huxley’s later work, particularly his idea of utopia, which came to the front in his last 
fiction. To begin with, how should we think of a relationship between Marxist theories 
and utopia? In Marxism, utopia has been a problematic and controversial concept. As is 
well known, Marx and Friedrich Engels did not necessarily like the term “utopian,” 
attacking the plans of their forerunner socialists (such as Henri de Saint-Simon, Charles 
Fourier and Robert Owen) with the phrase “utopian socialism,” as opposed to their 
practical ones, namely “scientific socialism” (see e.g., Engels, Socialism: Utopian and 
Scientific [1880]). However it can be said that, in terms of dreaming of social 
improvement, they were also “utopian,” and that utopian imagination played a key role 
behind their practical planning, too.75 There has been an unremitting controversy on 
utopia with regard to Marxism, and some critics, such as William Morris, Karl 
Mannheim and Ernst Bloch, were especially drawn to the notion.76 In Marxist criticism 
today, no one is more enthusiastic than Fredric Jameson in arguing for the importance of 
utopia. 
According to his Archaeologies of the Future: The Desire Called Utopia and 
Other Science Fictions (2005)—definitely one of the most influential in recent criticism 
of the present theme—utopia functions as a “disruption [Beunruhigung] of the present” 
to which we are bound (228), and “aims at imagining, and sometimes even at realizing, 
a system [in the future] radically different from this one” (xii). With this logic, one 
might argue that, paradoxically, the “increasing inability [of us today] to imagine a 
different future enhances rather than diminishes the appeal and also the function of 
Utopia” (232).77 Jameson’s own utopia is, of course, a Marxist one; his analysis in 
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Archaeologies of the Future is consistently underlined by his own search for an 
alternative society beyond capitalism (see e.g., xvi, 229-31). Furthermore, Jameson 
even indicates that utopias in general have to be Marxist, by drawing our attention to, 
for example, the fact that we cannot still imagine a future utopia without relying on such 
ideals as “the values of social and economic equality and the universal right to food, 
lodging, medicine, education and work” (196-97).78 
The unpopularity of utopia today is relevant to that of the notion of totality today. 
More concretely and plainly, the most perplexing question to us in forming a utopia is 
how to secure the inhabitants liberty there while also giving them a sense of 
togetherness. In general, totality has been used in two ways. The first is normative, in 
that it sets totality as a desirable goal that cannot be achieved under the present 
conditions. The second use is descriptive, based on a methodological belief that the 
concept of totality is effective in analysing a society whose constituent parts, as 
independent and unrelated as they appear, are inextricable elements of a larger whole 
(see Jay 23-24). 
It is widely accepted that the idea of totality has occupied a special place in the 
discourses of Western culture, and this is especially true of the lexicon of all Western 
Marxists (see Jay 12, 21).79 It was G. W. F. Hegel who most greatly contributed to 
Marxism by presenting a profound and multi-dimensional version of holism. Identifying 
totality with “good infinity,” Hegel reinforced a longitudinal aspect of totality, grasping 
history with a circular image of time. On the other hand, his attention to a latitudinal 
aspect of totality led Hegel to subscribe to the idea that lesser or partial totalities exist 
241 
 
on all levels of the meta-totality. As all of the pieces of the meta-totality were united in 
their root (as something emanated from the “Absolute Spirit”), the individual cannot 
achieve personal totalization outside of the context of global totalization (see Jay 59).80 
While confronting and assimilating some parts of Hegel’s vision, Marx moulded a 
holistic thinking—affirmatively using words such as “totality” and “the whole”—and 
associated totality with history, believing that history should be viewed descriptively as 
a totality and normatively as promising a totalization (see Jay 61-63). 
Nevertheless, even on the left, there has recently been “a general move away from 
the totalistic emphasis that marked the earlier Anglo-American reception of continental 
Marxism” (Jay 513). Two factors are involved in this matter.81 The first one is political: 
though not so surprisingly, the association of totality with totalitarianism is shared even 
by some Marxist critics and those with some sympathy with Marxism.82 The second 
factor is theoretical but is related to the first one. In modernist to postmodernist 
contexts, Marxism has lost its popularity, charged by poststructuralist critiques with its 
tendency of reductionism, i.e., the eradication of difference and heterogeneity for some 
unifying system. In general, poststructuralism rejects every conceivable form of totality, 
such as textual, subjective, synchronic and diachronic. For instance, Marxism with 
totalizing thought regards reality as ultimately an intelligible whole, whilst 
poststructuralism, which not only describes but also celebrates discontinuity and 
difference, bases itself on the sceptical, relativist and nihilist view that all texts are 
constituted of fragments and particulars, which cannot be reduced into any larger 
whole.83 However, such a “rejection of totality is inevitably accompanied by a rejection 
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of ‘meaning’ itself. If meaning is context-bound, and there is no identifiable whole 
which can serve as the context, then there can be no ‘meaning’ (a very under-theorized 
term), only endless permutations of signifying chains which cannot be stabilized with 
artificial totalizing schemes” (Best 338).84 
Against these currencies, Jameson is a rare theorist today who attempts to revive 
the concept of totality.85 In The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic 
Act (1981), Jameson presents, by taking a hint from the Althusserian notion of History 
or the Real as an “absent cause,” a paradoxical vision of totality as that which is the real 
but is “not available for representation, any more than it is accessible in the form of 
some ultimate truth” (55). According to him, history is an intelligible and meaningful 
whole that can be grasped in its totality by a single “narrative” which functions in the 
process of “transcoding” as the “mediation” between apparent separate phenomena and 
the real totality underlying them (see 40). In other words, for Jameson, history is a route 
towards emancipation, totality and utopia, and this “single great collective story,” which 
reflects the “political unconscious,” can be well interpreted only by a particular 
narrative (19). As well as diachronically, Jameson also employs narrative synchronically 
so that “we can restore, at least methodologically, the lost unity of social life, and 
demonstrate that widely distant elements of the social totality are ultimately part of the 
same global historical process” (226). However, since totalizing thinking is never free 
from the potential danger of overemphasizing systems or reducing complexity, the 
problem here is whether it is possible to devise an open totality, which is contingent, in 
process, and composed of differences, instead of a closed totality, which is 
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predetermined and finalized. By absorbing the poststructuralist critique of totality, 
Jameson has thus been paradoxically groping for a non-reductionist and non-essentialist 
version of totality that endures poststructuralist attack.86 
One of the reasons why Jameson defends totality so firmly is that, in his opinion, 
this concept plays a decisive role in relation to utopia, another object of his defence. 
Firstly, descriptive totality is the basis of “Utopian thinking” in that, once society is 
viewed from the perspective of totality, the necessity and content of an alternative plan 
come out spontaneously (see ST, 69-70).87 Secondly, and more importantly, normative 
totality is a necessary requirement for “the Utopian program” (see AF, 4-5). The 
question of what sort of utopia is to be realized is, after all, the question of what sort of 
totality is to be realized.88 
In his discussion of utopia, Jameson has addressed the issue of totality in a 
complex way, considering questions about how we should deal with anti-utopian fears, 
including those of totalitarianism and imperialism (AF, Part 1, Chapter 12), as well as 
how we can make a utopia with liberty, brushing away those fears, which can be traced 
back to “closure,” the formal condition of utopia (Chapter 13). While rejecting two 
contrasting tides typical of today—globalization (from commercialism to the Internet) 
and localism (political movements based on ethnicity)—Jameson shows a more positive 
interest in what can be called “federalism” (224), inspired by Robert Nozick’s pluralist 
notion of utopia as that which “consist[s] of utopias, of many different and divergent 
communities in which people lead different kinds of lives under different institutions” 
(217), as well as Yona Friedman’s proposal for a multiplicity of utopian communities, in 
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which “Utopias are not combined by way of the political [such as a world state] but 
related by the infrastructure, that is to say, by way of the globe itself and its materiality” 
(218-19).89 
The thinking of utopia can also be associated with his long-time theme of 
antinomies. In The Seeds of Time (1994), Jameson addresses the antinomies of the 
postmodern and deconstructs some of them in a postmodern way. For instance, he 
subverts the opposition of utopia and dystopia by insisting that “the most powerful 
arguments against Utopia are in reality Utopian ones, expressions of a Utopian impulse 
qui s’ignore” (54). In Archaeologies of the Future, Jameson also directs acute attention 
to antinomies incorporated in utopia (Chapter 10)90 and proceeds with his discussion 
about how to deal with these dilemmas (Chapter 11). With reference to Louis Marin’s 
classic Utopiques (1973), he argues that “neutralization can be grasped as production, 
rather than as simple cancellation or effacement” (41), and that the antimonies must be 
“retained and sharpened, made more virulent, their incompatibility and indeed their 
incommensurability a scandal for the mind, but a scandal that remains vivid and alive, 
and that cannot be thought away, either by resolving it or eliminating it” (180). 
 
3.2. Huxley’s Ideas of Utopia and Totality  
Does the history of Marxist struggles with utopia and totality not offer any 
suggestions as to understanding Huxley’s road to presenting his eutopia? He himself 
was originally sceptical about utopian thinking, preferring satirical writing in despair at 
this world (see e.g., the last scene of Point Counter Point, which suggests the “Kingdom 
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of Heaven” is only allowed for hypocrites and fools), and later engaged in producing the 
ambiguously utopian Brave New World and the nightmarish Ape and Essence. Despite 
his utopian impulse, Huxley was so cautious in turning it into a utopian program that he 
waited about twenty years until Island. I would argue that the main theoretical reason 
for this difficulty was that he had to face the issue of utopia and totality. 
Certainly, the concept of totality does not appear to fit well with the significant 
aspects of Huxley, which my study has thus far disclosed in the previous three chapters. 
His deconstruction of categories of identity, such as the psychological self (Chapter I), 
the feminine (Chapter II) and the savage/the civilized (Chapter III)—probably together 
with his empathy with solitary characters as well as his emphasis on the divided 
condition of this world or society (e.g., in Point Counter Point)—may seem to 
anticipate a postmodernist critique’s dislike of descriptive totality. On the other hand, 
his satire on imperialism and totalitarianism (particularly in Brave New World) must put 
the author on the same line with many critics wary of normative totality. 
In fact, Eyeless in Gaza is a story of the author’s journey to not only utopian 
thinking but also a belief of totality. Anthony, or Huxley, has “live[d] irresponsibly” and 
enjoyed “liberty” (to “read his books,” “exercise his talents for sarcastic comment” and 
“sleep with any presentable woman”) by regarding himself, this world and history as 
“all nonsense or a joke” which is composed of fragmentary pieces without any form of 
totality (500-501; see also Chapters 11 and 26). Finally, his reflection of his life, as well 
as his activity with the masses, as mentioned before, brings him a conversion by which 
he becomes aware of “the totality of life and being,” which endorses “some 
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significance” to his life, the world and history: “And now at last it was clear, now by 
some kind of immediate experience he knew that the point was in the paradox, in the 
fact that unity was the beginning and unity the end, and that in the meantime the 
condition of life and all existence was separation” (501). In a descriptive sense, there is 
the “reality” of chronological and synchronic totality, in which everything is physically 
or mentally related to each other; but there is also a “reality of division” (497-99), which 
makes our “achievement” of totality in a normative sense “impossible” (see 501). For 
Huxley, pacifism is a utopian struggle for a normative totality, based on the reality of 
descriptive totality. 
Huxley’s vision of totality is also reflected in the form of Eyeless in Gaza. For 
instance, the unchronological chapters seem incoherent at first glance, suggesting a 
fragmentary nature of the history of this world, but the above vision of totality leads to a 
discovery that the chapters are put in order, arranged by the author’s narrative.91 By 
making us reconstruct the story ourselves, Huxley uniquely lets us realize the fact that 
history is a meaningful story of phenomena, each of which is ultimately managed 
behind totality.92 
Although it seems that Huxley thereafter maintained the same sort of view of 
totality,93 the question remained unresolved as to how to achieve totality in a utopian 
program without anti-utopian fears such as that of totalitarianism. A result of his 
speculation on this issue can be found in his last novel, Island. As symbolized by the 
encounter of a British doctor and a Palanese Buddhist, as well as their and the citizens’ 
efforts to “make the best of all the worlds” to establish and keep a culturally hybrid 
247 
 
utopia (128-29; see also 220-21), this novel thematizes utopia, totality and antinomies.94 
It may be argued that Palanese totalizing thinking (a vision of descriptive totality) 
has contributed to their successful management of Pala as a place that is closest to a 
normative totality. Huxley’s utopia is a classless, pacifist and communitarian society 
where both economy and technology serve each person, unlike capitalist and state 
socialist countries outside (see 140-41). In Pala, totality is supported by the utopian 
attempt at neutralization or a rearrangement of antinomies: (in the Old Raja’s words) 
“All things, to all things / perfectly indifferent, / perfectly work together / in discord for 
a Good beyond” (30); “the reconciliation of yes and no lived out in total acceptance and 
the blessed experience of Not-Two” (38). The antinomies addressed in Pala contain 
those typical of utopia (as mentioned by Jameson) such as work and leisure (see I, 143-
43), religion and science (see 178, 212, 220), and optimism and pessimism (see 117, 
221); but it also questions or redefines many other antinomies, including those related to 
personal identity—e.g., self and other (see 34, 68, 76), man and woman (see 89, 96), 
and white and nonwhite (see 20).95 Only while taking Moksha or practising polished 
meditation, can all of these antinomies be perfectly neutralized or reconciled in a 
temporary utopia (see Chapter 15). In other words, even in the earthly paradise of Pala, 
the inhabitants usually need to make their own efforts to accomplish this paradoxically 
impossible mission, while trying to bring out the merit of each party of an antinomy, 
instead of eradicating one party (see 165).96 
Education has the important function of bringing the Palanese to the above way of 
thinking and lifestyle. Although originally “dualists” (88), children are trained at school 
248 
 
to view themselves, the world and history in an all-round manner through “the best-of-
both worlds programme” (221), which covers various subjects from science to religion, 
but which always begins with “ecology” because of their educational policy: “Never 
give children a chance of imagining that anything exists in isolation. Make it plain from 
the very first that all living is relationship”;97 “we always teach the science of 
relationship in conjunction with the ethics of relationship” (211). 
Meanwhile, this utopia with totality also figures out several ways to save 
individual liberty and differences from the threat of totalitarianism or reductionism. 
Politically, Pala is “a federation of self-governing units, geographical units, professional 
units, economic units—so there’s plenty of scope for small-scale initiative and 
democratic leaders, but no place for any kind of dictator at the head of a centralized 
government” (146). In terms of the family system, Pala is a pluralist and changing 
utopia: everyone belongs to a Mutual Adoption Club (MAC) but is “allowed, is actively 
encouraged [. . .] to migrate to one of its other homes” and to bring “hybridization” to 
each club by repeated “adoption” (90-91). This can also serve as a measure against 
other anti-utopian fears, such as those of the repressiveness of the family system and the 
static or boring life of utopia (see Jameson AF, 184-188, 190-91, 206-10).98 
How do we interpret the ending of Pala and Island? Pala is an enclave and has 
kept its totality or closure, partly thanks to geographical advantages, but it is eventually 
destroyed before spreading or totalizing its own virtues by the invasion of late 
capitalism or globalization, which may be called an evil form of totalization. Although 
the last scene may be read as implying “the sad fate of Huxley’s Island” (see Jameson 
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AF, 5)—as if to suggest the author’s eventual despair of utopian thinking and totality—I 
see it as the contrary. Huxley ends his narrative with the word “Attention,” after 
implicatively remarking: “The work of a hundred years destroyed in a single night. And 
yet the fact remained” (285-86). Yes, the fact remains that Pala really existed and 
Huxley narrated his utopia. By sacrificing itself, Pala tries to turn people’s “attention” to 
a normative totality, and this is the pacifist way of movement towards totalization, not 
an imperial way of it, as seen in many other utopias including those by Thomas More 
and H. G. Wells.99 By this ending, which is not the ending in a strict sense, Huxley 
closes his utopia not as a “closed” totality (not as “closure” in a spatial or textual sense) 
but rather as an “open” totality, by which he entrusts readers, namely us outside of Pala 
or the text, with the choice of whether to inherit, develop or simply reject his utopia. 
Despite his avowed dislike of Marxism, Huxley, in the same way as Jameson, 
who appears to have little interest in Huxley either, evaluates utopian thinking and 
searches for a practicable version of totality, recognizing the realities of separation and 
the danger of totalization. This may offer a hint that we can understand the significance 
of Huxley’s utopia not so much as by comparing it with the theories of his Marxist 
contemporaries (let alone of Marx himself) but by putting it in Marxist discussion of our 
time, as presented by Jameson. What is more, Huxley, in terms of his utopian thinking, 
may go beyond Jameson, probably the most influential Marxist thinker of utopia, in 
that, compared with Jameson, Huxley conceives of utopia with his acute wariness of 
centralization, his positive employment of the religious and his perspectives of ecology 




It is impossible to overemphasize the impact of Huxley’s work on utopian 
literature and thought. Although a strong image of Brave New World has never released 
the author from being compared with the “utopian” Wells or the “anti-utopian” 
Zamyatin and Orwell—indeed, Huxley has contributed to a genre of science fiction with 
this novel and Ape and Essence—Island may be worthy of more attention in terms of 
recounting a positive utopia or eutopia. With the characteristics discussed above, not 
least the anti-imperial, ecological and culturally hybrid aspects, Huxley’s eutopia is 
probably one of the forerunners of today’s influential utopian works, including those of 
Ursula K. Le Guin.101 Huxley’s paradoxical presentation of eutopia—which he himself 
destroys, leaving its fate in our hands—may be regarded as anticipating recent streams 
of utopian work, such as the “critical utopia,” through which authors—instead of 
showing readers a self-sufficient or closed vision of utopia, conceived entirely by the 
authors themselves—aim to provide readers with an open debate or thinking itself in 
order to direct their realities towards utopia.102  
 
4. Conclusion 
Stimulated by his hope for an empathy with the masses and his doubts about the 
class system, both of which had been suggested in his early work, Huxley in the 1930s 
more positively began to approach or relate himself to the masses under the influence of 
his encounters with them, through facing the severe realities of their lives “Abroad in 
England” as well as joining the PPU campaign as a mass movement. His wishes for a 
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peaceful world where everyone lives happily drove Huxley into his engagement with 
social and political activity, as reflected in his writings, such as Brave New World, 
which can be interpreted as unsparingly revealing the stupidity of the class system, 
Eyeless in Gaza, the story of an intellectual’s development into a utopian believer in the 
“unity” of human beings regardless of nationality or class, and Ends and Means, a more 
concrete proposal of what and how we should do to establish a society in accordance 
with this idealism. In an elitist manner, Huxley was certainly interested in large-scale, 
top-down planning, but as these writings show, he calmly maintained a certain distance 
from Russia or state socialism, unlike quite a few of his intellectual contemporaries. 
Despite his work for Hollywood from the late 1930s—which was, in a sense, another 
series of his encounters with the masses—Huxley does not appear to have filled his 
emotional gap between himself and the masses, refraining from being directly involved 
in any political movement. This period, the 1940s and 1950s, may be regarded as that of 
his escape from reality, but actually it was a period of his preparation to take a different 
approach to it. Controversial aspects of the later Huxley, such as his interest in religions, 
meditation and drugs, can be better understood if re-positioned in the context of his 
search for bonds with the masses—i.e., a utopian impulse towards the “unity” of people 
in some utopian program. This view is endorsed by his last novel, Island, where 
Huxley—while showing how to achieve a practicable utopia with mass happiness—
grasps a character modelled on himself as a member of the masses (though no one in 
this utopia can be categorized into the masses in a strict sense, inasmuch as they live 
with not just their sense of unity with each other but their each unique characteristics) 
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and leaves the future of this utopia in the hands of readers, namely the masses. The 
above development of Huxley’s attitude towards the masses cannot be explained by the 
image stressed in some studies of Huxley as the defender of the leisured class or 
aristocracy. 
We have also reconsidered Huxley’s later idea of utopia in relation to current 
Marxist theories. One of the theoretical issues in producing utopia today is how to grasp 
totality, a concept that has been recently exposed to a postmodernist attack on its being 
(potentially) involved in reductionism and totalitarianism. However, some critics, such 
as Jameson, realize that the rejection of totality might lead to the rejection of meaning in 
the world, history or life, and thus are groping for an un-reductionist form of open 
totality. As the previous three chapters have already unveiled, Huxley anticipated a 
postmodernist way of questioning identity, while also directing his acute scepticism 
towards totality from his position of liberalism. However, the present chapter has 
demonstrated that Huxley, too, was aware of the probability that such an attitude would 
deprive meanings of the world, history and life, and this finally prompted him to 
conceive both practicable versions of utopia and totality to relieve anti-utopian fears of 
reductionism and totalitarianism. In this sense, it could be argued that Huxley, a less 
popular modernist writer, actually shared some significant aspects of (post-) postmodern 
discussion of utopia, presented by the Marxist Jameson and others. Undoubtedly, 
Huxley’s apparently personal wanderings through the concept of identity, which we 




                                                
1 About Limbo, Nicholas Murray states that “the working classes were not Huxley’s field” (118). Given 
Trevenen’s suicide, which could be traced back to his unrequited love for a housemaid, a class issue was 
probably somewhat traumatic for Aldous Huxley. 
2 See, respectively, A. L. Morton, English Utopia (1952), 274; Theodor W. Adorno, Prisms (1955), 115; 
John Carey, The Intellectuals and the Masses: Pride and Prejudice among the Literary Intelligentsia, 
1880-1939 (1992), 88; Fredric Jameson, Archaeologies of the Future: The Desire Called Utopia and 
Other Science Fictions (2005), 202. 
3 In the present chapter, I use the word “utopia” for nowhere of any sort and a text that describes it. 
Following the custom, I employ this term rather than “eutopia” and “dystopia,” unless I especially intend 
to indicate only positive or negative utopia. This can be said for their derivatives. In my theoretical debate 
mainly in the latter part of this chapter, I also adopt Fredric Jameson’s phrases such as “utopian thinking,” 
“utopian program,” “utopian impulse” and “anti-utopian fears,” in accordance with his usage; thus, 
“utopia[n]” refers to “eutopia[n].” 
4 David Bradshaw is the first scholar who pays due attention to Huxley’s essays on “Abroad in England” 
to address hidden aspects of Huxley, particularly his compassion for the masses (see his introduction to 
The Hidden Huxley [1994]). However, it is worth having a look at a dissenting opinion presented by 
Jerome Meckier’s review (1996). 
5 In February 1931, during those tours, Huxley and Maria met Virginia Woolf (see Woolf’s Diary IV, 11-
12). Alice Wood mentions the influence of this meeting on Woolf’s late criticism, especially six 
journalistic articles for the British edition of Good Housekeeping magazine (1931-32). Comparing 
Huxley’s “The Victory of Art over Humanity” and Woolf’s “The Docks of London,” Wood finds in both 
essays Marx’s theory of commodity fetishism and indicates their differences: “Rather than looking 
outwards to discuss the global economies of trade [as Huxley does], Woolf’s essay instead turns inwards 
to provide an implicit commentary on the female consumer’s role in the sourcing and production of 
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colonial commodities” (38). 
6 With respect to adult education, the Grith Fyrd camp may be seen as a practical utopia, or an experiment 
of this: “Grith Fyrd was a utopian movement with a strong sense of practicability. Its members wished to 
construct an alternative world, not simply in order to criticise the present order, but in order that they 
might learn how to be a different kind of person, relating with one another in a different kind of way. Its 
demise was probably inscribed in this very demanding mission” (Field 163). 
7 The series of Huxley’s essays on “Alien Englands” are reminiscent of the work of George Orwell, a 
contemporary writer whom Huxley taught at Eton and who also reported on the living and working 
conditions of labourers, discussing issues of the English class system. There are certainly several points 
shared by both authors. Just as Huxley declares that “in no country of the West are they [class barriers] so 
high as in England (“AE,” AHCEIII, 264), “England is,” Orwell states, “the most class-ridden country 
under the sun” (The Lion and the Unicorn: Socialism and the English Genius [1941], E, 303). Whilst 
Huxley, watching people working in a coal mine, has to realize that “the marvels of our civilisation” are 
supported by “the body of man that has laboriously created the underworld of the coal-mine” (“SSAE,” 
AHCEIII, 278), a visit to a coal mine in Northern England gives Orwell a similar impression: “it is the 
miners who are driving your car forward. Their lamp-lit world down there is as necessary to the daylight 
world above as the root is to the flower” (The Road to Wigan Pier [1937], 30). In the same way that 
Huxley does not hide an upper-middle-class prejudice about the bad smell of the working class (see PCP, 
EG), referring to “a faint persistent smell” in a dock (“VAH,” AHCEIII, 288), so Orwell frankly 
confesses: “That was what we were taught—the lower classes smell” (RWP, 119). Furthermore, Huxley—
who finds “benevolence” and “kindness” in the poor, something lost from the rich’s lives—directs our 
attention to the “[h]umanity and decency” as seen in a lodging house for destitute women (“WG,” 
AHCEIII, 415, 417) and to the true form of a “communistic” life in a camp for unemployed people. In “a 
working-class home,” Orwell also detects “a warm, decent, deeply human atmosphere” as shared by few 
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upper-middle-class homes (RWP, 107-08), and insists that “a working man” is “a truer Socialist than the 
orthodox Marxist, because he does remember, what the other so often forgets, that Socialism means 
justice and common decency” (164-64). In contrast to Huxley, Orwell originally had acute awareness 
concerning class issues, probably because of the ambiguity of his having been born into “the lower-upper-
middle class”(RWP, 113). Orwell was also an avowed “democratic socialist” and such a journalistic 
writer that he, after writing about Northern England, reported the realities of the Spanish Civil War. 
Despite these differences, the influence of Huxley may be seen in Orwell’s non-fiction, such as The Road 
to Wigan Pier, where he mentions Huxley three times (see 100, 180, 188). Of course, compared to 
Orwell, who walked as a vagrant in slums and stayed under the same roof with families of the lower 
classes, Huxley in principle remained a passing “tourist” with “curiosity” (see “AE,” AHCEIII, 264; 
“SSAE,” AHCEIII, 278). 
8 See also Huxley’s “Anthropology and Social Reform” (1935). 
9 For a discussion on the names of Brave New World characters, see Meckier, “Onomastic Satire: Names 
and Naming in Brave New World” (2004), rpt. in AHMSNI, Chapter 12. 
10 Other examples of Marxist criticism of Brave New World follow. In The English Utopia (1952), the 
Marxist historian A. L. Morton, tracing utopia in English literature, positions Brave New World and Ape 
and Essence as representing “the lowest depths to which the new genre of anti-utopias could fall” (273). 
In his view, Huxley fails to see “the false politics of capitalism,” and instead attacks the idea of 
Humanism, believing “in human wickedness, in original sin” (258, 272). After all, “Huxley is unable to 
understand that a socialist society is a form of movement in which each individual is able to reach his 
highest potentialities in his relation to other individuals” (259). Theoretical criticism appears in Adorno’s 
essay, “Aldous Huxley and Utopia” (1951, included in Prisms). In his opinion, the serious problem with 
this novel is the “crude alternative of objective meaning and subjective happiness [or a choice between 
individualism and a totalitarian world-state], conceived as mutually exclusive” (111, 116), by which 
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Huxley “provides a pretext for the strengthening of domination” (113), instead of showing “a praxis 
which could explode the infamous continuum” (116). Huxley’s arguments that human beings are “not yet 
ready for socialism” and that “if they no longer had to work, they wouldn’t know what to do with their 
time” remind Adorno of “the member of the upper middle class who solemnly insists that it is not in his 
own interest but in that of all mankind that he advocates the continuance of a profit economy” (115). It is 
a bunch of nonsense to have too much “concern for the calamity that a realized utopia could inflict on 
mankind,” taking no note of “the real and far more urgent calamity” such as “hunger and distress” (115-
16). 
11 Since the early 1930s Huxley was involved in the Political and Economic Planning (PEP), the 
Federation of Progressive Societies and Individuals (FPSI), and the National Council for Civil Liberties 
(NCCL), though his dedication to them is far less than that to the Peace Pledge Union, stated later (see 
Bradshaw, “The Flight from Gaza: Aldous Huxley’s Involvement with the Peace Pledge Union in the 
Context of His Overall Intellectual Development” [1994], 11). 
12 Something like a eutopian nature of Brave New World emerges in Bradshaw’s reading, where the World 
Controller Mond, John’s opponent in the climax of the story, plays a role “as Huxley’s ideological 
spokesman” (“HS,” 161). 
13 Furthermore, as Chapter III indicated, from an anthropological viewpoint, both the upper and lower 
castes have similar customs (see BNW, 97). Considering that during his wandering into “Abroad in 
England” he held uncomfortable feelings about the class “barriers” exaggerated by “education,” Huxley 
in Brave New World appears to satirize it, especially when he envisages that children not only receive 
educations of different qualities according to the castes to which they belong (see 140) but also are, in 
advance, “conditioned” into having “Class Consciousness” through hypnopaedia, which repeatedly 
exposes them to such a voice: “Delta Children wear khaki. Oh no, I don’t want to play with Delta 
children. And Epsilons are still worse. They’re too stupid to be able to read or write. Besides they wear 
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black, which is such a beastly colour. I’m so glad I’m a Beta” (22; see also 64). One might level other 
objections at some of the above-cited criticisms (see note 10). Contrary to Morton’s rash judgment, 
Huxley, as his “Alien Englands” essays suggest, does not deny the essence of socialism. Instead, he 
shares with Morton the ideal image of a socialist society where people can exert their “potentialities” (see 
note 57); the brunt of Huxley’s attack in Brave New World is actually directed at capitalist and socialist 
countries, equally. On the other hand, Adorno—who is actually a good reader of Huxley’s works, 
including Eyeless in Gaza (see Adorno’s letters to Walter Benjamin, 15 October 1936 and 15 April 1937, 
Lonitz 57, 174)—provides a finer analysis. His complaints about Brave New World (regarding the simple 
binary opposition and lack of an alternative plan) are more to the point and more relevant to Huxley’s 
more mature ideas. 
14 Although Huxley “cannot provide a plan of action for us,” it is “nonetheless important. [. . .] Ethical 
socialists advance a very different view of evolutionary change to those of the scientific socialists. 
Huxley’s theory puts him in direct opposition to Shaw, who argues that only the natural leaders in society 
are capable of achieving progress, and to Wells, who emphasises communality at the expense of 
individuality” (Ingle, Narratives of British Socialism [2002], 105). 
15 Miller’s “anthropology” is not the same as anthropology in general but rather develops a ‘humanitarian’ 
aspect of anthropology that Huxley satirizes in Brave New World, as discussed in Chapter III. Miller’s 
anthropology is also different from Helen’s husband Hugh Ledwidge’s purely academic “ethnology” (see 
EG, Chapter 45): “To Hugh Ledwidge’s museum-bound ethnography, which liberates him from actuality 
to become the author of a nauseating novel of spiritualized love, is opposed Miller’s arduous field 
anthropology, a true science of man rooted in human experience, not in abstractions”(Woodcock 168). 
See also MacClancy 75-76. 
16 In January 1932, Ada Chesterton asked Huxley to join the council of the Community Theatre, and 
Huxley replied that he would do so with pleasure (see his letter to Chesterton, 31 January 1932, Smith 
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262). In August 1939, Chesterton also reported from Moscow for The Spectator: “The Soviet has a keen 
appreciation of foreign writers of all schools and creeds. The most popular at the moment is Aldous 
Huxley, not only among authors. He is also appreciated by students and the intelligentsia” (“The Author 
and the Soviet” [1939], 175). 
17 As possible sources for Miller, the following candidates have been listed: Gerald Heard, Dick Sheppard 
(both are mentioned later), F. M. Alexander (a therapist whose technique is well known and cited in 
Eyeless in Gaza), J. E. R. McDonagh  (a surgeon who recommended to Huxley colonic irrigation and a 
vegetarian diet) and Theodore Pennell (a doctor who in the 1890s used non-violent techniques in his 
dealings with American Indians) (see Bedford 320; Woodcock 166; Eros 103-05; Poller DFAD, 136). 
18 “After remarkable sea change in Huxley’s outlook occurs after he dedicates himself to pacifism in the 
autumn of 1935. [. . .] Huxley’s decision to join Sheppard’s Peace Movement was to prove the pivotal 
event of his life” (Bradshaw “FG,” 11). For a recent study on Eyeless in Gaza in pacifist movement 
contexts, see e.g., Charles Andrews, “Pledging Peace in Aldous Huxley’s Eyeless in Gaza” (2012). While 
Huxley was preparing An Encyclopaedia of Pacifism (1937, a revised and enlarged version appeared in 
Chapter 9 of Ends and Means), Maria was “busy with a thousand errands, helping to set up some of the 
practical work that members were undertaking such as looking after destitute local families or released 
prisoners or guaranteeing maintenance to Jewish refugees” (Bedford 328-29). 
19 For Huxley’s relationships with these three pacifists, see Bradshaw “FG.” For Heard’s pacifism, 
including his involvement with the PPU, see Alison Falby, Between the Pigeonholes: Gerald Heard, 
1889-1971 (2008), Chapter 4. For Heard’s influence of Huxley’s pacifism, see e.g., Paul Eros, “‘A Sort of 
Mutt and Jeff’: Gerald Heard, Aldous Huxley, and the New Pacifism” (2001). For Sheppard’s pacifist 
work with Huxley, see Carolyn Scott, Dick Sheppard: A Biography (1977), Chapters 16 and 17. Another 
influential pacifist for Huxley was the Dutch anarcho-pacifist Bart de Light, whose The Conquest of 
Violence (1937) contributed to the spread in Europe of Gandhian pacifism, together with Gregg’s book 
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(see Goodway 226-27). 
20 For the above description, see William Hetherington, Swimming against the Tide: The Peace Pledge 
Union Story, 1934-2014 (org. 2009, updated in 2015), 6-16. For a detailed analysis of the significance of 
PPU in contexts of British pacifism, see Martin Ceadel, Pacifism in Britain, 1914-1945: The Defining of 
a Faith (1980); especially for Huxley’s involvement in the PPU, see Chapters 10 to 15. 
21 Huxley realizes that, because of “education,” especially “the kind of discipline that ‘produces a 
militaristic mentality, at once obedient and domineering,’” “the members of the middle and upper classes 
are still, on the whole, more bellicose than the members of the working class” (AHCEIV, 270). 
22 Many interesting pamphlets are preserved in the British Library (title: Miscellaneous pamphlets and 
leaflets, author: Peace Pledge Union). For example, You Coward! Dialogue Between Stuart Gelder and 
His Wife (1936) deconstructs the word “cowardice” through a readable dialogue between an imaginary 
couple. From War To Peace: A Story of Some Very Stupid People Who Came to Their Senses (1936) 
preaches pacifism in a once-upon-a-time story. In To Mothers Especially (1937), Vera Brittain, as a 
mother of two children, calls out to other mothers to support pacifism. 1066 and All That (1937) has a 
strange title but this is the answer to the question “WHEN did we last fight for a War on British soil?,” 
and discloses people’s paranoid mentality regarding war. 
23 Bradshaw also states: “Huxley praised the Soviet Five Year Plan as ‘the most significant example of a 
social experiment’ [cited from “Science of Politics?” (1933)] and lauded a gung-ho account of it [M. Ilin’s 
New Russia’s Primer (1930)] as ‘not merely interesting; it is exciting’ [cited from “A Soviet School 
Book”]” (Bradshaw “HS,” 159). However, in the former essay, Huxley carefully adds: “At least a century 
will have to pass before anyone can decide how far experiment has confirmed the soundness of Lenin’s or 
Mussolini’s theories” (AHCEIII, 161-62); in the latter essay, he, identifying communism with religion, 
curtly predicts that its “spirit” will not continue for very long (309). 
24 Indeed, Huxley repeatedly exhibits the same dissatisfaction with Marxism or Russia, insisting that 
260 
 
                                                                                                                                          
human beings and history cannot be fully explained only by economics, which needs to be supplemented 
by other perspectives such as psychology (see, chronologically, “Ideals and the Machine Tool” [1931], 
AHCEIII, 294; “The Problem of Pleasure” [1932], AHCEIII, 338-39; “Psychological Dividends” [1933], 
AHCEIII, 357; “The Interpretation of History” [1936], AHCEIV, 127-30). 
25 See also “Babies—State Property” (1930), AHCEIII, 231; “The New Romanticism,” Music at Night 
(1931), AHCEIII, 251-52. As stated in the next section, Proudhon’s ideas are adopted in Huxley’s Island. 
26 As late as 2005, the proceedings of the conference were published as Pour la défense de la culture: Les 
textes du Congrès international des écrivains, Paris, juin 1935 (ed. Sandra Teroni and Wolfgang Klein). 
Although the congress “has often been presented as a sorry example of the relations between Communism 
and the intellectuals” (it is said that Moscow is behind an initiative “which seeks to consolidate control 
over Communist intellectuals”), the proceedings show that the congress “happened in many ways despite 
Moscow” and that “the many speeches and discussions at the Mutualite display diversity of opinion” 
(Bowd 119). 
27 Eyeless in Gaza has several characters with socialist or communist ideas, but all of them appear to 
experience some setbacks or despair. Anthony, Brian and Mark are all members of the Oxford Fabian 
Society. When visiting his girlfriend Joan’s home, which is a working family, Brian can only hesitate for 
the atmosphere, getting a “feeling of moral discomfort,” instead of anything like empathy with them 
(203). Beppo, a homosexual communist, seems to eventually become just an egoist who exploits young 
men of the working class as the object of his sexual desire (see 382-83). 
28 As early as 1931, Huxley might have held a similar impression when he saw and talked with a butchery 
worker: “My young Jewish friend was a communist, and did not forget the fact even when he was 
discussing books. For example, he judged D. H. Lawrence by the standards of Marxism and found him 
wanting” (“GLL,” AHCEIII, 300-01). 
29 Although Huxley planned to join Julian’s Russian trip, his re-writing of Brave New World, which took 
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longer than expected, made it impossible (see his letters to Julian, 17 May 1931 and 27 May 1931, Smith 
256, 348-49). Of course, many published materials on Russia were available to Huxley. For example, he 
agreed with Yevgeny Zamyatin’s article about the future of literature in Le Mois (“New World Drama” 
[1932], AHCEIII, 336-37) and appreciated P. S. Romanov’s Three Pairs of Silk Stockings (also referring 
to his Without Cherry Blossom) as “the most real and convincing account of life in Russia” (letter to 
Leonard Huxley, 24 August 1931, Smith 352). Huxley was also probably influenced by unidentified 
people engaged with the organizations that he joined, such as Political Economic Planning (PEP) and the 
Society for Cultural Relations Between the Peoples of the British Commonwealth and the USSR (see 
Bradshaw “FG,” 155-160). 
30 On his return, Julian recorded his vivid admiration: “The technique and the very idea of large-scale 
planning [. . .]—in these and many other ways the new Russia, even in its present embryo stage of 
development, is in advance of other countries: and if the rest of the world refuses to learn from the object-
lesson provided by Russia, as well as profiting by her mistakes, so much the worst for the rest of the 
world.” In 1970, however, Julian corrected this by mentioning the deficiencies dissatisfying him, such as 
“the absence of free speech,” and by stating that, on his second visit in 1945, all of his “fears proved 
justified” (MI, 201; see also Chapter 19 of the same volume). 
31 Mitchison only published some extracts from this diary under the title of “Pages from a Russian Diary” 
in Modern Scot, 3 (October 1932). Pages 246-52 of the diary are also printed as an appendix (209-15) in 
Helen Lloyd’s doctoral dissertation, Witness to a Century: The Autobiographical Writings of Naomi 
Mitchison (2005). 
32 “I feel they have solved, or nearly solved, the sex question which has preoccupied us for so many years, 
simply giving women complete economic freedom and equality” (Mitchison’s diary, 251, rpt. in Lloyd 
214). As Jenni Calder remarks, Mitchison was encouraged in Russia by the fact that there seemed to be 
“no conflict between socialism and feminism” (112). 
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33 For Mitchison’s ideological and personal relationship with the feminine and the maternal, see Chapter 
II, Section 3. 
34 Here, Mitchison has News from Nowhere (1890) in mind. This sounds a little strange because, in that 
work, Morris idealizes maternal instinct and motherhood (including contractions), while flatly rejecting 
feminist arguments for women’s liberation (see Chapter 9), to which Mitchison subscribed. Not 
theoretically but rather intuitively, she may have been attracted to a socialist revolution: “Above all I felt 
that in a fairer world people would become automatically nicer, all social intercourse would be happier 
and easier” (YMWA, 191-92). 
35 In March 1931, Cynthia left the Labour Party for the New Party, which Oswald formed. According to a 
letter from the poet Robert Nichols to the neurologist Henry Head (qtd. in Bradshaw “HS,” 154), Huxley 
saw Cynthia at least once before or in February 1931. 
36 What Huxley wrote in his reply to Cynthia Mosley’s accounts of Russia is not known. There remains, 
however, an unpublished letter from Huxley to her (26 September 1931) in which he states that he 
“should very much like to know your [her] views on the situation & your [her] plans,” while attacking “a 
few of the old politicians who have landed us [them] in this mess by their criminal negligence” 
(Birmingham University Special Collections, OMD/1/1/2/2). This letter suggests that Huxley paid some 
attention to Cynthia’s political opinions, and that he was also interested in her husband’s political 
potential and planning, prompted by his disappointment in parliamentary democracy (see Bradshaw 
“HS,” 154-55; his introduction to HH, xvii-xviii ). 
37 In 1936, for example, Huxley positively associated pacifism with socialism: “The pacifist must aim at 
getting rid of militarism everywhere. This means, that in the economic sphere, his goal must be 
socialism” (“100,000 Say No!,” 79; see also EG, 335). 
38 Huxley’s writing is contrasted not only with these works by Mitchison and Julian but also with many 
other positive accounts of Russia by contemporary intellectuals, such as Stalin-Wells Talk: The Verbatim 
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Record and a Discussion (1934)—an interview with Joseph Stalin by H. G. Wells, George Bernard Shaw, 
J. M. Keynes and so on—and Soviet Communism: A New Civilization (1937) by Sydney and Beatrice 
Webb. In his negative view of Russia, Huxley synchronized with (and thus may have been influenced by) 
Heard, who made his anti-Russian attitude clear (see Falby 58-59). 
39 It is well known that his screenplay for Disney’s animation, Alice in Wonderland, was rejected in 1951. 
40 In Tom Dardis’s view, Huxley “left a small legacy of two absolutely first-rate screenplays [Pride and 
Prejudice and Jane Eyre]”: “Despite his chronic bad health, near-blindness, and own avowed lack of 
dramatic sense, his high degree of success as a screenwriter was astonishing” (215). A more positive view 
of Huxley’s involvement with Hollywood can be seen in Aldous Huxley and Film (1987) by Virginia M. 
Clark (see also Meckier’s dissenting review [1988]). In terms of biographical interest, the minutest 
account of Huxley’s relationship with films is still David King Dunaway’s Huxley in Hollywood, where 
Huxley never seems to be satisfied with the film industry and vice versa. 
41 However, during this period Huxley certainly deepened his understanding of ecology, which he would 
further explore in his last novel. Dana Sawyer remarks that in Science, Liberty and Peace (1946) and 
Themes and Variations (1950) Huxley was “prescient in assessing the impact of environmental 
catastrophes on the human population—anticipating the interrelationship between environmental crises 
and economic globalization” (“BNWV,” 222). 
42 In Brave New World Revisited (1958), Huxley states: “We are far indeed from Jefferson’s ideal of a 
genuinely free society composed of a hierarchy of self-governing units—‘the elementary republics of the 
wards, the country republics, the State republics and the Republics of the Union, forming a gradation of 
authorities’” (AHCEVI, 233). Discussing Huxley’s major writings including After Many a Summer, Brian 
Smith highlights several points of similarity between Huxley and Thomas Jefferson, though the former is 
more pessimistic than the latter in terms of the future of the world and of human beings (see “Jeffersonian 
Reminders: Aldous Huxley on Property, Happiness, and Freedom” [2011]). 
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43 The booklet is unpaginated. The questions were based on Cunard’s firm belief: “It is clear to many of 
us throughout the whole world that now, as certainly never before, we are determined or compelled, to 
take sides.” Of the 148 answers, she classified 126 as the support for the Republic (e.g., W. H. Auden, 
Samuel Beckett, C. Day Lewis, Havelock Ellis, Ford Madox Ford, Naomi Mitchison, John Middleton 
Murry, Rebecca West, Leonard Woolf), 16 as neutral (e.g., Vera Brittain, T. S. Eliot, Ezra Pound, H. G. 
Wells) and 5 for Franco (e.g., Evelyn Waugh). 
44 In a similar way, Brittain, another sponsor of PPU, answers: “As an uncompromising pacifist, I hold 
war to be a crime against humanity, whoever fights it and against whoever it is fought.” As a consequence 
of Huxley’s seemingly positive mention of the anarchists, Emma Goldman, an American anarchist and 
feminist, contacted Huxley to sponsor the SIA (Solidaridad Internacional Antifascista [International Anti-
Fascist Solidarity]), only to find his reluctance to join her activities (see Goodway 227-30). 
45 Just when he was writing After Many a Summer, Huxley refused his friend’s proposal for a statement 
deploring the treatment of Jews in Nazi-occupied Europe, because he thought: “Expressions of 
generalized opinions, outbursts of indignation and the like don’t seem to me to fulfil any very useful 
purpose” (letter to Jacob. I. Zeitlin, 19 November 1938, Smith 439). Yet he wrote an introduction to They 
Still Draw Pictures (1938) to raise a little extra money, and also sent his limited funds to Germany to help 
two political exiles emigrate (see the same letter; see also Dunaway HH, 110). 
46 See Bell, “Notes for a Memoir,” JB 19; see also his letter to Vanessa Bell, 1 October 1936, JB, 159; 
“On Roger Fry—A Letter to A.,” JB 260-62. See also Peter Stansky and William Abrahams, Julian Bell: 
From Bloomsbury to the Spanish Civil War (2012), 64, 105. 
47 For details on Bell’s decision to go to Spain, his death and the responses of his family and others, see 
Stansky 226-53, Chapter 5. Virginia Woolf’s Three Guineas (1938) is also “in many ways a posthumous 
discussion with Julian” (Stansky 258). 
265 
 
                                                                                                                                          
48 In the company of Eustace, an individualist who adheres to his “self,” Bruno feels despair: “Out of ten 
thousand only one would ever break out of his carapace completely [i.e., improve oneself]” (87); “One 
doesn’t have to catch the infection of goodness, if one doesn’t want to. The will is always free” (89); 
“resurrection is optional” (92). 
49 In Time Must Have a Stop, Huxley repeatedly attacks the past and present states of actual politics, 
especially its violence—such as imperialism, religious wars, totalitarianism and the Second World War 
(see 112, and Chapters 20 and 30)—and makes Sebastian realize his indirect responsibility for mass 
unhappiness (244), while rejecting Eustace’s individualistic position. However, Huxley insistently shows 
no expectation of a direct political approach to the world situation; John, Sebastian’s father, for example, 
turns out to be a dogmatic, inhuman socialist who finally arrives at “the conviction that political 
principles [. . .] were almost irrelevant to the real problem,” i.e., “the present miseries of India—the 
Bengal famine, the pandemic of malaria, the prisons crowded with the men and women at whose side a 
few years before, he himself had fought for swaraj” (259). Meanwhile, the unhappiness that is later 
brought upon members of the family who have benefited through imperial exploitation, can be read as a 
criticism of rampant capitalism. 
50 This sense of despair was shared by his non-fictional writing, The Devils of Loudun (1952), where 
Huxley focuses on the collective madness of human beings through narrating a real case of sexual 
hysteria in seventeenth-century France—the case in which a young priest was burned at the stake on a 
charge of his league with the devil. Huxley clearly considered the contemporary totalitarian atmosphere 
not only of communist countries but also of America with McCarthyism. 
51 See e.g., Thomas Mann’s letter to Ida Herz, 21 March 1954, rpt. in Watt 394-95. 
52 In February 1940, Huxley collected material for a utopian novel but this was not completed (Smith 16). 
Meanwhile, he worked on Grey Eminence, a biography of Father Joseph (François Leclerc du Tremblay), 
the French monk and advisor to Cardinal Richelieu. Huxley traces the tragedy of contemporary politics 
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back to Father Joseph’s mistake in committing himself to power politics and encouraging others to fight 
for the unity of his nation (which in his view was God’s will), although Huxley admits that this monk 
succeeded to some extent in mystic experience. 
53 For Huxley’s confession of his difficulties writing about a positive utopia, see “Monitor” (1958). 
54 See also Palanese people’s criticism of contemporary communist states such as China and Russia (91, 
96, 201). 
55 Among Marx’s writings, Palanese life may particularly evoke the famous image of human life after the 
abolition of the division of labour as presented in German Ideology (1932, written with Engels c. 1846, 
trans. 1938): “in communist society, where nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity but each can 
become accomplished in any branch he wishes, society regulates the general production and thus makes it 
possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, 
rear cattle in the evening, criticise after dinner, just as I have a mind, without ever becoming hunter, 
fisherman, shepherd or critic” (KMFECW5, 47). Such a way of life is experienced by Robert, who is 
engaged with not only “intellectual work” (such as medical treatment and politics) but also “muscle 
work” (such as “digging and delving”) not as “part of his duties” but “part of his pleasure.” This lifestyle 
effectively keeps Palanese people both physically and mentally healthy (142-43). 
56 Jake Poller remarks that Huxley was probably “thinking of [Madame] Blavatsky when, in Island, he 
created the character of the Rani, a corpulent theosophist who receives astral communications from the 
Master Koot Hoomi” (“GI,” 130). A deeper analysis of this point can be found in Meckier, “Enemies of 
Utopia: Young Krishnamurti and Madame Blavatsky” (2012). 
57 “Human potentialities” is one of Huxley’s favourite phrases in his later work and is relevant to his 
vision of eutopian society (see note 71). In “Human Potentialities” (1961), he writes: “Ancient and 
modern, the two babies are indistinguishable. Each of them contains all the potentialities of the particular 
breed of human being to which he or she happens to belong. But the adults into whom the babies will 
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grow are profoundly dissimilar; and they are dissimilar because in one of them very few, and in the other 
a good many, of the baby’s inborn potentialities have been actualized” (417). Huxley then discusses the 
ways of actualizing these potentialities. For more details on this notion, see e.g., Bernfried Nugel, 
“Aldous Huxley’s Plea for Desirable Human Potentialities: Some Unknown Late Comments (1961-63)” 
(2012). 
58 Proudhon, too, expected the working class to behave as people with subjectivity and responsibility, 
idealizing a form of self-government rather than centralization (see e.g., On the Political Capacity of the 
Working Class [1865]). He argued for a limited right to private property (see What is Property? [1840]) 
and was one of the forerunners of anarcho-pacifism (see War and Peace [1861]). Like his rival, Marx, 
Proudhon is very critical of belief or religion (see e.g., General Idea of the Revolution in the Nineteenth 
Century [1851]). 
59 For a classic study of Huxley’s interest in Eastern religions, see B. L. Chakoo, Aldous Huxley and 
Eastern Wisdom (1981); for a more recent one, including an analysis of the influence of Western 
mysticism on Huxley, see Poller’s doctoral dissertation, especially Chapters 4 and 5. 
60 As a possible jacket for Island, Huxley proposed “some Chinese or Japanese rendering of rocks in 
water, suggestive of an island,” as well as Van Gogh’s “Fields under Storm-clouds” (letter to Ian Parsons, 
19 January 1962, Smith 928). Though apparently far less interested in Japanese than Indian cultures, and 
despite his negative descriptions of Japan (see Jesting Pilate, AHCEII, 540-45), Huxley in one of his early 
essays wrote about the Japanese Buddhist monk Ekai Kawaguchi (see “Tibet” [1923], AHCEI, 419-21; 
the name “Kawaguchi” is given to a scientist in Brave New World). In the 1950s, Huxley mentioned not 
just Suzuki’s books but Zen in English Literature and Oriental Thought (1942) by R. H. Blyth (see 
Huxley’s letters to Mrs Elise Murrell, 4 November 1951, Smith 638-39; to Dr Roger Godel, 23 December 
1951, Smith 639). Blyth was an English scholar who lived the latter part of his life in Japan, becoming 
one of Suzuki’s dear friends, and who discussed Huxley in A Survey of English Literature (1957) (see 
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362-63). Huxley also appreciated the image of nature in Chinese and Japanese art, including Bashō’s 
haiku, which in his view anticipated Wordsworth’s attitude towards nature, i.e., the idea that a “bridge of 
living substance links man with the material world” (HS, 44-45). 
61 See Huxley’s letters to Hubert Benoit, 3 February 1950, Smith 618; to Philippe Dumaine, 3 September 
1950, Smith 533-34; to Dr Humphry Osmond, 1 June 1957, Smith 825; to Mrs Lucille Kahn, 8 August 
1961, Smith 918; see also the bibliography of The Perennial Philosophy, 306. On the other hand, Suzuki 
mentioned the following works by Huxley: Brave New World, The Perennial Philosophy, The Devils of 
Loudun, The Doors of Perception, Heaven and Hell and the dramatized Gioconda Smile (see “Toyo wa 
Sekaibunka ni Nani wo Kouken Shiuru ka” [1948], SDZ33, 234; Toyoteki na Mikata [1953], SDZ20, 222; 
“Yomigaeru Toyo” [1954], SDZ21, 331; “Amerika no Sakkon” [1955], SDZ34, 97; Daisetsu Tsurezure 
Gusa [1966], SDZ20, 337; letters to an unknown recipient, March 1949, SDZ37, 210; to Lunsford P. 
Yandell, 30 September 1959, SDZ38, 171; “English Diaries IV. 1950 to 1951,” 36; “English Diaries IX. 
1952 to 1953,” 48. Suzuki also enjoyed a friendship and corresponded with the philosopher Alan Watts, a 
friend of Huxley. 
62 See also Suzuki’s letter to Fukuzawa (sic), 7 December 1955, SDZ38, 284. 
63 See Suzuki, “EDIV,” 6-7, 78; “EDIX,” 3; “English Diaries X. 1954 to 1955,” 31; see also SDZ40, 196, 
211, 245. In letters, Huxley recollected his meetings with Suzuki as follows: “I saw dear old Dr. Suzuki 
the other day and had a very pleasant and instructive talk with him” (to Dr Roger Godel, cited above, 
Smith 639; see the letter to Murrell, cited above, Smith 638); “I also saw dear old Suzuki in New York. 
What a really wonderful old man!” (letter to Dr Humphry Osmond, cited above, Smith 825). 
64 For example, in the above-mentioned letter to Murrell, Huxley devoted more space to Suzuki than the 
news of his first grandchild: “He is a little old Japanese of more than eighty, [. . .] with an extraordinary 
charm and gentleness. I saw him once a year ago, and was greatly taken by him, would like very much to 
talk with him again” (Smith 638). 
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65 In an article, Suzuki makes the same sort of comment, believing that social progress, both in the East 
and the West, largely depends on the activity of socialism (see “Shakaiminshuto no Ketto Kinshi ni 
Tsukite: Shakaishugi no Shukyoteki Kiban” [1901, “On the Prohibition of the Formation of the Social 
Democratic Party: The Religious Foundations of Socialism”], SDZ30, 266). 
66 See the introduction and the seventh lecture of his Nihon no Reiseika (1947, The Spiritualization of 
Japan, included in SDZ8). Suzuki was especially interested in the “RENUNCIATION OF WAR,” Article 
9: (1) Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever 
renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling 
international disputes. (2) In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air 
forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will 
not be recognized. The same sort of pacifism is declared in the preamble, too. These fit with Pala’s 
renunciation of the war and army. Suzuki wrote several essays on war and peace, which are mostly 
gathered in volume 33 of Suzuki Daisetsu Zenshu. For a detailed analysis of Suzuki’s attitude towards 
war, see Kemmyō Taira Satō, “D. T. Suzuki and the Question of War” (2008). 
67 Like the two founders of modern Pala and Huxley, Suzuki, discussing what post-war Japan should be 
like, argued for the Buddhist ethical control over science technology and other aspects of American 
culture (see his Nihon no Reiseika, especially the seventh lecture). On the other hand, Suzuki was 
sceptical that drugs, such as LSD, can provide a similar result to that of Zen (see e.g., Daisetsu Tsurezure 
Gusa, SDZ20, 337; letter to Yandell, 30 September 1959, SDZ39, 171). 
68 In Antic Hay (1923) too, the old gentleman who happened to be in the same train talks to Gumbril in a 
similar way: “What disgusts me is the people inside the architecture, the number of them, sir. And the way 
they breed. Like maggots, sir, like maggots. Millions of them, creeping about the face of the country, 
spreading blight and dirt wherever they go; ruining everything” (219). 
69 As well as “Richard Greenow,” Huxley in Island returns to another of his early pieces, the poem “Soles 
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Occidere et Redire Possunt.” Catullus’s original lines are cited in Island with Huxley’s comments: 
“Sunsets and death; death and therefore kisses: kisses and consequently birth and then death for yet 
another generation of sunset-watchers” (238-39). Here, we cannot help imagining that Huxley had his 
coming death in mind, dedicating this novel to “another generation.” 
70 Huxley also became acquainted with Timothy Francis Leary, the psychologist who, unlike Huxley, 
argued for almost unrestrained use of LSD and who later became influential in the counter-culture of the 
Sixties and the Seventies (see Huxley’s letter to Leary, 20 July 1963, Smith 955; see also Sawyer AH, 
174-78). 
71 In Brave New World Revisited, Huxley presents a relevant vision: “societies are composed of 
individuals and are good only in so far as they help individuals to realize their potentialities and to lead a 
happy and creative life” (AHCEVI, 233). 
72 Dunaway states that “Ape and Essence is an unrecognized predecessor of science fiction films on the 
environmental destruction of Los Angeles and human devolution” and mentions as such examples Planet 
of the Apes (1968), Them! (1954), Blade Runner (1982) and The Omega Man (1971) (HH, 222-23). 
73 In The Making of a Counter Culture: Reflections on the Technocratic Society and Its Youthful 
Opposition (1969), Theodore Roszak remarks that Island is “cluttered with brilliant communitarian ideas 
and insights, and which [it] has had great influence among its young readers” (300). More recently, in 
Atomised (1998), Michel Houellebecq describes two brothers mentioning Island, as well as Brave New 
World, in their discussion of utopia: “Aldous would become a major influence on hippie culture. He had 
always been in favour of sexual liberation, and he was a pioneer in the use of psychedelic drugs. The 
founding members of Esalen met him and were very influenced by his ideas. Then the New Age came 
along and recycled all the ideas of Esalen. Aldous Huxley is probably one of the most influential thinkers 




                                                                                                                                          
74 Rpt. in The Jameson Reader (2000), ed. Michael Hardt and Kathi Weeks, Chapter 8. 
75 See e.g., Jameson, The Seeds of Time, 58-59. For a detailed account of Marxism and utopia, see e.g., 
Ruth Levitas, The Concept of Utopia (1990), Chapter 2; Jameson, “Introduction/Prospectus: To 
Reconsider the Relationship of Marxism to Utopian Thought” (1976), rpt. in JR, Chapter 20. 
76 Alice Reeve-Tucker and Nathan Waddell point out the “pluralism” of recent studies on utopia, which 
can be traced back to Bloch’s multi-modal philosophy of utopianism, functioning to counter a reductionist 
identification of utopianism with authoritarianism, fascism and totalitarianism. Reeve-Tucker and 
Waddell also see the twentieth century as “a century of utopianism” because of 1) the production of 
famous literary utopias, 2) re-theorization of utopianism by critics, and 3) (though problematically) the 
rise of authoritarian utopias advocated by Adolf Hitler, Pol Pot, Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong (2-5). 
77 “Utopia thus now better expresses our relationship to a genuinely political future than any current 
program of action, where we are for the moment only at the stage of massive protests and demonstrations, 
without any conception of how a globalized transformation might then proceed. But at this same time, 
Utopia also serves a vital political function today which goes well beyond mere ideological expression or 
replication. The formal flaw—how to articulate the Utopian break in such a way that it is transformed into 
a practical-political transition—now becomes a rhetorical and political strength—in that it forces us 
precisely to concentrate on the break itself: a meditation on the impossible, on the unrealizable in its own 
right” (Jameson AF, 232). 
78 Jameson continues: “The proof is that even the neo-conservative fundamentalisms of the day continue 
to promise eventual satisfaction in all these areas, in that rising tide of universal prosperity and 
development to which they claim to add the elusive thing called freedom, as well as the imaginary thing 
called modernity” (AF, 196-97). 
79 For the history of “totality” in Western culture, from ancient Greece to Hegel (including Plato, 
Aristoteles and Spinoza), see Martin Jay’s great book, Marxism and Totality: The Adventures of a 
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Concept from Lukács to Habermas (1984), Chapter 1. 
80 With regard to real evils, such as the violence of Communists, Fascists and Nazis, Huxley emphasizes 
the danger of abuse of the Hegelian word “historical”: “The appeal to history is one which the dictators 
find particularly convenient; for the assumption which underlies it is that, in Hegelian language, the real 
is the rational—that what happens is ultimately the same as what ought to happen”; “In consequence, 
those who have seized absolute power are prepared, as a rule, to make use of any means, however 
disgraceful, in order to retain it. Spying, delation, torture, arbitrary imprisonment, and execution—in 
every dictatorial country these are the ordinary instruments of domestic policy. They occur; they are 
therefore ‘historical.’ Being historical they are, in some tief, Hegelian way, reasonable and right” (EM, 
AHCEIV, 194). In terms of the nature of history, Peter Edgerly Firchow reveals some points in which 
Huxley’s thought is similar, and perhaps superior to, that of Herbert Marcuse and Francis Fukuyama—the 
Hegelians of the left and the right (see Modern Utopian Fictions from H. G. Wells to Iris Murdoch [2007], 
Chapter 3). 
81 For the outline of Marxism, totality and poststructuralism in this section, see Best 333-38; Homer 152-
54. 
82 For instance, the poststructuralist Michele Foucault argues: “We readily believe that the least we can 
expect of experiences, actions, and strategies is that they take into account the ‘whole of society.’ [. . .] 
But I believe that this is asking a great deal, that it means imposing impossible conditions on our actions 
because this notion functions in a manner that prohibits the actualization, success, and perpetuation of 
these projects. The ‘whole of society’ is precisely that which should not be considered except as 
something to be destroyed” (Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews 
[1977], 233). 
83 In The Archaeology of Knowledge (1969), Foucault employs the notion of discontinuity to deconstruct 
historical forms of totality, such as “epoch” and “history.” In Anti-Oedipus (1972), considering the 
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Oedipus complex to be socially constructed (not primitively possessed, as Freud argues), Gilles Deleuze 
and Félix Guattari level severe criticism at the conventional understanding of desire in psychoanalysis, 
instead seeking radical potential in the politics of desire. 
84 Although he “acknowledges all of these [poststructuralist] reasons why the discourse of totality is now 
so much in disfavor,” Jay paradoxically advocates maintaining the notion of totality in order to address 
current global issues: “The search for a viable concept of totality [. . .] should not therefore be written off 
as no more than a benighted exercise in nostalgia for a past plenitude or the ideology of intellectuals bent 
on legitimating their domination of the rest of mankind. For if the human race is to avoid the negative 
totality of nuclear catastrophe, we may well need to find some positive alternative”; “If the Western 
Marxist discourse on totality can be said, Habermas aside, to have undergone such a decline, is it too 
much to hope that amidst the debris there lurks, silent but still potent, the germ of a truly defensible 
concept of totality—and even more important, the potential for a liberating totalization that will not turn 
into its opposite” (536-37). This conclusion is interesting because Jay associates totality with utopia (an 
alternative world) and even appears to suggest these two concepts support each other—in the same way 
as Jameson, to whom Jay, however, does not pay much attention. 
85 Another philosopher who views positively the notion of totality is Jürgen Habermas, who influenced 
Jameson. Habermas daringly attempts to reconstruct Marxist holism in a non-Marxist way, that is, by 
“drawing on a wide variety of non-Marxist sources” (such as Max Weber) while “[s]purning a class-
specific concept of reification, calling once again into question Marx’s value theory, explicitly rejecting 
the philosophy of history that was still potent in the Frankfurt School” (Jay 504). 
86 For this paragraph, see Best 339-351. If Jameson’s thought above is historicized, the impact of 
particularly three Marxist critics can be revealed: 1) Louis Althusser, who advocates a “structural 
totality”—the “decentered whole” governed by overdetermination and comprised of multiple, 
autonomous, complexly interrelating levels; 2) György Lukács, who develops the concept of “mediation,” 
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which is useful for grasping interconnections among social levels; 3) Jean-Paul Sartre, who proposes a 
syncretic theory which mediates objectivist accounts of Marxism and subjectivistic accounts of 
existentialism and psychoanalysis (see Best 345-51). 
87 “[T]he thinking of totality—the urgent feeling of the presence all around us of some overarching 
system that we can at least name—has the palpable benefit of forcing us to conceive of at least the 
possibility of other alternate systems, something we can now identify as our old friend Utopian thinking” 
(ST, 70). 
88 “Totality is then precisely this combination of closure and system, in the name of autonomy and self-
sufficiency and which is ultimately the source of that otherness or radical, even alien, difference [. . .]. Yet 
it is precisely this category of totality that presides over the forms of Utopian realization: the Utopian city, 
the Utopian revolution, the Utopian commune or village, and of course the Utopian text itself” (AF, 5). 
89 Here, Jameson refers to Robert Nozick, Anarchy, the State and Utopia (New York, 1974), pp. 311-312; 
Yona Friedman, Utopies réalisables (Paris, 1975), p. 275. See Jameson AF, 217, 219. 
90 The antinomies mentioned here by Jameson are: “work and leisure, laws and behavior, uniformity and 
individual difference, sexuality and the family”; “the ascetic/abundant (indulgent), aesthetic/functional, 
scientific/primitivist, sensual/spiritual and religious/secular”; “egalitarian/inegalitarian (or elitist), 
‘open’/totalitarian, libertarian/coercive, democratic/undemocratic and optimistic (with regard to human 
nature)/pessimistic”; “industrialism versus anti-industrialism; private property versus common ownership; 
religion versus secularization; revolution versus gradualism; statism versus communitarianism; and 
democratic versus authoritarian organization” (AF, 145-46). As shown later, Huxley in Island also 
addresses some of these antinomies and deconstructs them. 
91 In fact, Huxley first wrote the chapters chronologically and later rearranged their order; for a detailed 
analysis of the structure of this novel, see S. Krishnamoorthy Aithal, “Huxley’s Eyeless in Gaza” (1984). 
92 In Ends and Means, Huxley states that, although science has begun to deepen an understanding of 
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“total experience,” the “masses” still believe that “the world is without meaning or value. But nobody 
likes living in such a world. To satisfy their hunger for meaning and value, they turn to such doctrines as 
Nationalism, Fascism, and revolutionary Communism” (AHCEIV, 366). Huxley goes on to confess to his 
previous subscription to “the philosophy of meaningless,” which was, for him and most of his 
contemporaries, “an instrument of liberation” from “a certain political and economic system” and “a 
certain system of morality” (369). He also adds: “I had motives [non-intellectual reasons] for not wanting 
the world to have a meaning” (366-67). This comment should remind us, as Dunaway points out, of 
Huxley’s own past sorrows: “any rational world would have had to account for his mother’s and Trev’s 
deaths and his own blinding” (HH, 48). 
93 Huxley’s view of descriptive totality can also be found in his works after Eyeless in Gaza, although he 
gradually began to emphasize spiritual rather than material aspects. See e.g., Propter’s analysis of the 
world as being composed of not only the levels of humanity and of animality but also “the level of 
eternity,” which we cannot reach in reality but which exists above individual differences (see AMS, Part 1, 
Chapter 9), and his view of history as a series of incidents that may appear pointless or irrelevant but 
actually happen in accordance with certain laws behind the reality (see 327-28). See also The Perennial 
Philosophy, Chapter 12, “Time and Eternity.” 
94 Before finally arriving at Pala, Andrew travelled in many places as a naturalist and worked for a 
hospital in Madras in South India. One characteristic of Pala is the coexistence of people with animals, 
which may be traced back to his life in northern New Guinea (189). Here, we see Andrew’s, or the 
author’s, hope of making use of the wisdom of non-Western cultures. Ideologically, this is in a sense 
reconciliation between the rulers and the ruled of Western imperialism, which is symbolized by the 
British doctor and the Old Raja, who is deeply influenced by Indian thought. The culturally hybrid 
attitude appears in how languages are employed in Pala. For example, introducing English into some 
academic contexts never prevents the maintenance of the native language there. The Palanese have 
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developed their hybrid culture not by rejecting but by subverting Western culture, e.g., by rewriting Greek 
literature to reflect Palanese values. 
95 Other examples contain human and God (see 116), human and nature (see 189, 210-12), life and death 
(see 107, 166, 239), the body and the mind (see 75-79), the present and the past (see 189), time and 
eternity (see 166-67). 
96 In this respect, this utopia is different from the World State of Brave New World, where anything 
inconvenient, such as pain, is totally eradicated by the Controllers (see John’s discussion with Mond, 
Chapter 17). However, in Island, Huxley still appears to maintain dualistic thinking when he makes 
Palanese people practise the improvement of human quality, which must be based on the distinction 
between superior and inferior. 
97 This part might sound Lawrentian. Certainly, in Eyeless in Gaza, Anthony shows his dissatisfaction 
with Lawrence for his overemphasis on animal aspects of life (see 288-90), finally arriving at a 
multifarious philosophy of life. Yet this does not mean Huxley’s unequivocal refusal of Lawrence but that 
he supplements it in his own way by incorporating his encyclopaedic knowledge and his experience of 
pacifist activity. The presence of Lawrence in Huxley’s later thought can be confirmed by, for example, 
John Rivers’s view of life in The Genius and the Goddess (see 118-31) as well as some aspects of the 
Palanese life, cited above. For a literary analysis of Huxley’s views of Lawrence, including his 
misunderstanding of Lawrence, see e.g., Meckier, Aldous Huxley: Satire and Structure, Chapter 4. 
98 Island is a text in which three different genres of utopia, Bildungsroman and autobiography are 
inseparably combined. It can thus be read as a response to a criticism of the utopian text as that in which 
an individual perspective tends to be lost (see e.g., Jameson ST, 55-56). It can also be remarked that 
Huxley actively takes advantage of the traverse nature of utopian text, which has traditionally been 
formed by connecting exiting genres (see Jameson AF, 35). An example of “neutralization” can especially 
be found in Huxley’s combination of two genres of autobiography and utopia, in which the real/factual 
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autobiography paradoxically coexists with the possible/imaginary story without killing each other. 
99 In Utopia (1516), Thomas More argues for pacifism in the first volume, and the inhabitants of Utopia 
are described in the second volume as pacifists; but this country has colonies abroad and even appears to 
be attempting an imperial enlargement (see Vol. 2, “Social Relations,” “Slavery” and “Military Affairs”), 
as if to foretell the appearance of the British Empire thereafter. 
100 Although both Jameson and Huxley see history as a meaningful process towards emancipation, 
Jameson has in mind a descriptive totality based on the Marxist preference for economy, whereas Huxley 
is not particular about the notion of class struggle. Regarding normative totality (or utopia), the 
comparison between these two utopians is more interesting. As I have argued, Huxley’s 1962 utopia is 
characterized by the ecological, the religious and the culturally hybrid. In contrast, Jameson appears to be 
cautious of the popularity of ecology in postmodernism, pointing out the essentialist danger of “nature” 
(see ST, 45-52). Despite his definite interest in religious elements, such as magic in science fiction (see 
AF, Chapters 5 and 6), Jameson overlooks the potential of religions or mysticism (for a detailed 
discussion on Jameson’s ambiguous view of religions, see Roland Boer, “Religion and Utopia in Fredric 
Jameson” [2008]). Culturally, Jameson may have a tendency to be somewhat Eurocentric. It is not just 
that his interest basically centres on American and European writing, but that his view of the Third World 
(see e.g., “Third-World Literature in the Era of Multinational Capitalism” [1986], rpt. in JR, Chapter 18) 
appears relatively simplistic and exclusive, which has been indicated by several postcolonial critics. For 
an overview of postcolonial critique of Jameson, see Avram Alpert, “We are Cannibals, All: Fredric 
Jameson on Colonialism and Experience” (2010). 
101 “Though respectfully received,” Island was “perhaps in any case too early to contribute in a serious 
way to the ecological culture, which developed only towards the end of the decade” (Kumar 409; see also 
Houellebecq 189-90). For a detailed analysis of Island as an ecological utopia, see e.g., Marius de Geus, 
Ecological Utopias: Envisioning the Sustainable Society (1999), Chapter 9. 
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102 The idea of “critical utopia” was originally proposed by Tom Moylan (Demand the Impossible: 
Science Fiction and the Utopian Imagination [1987]), but it seems that this notion has been recently 
employed in a wider or more general sense (see e.g., Barnhill 214-15). Because of the differences of 
views regarding several points of Island, including its narrative and ending, opinions are divided about 
whether to count this novel as an example of the critical utopia (see Moylan 216-22). Meanwhile, in order 
for us to think about the problematic ending of Island, Jameson’s mention of the failure of utopias is 
worth taking into account: “at best Utopia can serve the negative purpose of making us more aware of our 
mental and ideological imprisonment”; “therefore the best Utopias are those that fail the most 






Although previous studies on Aldous Huxley have tended to discuss the issue of 
identity, particularly the self, in the contexts of philosophy and literature, my research 
has so far demonstrated that throughout his career Huxley pursued the theme of identity 
in various ways, struggling with numerous facets of the political and cultural climate of 
his time. 
Immediately after the Great War, Huxley embarked on his debut piece of fiction, 
“Farcical History of Richard Greenow,” in which he already drew close attention to the 
divided nature of the self, perceiving human aggression more pessimistically and 
complicatedly than most of his contemporaries. It can be argued that this novella 
synchronizes with or anticipates some varieties of psychoanalysis, especially Sigmund 
Freud’s, Melanie Klein’s and more recent critics’ discourses on human destructiveness, 
which potentially or actually deconstruct the generally assumed opposition between the 
rational/the cultural and the instinctive/the violent. Huxley’s prescient insight could be 
partly traced back to his exceptional or lonely position during the war due to his failure 
to join the army, as well as his discovery of something like the destructive instinct in 
human mentality, including his own. Although he was certainly aware of the unclear, 
unstable relationship between the self and the other, Huxley at this point did not try to 
bridge the gap between himself and different types of others. 
His wartime solitude in terms of gender, as well as the childhood loss of his 
mother, may have allowed Huxley to stand a certain distance from the ideology of 
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womanhood. Inspired by his relationships with Maria Huxley, Naomi Mitchison and 
Nancy Cunard, who did not necessarily conform to the traditional ways of women’s life, 
Huxley in Point Counter Point portrayed Marjorie and Elinor, less maternal women 
who undergo the division of identity with regard to motherhood, as well as Lucy, a less 
feminine woman who performatively lives in a masculine way without caring about the 
femme fatale label. Beyond the contemporary debate over reproduction, his descriptions 
of these women can be compared with recent discussions of gender which have resisted 
the essentialist notions of the maternal and the feminine. 
A similar and less-known radical side of Huxley can be seen in Brave New World, 
especially its representation of savages. While relying on anthropology, Huxley 
envisages, with his “contrapuntal imagination,” the future of American Indian society 
more freely than anthropologists, showing his acute awareness of the violent and 
paradoxical natures of imperialism. Huxley could have modelled the savage hero with a 
complex, hybrid identity upon himself and Ishi—the real ‘savage’ with an ambiguous 
identity, with whom the author would have secretly empathized. Huxley’s scepticism is 
directed towards not only the imperialism and anthropology of his time but also the 
conventional markers behind them, such as race, nation, the civilized/the savage and the 
modern/the primitive. The tale contains some elements that are insightful and thought-
provoking in respect of postcolonial concerns. This was the first time that Huxley 
imagined the future and destiny of non-Western Others, and it may have triggered his 
ideological and emotional shift from his racist and Eurocentric stance to a more tolerant 
attitude towards Others, including his pacifism and deep interest in Eastern cultures. 
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Through visiting mining villages and camps for unemployed people, organizing a 
pacifist campaign, writing screenplays for Hollywood, and deepening his interest in 
religions and drugs, the later Huxley gradually wished more earnestly for ties with the 
masses, whom he had previously despised. He also began to visualize a utopia where 
ordinary people live happily, developing each of the human potentialities, unlike any of 
the existing socialist or capitalist countries. Due to the difficulty in making a utopia 
compatible with liberty, it was not until his last novel, Island, that Huxley could 
fictionalize his own utopian program in detail. His struggles with utopia can be 
compared with the Marxist Fredric Jameson’s arguments on utopia and totality, but in a 
sense Huxley’s utopia may be beyond them, because of its attempt to neutralize all sorts 
of antinomies, its ecological vision and its culturally hybrid or syncretic nature. 
A recapitulation like this convinces us that Huxley’s literary oeuvre, from 
“Richard Greenow” to Island, constitutes a story of his own wanderings through the 
issue of identity. From his younger days Huxley expressed scepticism about the notion 
of identity but paradoxically, in doing so, he was consistently searching for a certain 
type of identity. Through writing his series of fictional works, Huxley used his 
imagination and sensitivity to question or deconstruct the conventional forms of 
identity, such as the psychological self, gender, race and class, and to satirize or criticize 
the cultural and political ideology associated with these concepts. In the end, 
scientifically, religiously and experientially, Huxley came to assume a certain “unity” 
behind all fragments of the world and history, and to argue that anyone can freely and 
equally gain a non-exclusive and non-fixed form of identity by positioning themselves 
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within this open and changing order of unity. The pilgrimage to this utopian vision was 
also his long journey in search of ties with others, which could be partly traced back to 
his unrewarded wishes to restore severed friendships with enlisted (and dead) friends. 
Huxley, who had started writing fiction with his contempt for others—as reflected in 
“Richard Greenow”—now closed his career with his hopes for others—as suggested by 
the ending of Island, where he left the destiny of his utopia in the hands of readers. 
Theoretically, we can acknowledge that Huxley’s way of addressing the issue of 
identity transcended his time and may now appear postmodernist or even beyond. 
Huxley anticipated not only the positive effects of the deconstructive view of identity, 
e.g., emancipation and respect for diversity, but also the downsides, such as the danger 
of depriving people of meanings of or reasons for their life, which could be followed by 
some people seeking salvation in extreme versions of traditional patterns of identity 
(e.g., exclusive nationalism) and others spending their lives in vain without any purpose 
or value. An example of the latter case was the author himself in his youth. The hero of 
his final novel, Will, is a “schizoid” intellectual who sees everything with fragmentary 
images, just as Huxley did. However, having seen a utopian unity in a moment, Will 
tries to start his new and meaningful life, which is no longer only his but involves 
others, too. In fact, postmodern ways of welcoming and appraisals of fragmentary, 
disconnected and empty images of identity (a typical example is Deleuze and Guattari’s 
eulogy of the schizophrenic in a political sense) have been not only questioned for the 
limits of their political effectiveness but also rejected for their lack of recognition of the 
actual situation of schizophrenic people suffering and fighting such fragmentation, 
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disconnection and emptiness (see e.g., James M. Glass’s Shattered Selves: Multiple 
Personalities in a Postmodern World [1993], a critique of postmodernism grounded on 
the narratives of women with multiple personality disorder).1 There are also some critics 
among postmodernists (or those influenced by postmodernism) who have themselves 
been searching for a means of coping with the ‘identity crisis.’ As Chapter IV indicated, 
Jameson, while having been inspired by postmodernism, proposes a meaningful life, 
based on the un-reductionist and open form of totality, where differences are not erased 
but rather paradoxically enhance each other. Furthermore, Edward W. Said is not 
entirely satisfied with his advocacy of a contrapuntal reading of histories, and 
paradoxically expresses his hope for an “impossible union” of the history of the 
humanity (CI, 339-40), by which he is exploring the possibility of life with another 
form of identity not involved in identity politics. Here again, Huxley’s apparently 
strange proposal of a new sort of identity, which rests on the paradoxical basis of the 
impossible (thus utopian) demand for “unity,” may look far ahead into the future. 
It is worth noting that these understandings can surface through a close reading, 
which, according to Peter Edgerly Firchow, has often been assumed by academics to be 
unsuitable for Huxley’s text. In fact, my intensive analysis of his literature has proved 
the extraordinary characteristics of Huxley as a novelist (rather than an essayist) who 
has not only intelligence but powers of imagination, empathy and expression.2 
My research also has some suggestions towards literary studies with little interest 
in Huxley. If the critics have belittled Huxley despite the above facets of his literature, 
especially its suitability for close reading and theoretical discussion, would it not imply 
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that they may have been ridden by prejudices, including the image of Huxley as a 
conservative elitist, partly because of his “identity” in the traditional sense of this word? 
The unpopularity of Huxley, then, could be attributed to the ‘conservatism’ of literary 
scholars, rather than their radicalism as indicated by Firchow. Of course, this situation is 
also ascribed to Huxley himself, who in principle maintained a distance from the radical 
ideology of politics and culture, sometimes due to his misunderstanding of it, which has 
resulted in a vicious circle, arousing theorists’ misunderstandings of him, instead of 
penetrating into the radicalism hidden under the surface of his text. But were such 
images of Huxley—part of the reason for his unpopularity—not formed, copied and 
even spread by Huxley researchers themselves? If so, this might mean that, without 
being aware of it, they have so far limited the potential of Huxley and his literature, 
which are worth interpreting more freely, diversely and paradoxically. 
In 1916, exactly a hundred years ago, Aldous Huxley took an undergraduate 
degree in English literature but gave up the idea of entering academia because Oxford 
could not afford to hire a new lecturer during wartime. In “Literature and Examinations” 
in The Olive Tree (1936), Huxley, as if to avenge this misfortune, mercilessly declared 
that “[v]ery many of the scores of theses produced each year in the various universities 
of the world are totally pointless.” At the same time, he also confessed his “extremely 
mixed” feelings when he received letters from students who were writing about him, 
and mercifully showed some sympathy for them: “The candidate for academic honours 
has no choice but to study the insignificant aspects of a good writer’s work or else the 
work, not yet explored, because universally deemed not worth exploring, of a bad 
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writer” (AHCEIV, 59). Even though it is not for me to judge whether my thesis is 
pointless or not, I optimistically believe that I have studied the significant aspects of a 
good writer’s work. 
                                                
1 As a possible answer to how we characterize the general connections between postmodernism and 
identity, Anthony Elliott proposes: “[we] must be careful to avoid a naive celebration of the multiplicity 
of selves, fragmented identities, narcissistic personality disorders and schizophrenia as possible subjective 
sources for alternative social arrangements” (148). 
2 It is interesting and probably significant that Huxley could effectively delve into the issue of identity in 
his fiction rather than his non-fiction. Compared with most non-fiction, the writing of fiction, which 
usually involves the process of pretending to be other people, is itself an act of consciously causing an 
‘identity crisis’ within authors, in that it necessarily shakes their subjectivity, subverting the rigid 
distinction between the self and the other. By way of example, as Chapter III argued, his characterization 
of the Savage in Brave New World gave Huxley an opportunity to reconsider his own identity in terms of 
race, nation and culture. In addition to deepening his insight into the issue of identity, Huxley, through 
writing fiction, developed and reconstructed his own identity, and this point may be more or less applied 
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